No. 48

SURVEY

A JOURNAL of SOVIET and EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

THE CULTURAL FRONT

SOCIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCENE

Walter Laqueur
Anti-Komintern

Miklos Veto
Kremlin and Vatican

Melvin Croan
The Dialectics of Polycentrism

JULY 1963

FIVE SHILLINGS

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SURVEY

A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies

No. 48 **July 1963**

Editor: Walter Z. Laqueur **Associate Editor: Leo Labedz**

The Cultural Front

Introduction 3
Pictures from an Exhibition ..... *R. Etiemble* 5
From Amis to Waugh ..... *Ronald Hingley* 19
Music ..... *Fred. K. Prieberg* 30
Repercussions in East Germany ..... *Heinz Kersten* 36
Recent Hungarian Writing ..... *George Gömöri* 47
Document: Literaturnaya Gazeta ..... *R. Samarin* 52

Sociology and the Social Scene

Sociology as a Vocation ..... *Leopold Labedz* 57
Sovkhoz Kuban ..... *Allen Ballard* 66
Soviet Medical Institutions ..... *Mark G. Field* 79
The Soviet School Today ..... *Frederic Lilge* 92
Marriage and Divorce ..... *Peter Juviler* 104
Opinion Polls ..... *Emilia Wilder* 118

The Dialectics of Polycentrism ..... *Melvin Croan* 130
Anti-Komintern ..... *Walter Laqueur* 145
Kremlin and Vatican ..... *Miklos Vetö* 163

Views and Reviews:
Darkness at Noon revisited—The Warsaw Rising—The Kurdish Republic—Yugoslavia—Hungary 1956 173

Our Contributors 78

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Encounter

EDITED BY STEPHEN SPENDER AND MELVIN J. LASKY

NEW VOICES IN RUSSIAN WRITING

We still have a few copies of the April issue of ENCOUNTER, containing this highly successful anthology of stories and poems by contemporary Russian writers. The introductory essay by Patricia Blake has aroused a great deal of interest. The translators include W. H. Auden, Manya Harari, Richard Wilbur, Max Hayward, Stanley Kurnitz, Ronald Hingley and Robert Conquest.

4*s.* (75 *cents*) *a copy. Postage* 6*d.*

KHRUSHCHEV ON CULTURE

This ENCOUNTER pamphlet contains the full text of Khrushchev's speech in Moscow on March 8th, 1963. It also includes some valuable notes on Ehrenburg, Evtushenko, Sholokhov, Painting, Jazz, Cinema, Composers, etc., and several pages of press comment on the speech and its aftermath.

3*s.* 6*d.* (50 *cents.*) *Postage* 4*d.*

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INTRODUCTION

'HEGEL remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add, the first time as a tragedy, the second as a farce.' The Zhdanov era was a tragedy; for outside observers the neo-Zhdanovite campaign that started last December has its ridiculous aspects, but it is no joke for those directly affected. The furthest limit of destalinisation was reached in the early months of the winter, with the publication of *Ivan Denisovich*, *Stalin's Heirs*, and other such works; the painters' exhibition at the Manège in December marked the turning point. One faction in the Soviet leadership had followed what it regarded as pernicious revelations about their own and Russia's recent past with the greatest misgivings, and it is almost needless to add that they looked with the greatest disfavour at the way things were developing. As a police chief of Berlin said at the turn of the century, with disarming simplicity, when asked why he had banned an avant-garde play—*Die janze Richtung passt mir nicht*; those Soviet leaders too could truly say, 'we do not like the whole trend'. At the time of the Manège exhibition the advocates of a hard line gained the support of those who until then had been willing to tolerate, within limits, something in the nature of a second thaw.

A great number of factors and considerations seem to have been in play here; Mr Khrushchev's need to mend his ideological fences, in view of pressure from the 'dogmatists' inside the party and inside the camp; the inability of the generation of political leaders who made their career under Stalin to jump over their own shadows; the clash between the old and the young generations in literature and the arts; resentment on the part of provincial backwoodsmen against the metropolitan city slickers; traditional anti-Westernism, which very much antedates the October revolution; a suspicion of the intelligentsia that likewise goes far back; philistinism versus the avant-garde. These undoubtedly played a part; yet what was basically at stake was not of course abstract art or serial music but cultural freedom, or, to be precise, that minimum of freedom from guidance and control without which there can be no genuine creative process, no real work of art.

The milestones marking the retreat so far have been the Manège exhibition, Khrushchev's speech of 8 March 1963, and the current meeting of the central committee, devoted to detailed discussion of the state of Soviet culture and the need to enforce stricter supervision.[1] In addition writers, painters, and film makers have had their national conferences and there have been many regional meetings. The campaign

[1] A fuller discussion of the Russian 'New Wave' was provided in *Survey* No. 46 ('New Wave in Russia?'); the text of Mr Khrushchev's speech of 8 March 1963, with comments by a group of *Survey* contributors, was published in May as a special *Encounter* pamphlet (*Khrushchev on Culture*) price 3s. 6d., and can be obtained through the trade or by writing to the editors.

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is still in full swing. The following articles are an attempt to provide some interim reports; coming numbers of *Survey* will deal in greater detail and wider perspective with the year of the great leap backwards.

It is significant and perhaps slightly encouraging that the Soviet campaign has had varied repercussions within the communist camp. Nor, apparently, is there complete unanimity among the key figures in the field of cultural policy in Moscow, which explains the signs of indecision, and the contradictory statements recently made. For small parties, such as the British, that have few intellectuals left in their ranks, it was easiest to fall in line. But if in the French party there was little enthusiasm, the Italian comrades were openly critical, and even such minor groups as the Austrians and Norwegians dissociated themselves from the attacks on modern art. Within Eastern Europe, Hungary has followed a comparatively independent line; true, Kadar took great pains to stress that the current thaw was not really a thaw and that it had nothing to do with a more 'liberal' attitude. All the same, Hungary did follow a more liberal line. Some of the details are given on later pages of this issue; meanwhile Istvan Szirmai, a Hungarian Politburo member, has added his voice to Khrushchev's strictures on 'ideological coexistence' and called for an 'ideological offensive'. Nevertheless, Hungary seems to be taking a fairly broad-minded view and the present policy of giving room to 'all well-intentioned writings' (Kadar dixit) will not be discontinued if the Hungarian leaders can help it.

At the other end of the scale is East Germany, where even many Soviet books and works of art are now considered subversive and have been banned. As Mr Ulbricht put it: 'Certain works of this kind may be effective in relation to the Soviet internal situation, but there is absolutely no reason for us to publish them.' A brief account of recent developments in the GDR is given elsewhere in this issue. From Czechoslovakia come many reports of a growing literary ferment, and, while the 'bourgeois liberal deviation' in other East European countries was reflected in an interest in Kafka and Camus, the Rumanians have been busy translating Françoise Sagan (*Aimez-vous Brahms*?) and Lawrence Durrell. *Scinteia* has now firmly told those who did not know it that Durrell is not a realist-progressive writer. In Poland there seems to have been no radical change in the cultural policy of the government, which these days is probably the best one can hope for.

W. Z. L.

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PICTURES FROM AN EXHIBITION

R. Etiemble

(Professor Etiemble, of the Sorbonne, is no stranger to the readers of SURVEY (The Sorbonne in Paris, Survey, *No. 30).*

One of the world's leading authorities in comparative literature, he has lectured in Moscow and Peking in recent years; his account of the famous Manège exhibition last December is the most detailed and, we think, the most interesting account written so far, though we do not necessarily accept all of Professor Etiemble's explanations, such as the assumption that Mr. K. was dragged into the whole controversy by the 'diehards' headed by Academician Serov. It now seems that the abstract painters exhibition was merely the last drop which made the barrel overflow. Professor Etiemble's article was originally published in France-Observateur, *and has been slightly abridged; the sections deleted deal with subjects dealt with elsewhere in SURVEY (such as the publication of 'Ivan Denisovich'). Professor Etiemble's articles provoked a violent retort from* Literaturnaya Gazeta, *written by Dm. Moldavsky, a reply in* France-Observateur, *a letter from Professor Etiemble to the editors of* Literaturnaya Gazeta *(he is a member of the France–USSR Friendship society), and lastly a long statement by the editors of* Literaturnaya Gazeta. *This polemic, for all we know, may go on for some time; of considerably greater interest is the Professor's original report on the exhibition, which follows below.)*

Russia's Belle Epoque

WHEN I HAD VISITED the Old Riding School on Friday, 30 November, I hadn't had to wait around. True, there was quite a crowd; about three thousand people a day; but at any rate one could move. I was assailed and almost overwhelmed by work of the *Belle Epoque, belle*, that is, only in the sense that it deserved first prize for its academicism and conformity. This was the *Belle Epoque* in which Gerasimov made a fortune by turning out angelic Stalins and faithful Voroshilovs; when to be a genius you simply had to keep on good terms with the tyrant's police. The Personality only had to get a whiff of a real painter or sculptor and he was sent to 'sit', as they say over there, for five or ten years.

Gradually I managed to ignore this official painting, whose style was just about as petty-bourgeois as it could possibly be, though its content was supposed to be socialist (scenes of factories, kolkhozes, patriotic wars, straining muscles, outstretched arms, tired smiles, dialectical optimism), and to distinguish one or two works which made one cry out, 'At last! Here's someone who's heard of Bonnard, or Braque, or Picasso, or Matisse.' Between two buildings, hallucinatory in their tragic

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reality, a child with a ball, bewilderingly poetic, even made one think of Chirico. Ehrenburg had been right then, when he whispered the good news, that this exhibition at the Old Riding School was the end of the *Belle Epoque*; of their *Belle Epoque* (for France had her own, and when all is said and done it wasn't much better than theirs).

This was the exhibition I had been hoping for since 1957; since Deineke's retrospective exhibition which had been shown me discreetly on my return from China. This was the exhibition I had been hoping for since the ones I had visited in 1958 when I was teaching at Moscow University. This was it. This time they had made it. A man could paint in the Soviet Union; he could even exhibit a good painting. The Old Riding School was moving in the right direction.

I came out dazed, my head stuffed with names, some of which were completely new to me, with wonderful pictures and wild hopes. Elkonin's *Baltic*, for instance, and his *Bottles*, and, most important of all, the two *Sturgeon* in a basket, which would have done credit to any artist in Europe or China. D. P. Sterenberg was another. The portrait of an old man on a blue background, which he painted in 1934, when Stalin was already pushing Stalinisation to its limits, anticipated the work of a younger painter which makes a felicitous companion to it; his *Maternity*, dated 1962, is an effective pattern of curves, subtly stylised and disguised, standing out on a smooth wall; I went up to it and thought I could make out the name Birger. To me at any rate it was an unfamiliar name. This Birger was really rather good. But there was something better still: a perfect black table, laden with oranges, signed V. G. Weisberg. There were also some still-lifes and portraits by the same man.

So memorable was this black table that love of those three or four oranges filled me with optimism; I went into a restaurant, ordered a hundred grams of *stolichnaya* and some caviar in honour of Elkonin, and sat there daydreaming. . . .

Roma what was it? What the devil was the name of the painter of that *Night* (1947) and that *Spring* (1962)? Romashin, or Romadin? It doesn't matter anyway: only the work matters and blow the personality cult which corrupts the artist himself. Roma something-or-other, my friend, you are incredibly talented. I bet you have daydreams too and even real dreams like Chagall, the commissar of fine arts in Lenin's day.

A Hundred Grams of Vodka

WAITER, ANOTHER hundred grams of vodka.'

'That's out of the question. We can't serve more than a hundred grams to anyone.'

'Too bad, I'll go somewhere else.'

As I walked past a secondhand bookshop a Matisse in the window reminded me of Konchalovsky. Admittedly he was a bit of a slave to

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Matisse's influence, but how can one help being delighted that this octogenarian who died in disgrace at the beginning of the destalinisation occupies a generous slab of wall at the Old Riding School with a brilliant portrait of one of Stalin's own famous victims: Meyerhold? One has to admire a particular picture of 1946, with a good 'socialist' subject, which no longer strikes the eye just because of the subject, but because of the way certain yellows are related to certain reds and greens and blues.

There is the same skill in Tyshler's work; though he is sometimes restricted by, or at least confined to, subjects dictated by the genius of the Personality (*The Death of the Commander* was done in 1937), he manages to produce fine plastic effects. Anyway, what is wrong with the death of the commander if one acquires the right, or steals the right, to *paint* it, that is to create it?

Once Freedom, or at any rate freedom in some things, was restored, thanks to Khrushchev, Tyshler made full use of it in the *Tsiganes* of 1958, for instance, and those two portraits of women, dated 1961, where there is a slight touch of Rouault, discreet enough to be pleasing. I found some more Tyshler, again with keen pleasure, in the gallery of models, as a stage-design for Mayakovsky's Comic Opera.

Painting certainly makes one thirsty. I should no doubt be able to get another hundred grams of vodka. Manchurian décor, quite a pretty singer, in fact a hundred grams of vodka. The little bitch isn't bad looking either, and for two kopeks there's nothing socialist-realist about her. The Chinese décor reminds me of Kuznetsov whom I have recently got to know more intimately, thanks to the book by Romm which has recently been republished.[1] At this very moment they are showing at the Old Riding School his *Shepherds Resting* (1927) which has a good dose of Gauguin (in the action) and of Matisse (in the colours). On this canvas two horses are nuzzling in the background. In the *Motherhood* of 1932 the genius of the Personality is evident and horsepower takes the form of a tractor, on the viewer's left and to the right of the mother, which gives life to the background; but the painter has not changed his palette. As the *Still-life with Bananas* (1946) shows, he lost under Stalin very few of the qualities which give such magic—that's the only word for it—to *Evening on the Steppes* and *Mirage on the Steppes* (both of 1912). Aslamazian, too, as it happens, found his inspiration, his joy, in a few bananas, necklaces, pineapples, and Negro idols. And I had almost forgotten Mashkov (was this the effect of those two hundred grams of vodka?). Ivanovich Mashkov was there too, staunchly faithful to his plums, oranges, peaches, pineapples, pears, and mandarins, in spite of the fact that these fruits are scarce in Moscow. There is nothing realist, nothing socialist about him; but whether or not one considers him healthy,[2] this painting proves that Mashkov could paint still-lifes and paint them extremely well.

[1] A. G. Romm, *Pavel Bartolomeyevich Kuznetsov* (Moscow, 1960).
[2] Druzhinin praises him for his healthfulness in his recent book, *Ilya Ivanovich Mashkov* (Moscow, 1961).

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Let us see if two hundred grams of vodka will help me sum up: Elkonin, Sterenberg, Birger, Romadin, Konchalovsky, Tyshler, Kuznetsov, Aslamazian, Mashkov; that makes one, two, three, four, five, six, four, two—no; six, seven, eight, nine. That's not bad for one exhibition, and I've left someone out. I know there's someone I've left out. Why! of course, its Shiukin; but he died quite young, before Stalinism was in full swing. And Prorokov? No. I am not keen on Prorokov. He is too ornamental for my liking, too directly influenced by the German type of expressionism, a post card expressionism. . . . No, my friend, you are losing the thread, a poster-colour expressionism. What a mouthful! No, I've got hiccoughs. What about number eleven? I'll make it a dozen. Shish-kebab, my word. I'm imagining I'm in the *Baku*—Waiter, bring me an Arslan. There aren't any? Then bring me any kind of mineral water. But sshh! I've got to make up the dozen. I know; Matviev, no, Matveyev, Bourdelle's pupil; bother, they are going to quibble with my Russian transcriptions again. So what? That makes a dozen but don't let's be mean, damn it! I give thirteen to the dozen; niet, nichevo, nietvestny; no, that's not the name of the other great sculptor. Let me think; I know, it's Neizvestny. And the other one; Lebedeva, Sara Lebedeva. Fourteen or fifteen to the dozen! And there is Konenkov too, and his head of Paganini, a bit of an expressionist for a Zhdanov; but now I have started sticking tags on them and that's bad, very bad; that's a Stalinist way of carrying on and not a bit Leninist. Let's go outside and see if I have got them right. The air will clear my thoughts and put me back on the right road, the road to the real, the road to reality, to realism, and even, who knows, to socialist realism.

The Letter from the Front

BELIEVE IT OR NOT, I had hardly gone a hundred yards from the door when I came round with a start to find myself confronted with a piece of reality, which was hard to swallow. No, it's too funny for words. You can have the whole lot. I suddenly remembered that lousiest, scummiest bit of good, honest drivel, the masterpiece of the Old Riding School: *The Letter from the Front*. Oh, those fine families! those holy families! It's not you I hate, family; happy families like the ones in the American commercials on telly; sorry, I mean T.V. Families licked clean like a Bouguereau. What a runt this Laktionov is! Laktionov, the clean-licked runt. Isn't he handsome there on the left, that handsome soldier, badly wounded, but just badly enough, nicely wounded. Oh God, isn't war pretty with its games, its long hours of leisure, a handsome soldier who, if gaiters were still made and still worn wouldn't have a single button missing, and while they read in the sunshine—that goes without saying, the little father, tsar-otets Stalin, always made the sun shine so that his people would be happy—while they read the letter from the front to each other everyone sings of the joys of war; adults, children, and animals alike, each one trying to be more like Déroulède than the other.

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But I know exactly what it is, it's ex-act-ly like Brullov, or Briulov, the beautiful Madame Saltikova with her feet on a tiger skin and a peacock feather fly-swat in her hand; the same comic Ripolin enamel. That, ye gods, is what is meant by cultural inheritance. Laktionov, son of Briulov, Brullow, or Von Bülow, anyway son of the author of the last days of Poppeii, of Poppea; no of Pompeii! Laktionov, the traditionalist, son of all that is legitimate, traditional, and bourgeois.

Suddenly I was no longer drunk. Laktionov is something you cannot forgive. So I thought I could give seventeen or eighteen to the dozen did I? Was I seeing double? I swear that in future I will respect Khrushchev's advice and never exceed the stated dose of vodka, the Leninist dose; one hundred grams.

I joined the queue at the number 12 bus stop in Mayakovsky Square, to get back to the Sovetskaya, where I would be able to console myself for Laktionov with another hundred grams of vodka. Swine! You have just promised yourself not to exceed the Leninist dose again. Four kopeks? I haven't got them. Damn it all! It's worth wasting this fifteen kopek piece in the machine for the exhibition at the Old Riding School. An old woman asked me to get her ticket because it was so devilishly crowded. I looked at her; anyone could see that she was a bit tired; a bit bloated; she must have suffered a great deal under the stars, I mean under the tsars; I suddenly felt my heart tighten at her beauty; yes, under that badly cut coat what the poet sees is the misery of a woman, worn out with toiling, swollen with the fat of poverty, that is Falk, Falk's nude, that nude, terrible in its compassion, as beautiful as Grünewald's Christ; an uncompromising nude, a nude with sagging flesh, brown, grey, greenish, but of such power, and truly, of such beauty! Yes, without a doubt, that was the most impressive work in the exhibition.

I took off my gloves, and fumbled in my pocket for the bits of paper on which I had jotted down the chief points: 'Falk: nothing socialist-realist in the ordinary sense of the word. Completely *true*. Beautiful in the same way as one of Soutine's flayed oxen. If they accept that they will accept anything. They accepted it a month ago. They will accept anything then. From now on we will have to reckon with Soviet art.'

And what about Nudes?

TRUE TO THE WISE principles of Vladimir Ilyich, I went to bed that night at the Sovetskaya without having drunk my third dose of *Stolichnaya*. The next day I went back to my place in room one in the Lenin library and settled down to work, in surroundings of a comfort which would be inconceivable in Paris, on the Rimbaud myth in Russia and the Soviet Union. A few days later *L'Humanité* arrived by air-mail, and informed me to its own evident satisfaction, if not to mine, that 'during his visit to the Old Riding School Exhibition—2,000 canvases, drawings, and sculptures—Nikita Khrushchev praises art which offers an accurate representation of life. By our special correspondent, Max Leon . . .

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Pravda . . . emphasises the progress made by Deineke, Plastov, and Laktionov—What! Laktionov? That's impossible! Oh well!—accused by some people of being photographic—who could that be?—supported by others who like clarity of content and style. Nevertheless there are certain works which disappoint, and provoke serious objections. In some of Falk's paintings. . . .' Falk? Surely they must have got the wrong impression. Are 'formalist tendencies clearly visible' in Falk? Do his 'people take on monstrous shapes'?

Have the Soviet people never seen a naked woman? A real woman; not a Miss This or a Miss That; but a woman like one sees in bed, in maternity hospitals, or in a morgue. What about realism? That reality which is hard to accept? . . . Max Leon went on happily: 'Certain painters despise public opinion; but if a work can be understood only by its author, declares Khrushchev, if the people do not recognise it, it cannot be considered an authentic work of art.'

Half a dozen telephone calls, which I made immediately, confirmed the news: the Old Riding School was no longer moving in the right direction! Ehrenburg was not to be found.

Prompted by *L'Humanité*, I wanted to see the Moscow papers! I learned from them that Nikita Sergeyevich, with a number of important people from the worlds of politics and art, had in fact visited the exhibition at the Old Riding School and the one which a group of 'abstract painters' had discreetly put on. The outcome of that experiment was that Khrushchev had condemned the liberalism of the organisers who had allowed work of an intolerably poor standard to be shown at the Old Riding School, and the moral deviation of the 'informals', whom he had accused of producing painting which was 'alien to our people' and so bad anyway that one couldn't help wondering whether it had been 'done by a human hand or daubed by a donkey's tail'. These views took up the front page of *Pravda* and the front page of *Izvestia*; the evening papers and the literary periodicals toed the line with touching alacrity. The language was certainly sharp, and the rally to 'socialist realism' especially alarming for the numerous liberals, since, except for Deineke, he ended up by condemning not only Falk who had always been under threat, but all, or almost all, the good painters at the Old Riding School.

It seemed even more serious when the next day and for the following month there was a rush among the untalented and the disguised Stalinists to volunteer for service. On 3 December a cartoonist published a drawing, singularly lacking in life, of a creature with a donkey's head daubing at an 'informal' painting with his tail and holding a palette awkwardly behind his back in his paws. The caption was 'Artistic ecstasy'.

Shukaev, the man in question, simply indicated Khrushchev, who was copying—did he realise it?—the celebrated Boronali of our youth, which delighted many people who were in the know. The same day *Pravda* quoted the engineer, Petrov, who had just arrived from the Urals and

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gaped in astonishment at these works of which he could make neither head nor tail. The same day a bit of doggerel by Serge Vasiliev ended with this noble thought: 'The more senseless it is the richer you get.' Everywhere people were repeating, exaggerating and overstressing the importance of Nikita Sergeyevich's words. Curious, is it not?

No one here is surprised that in a socialist country the government should pronounce judgment on art. It is only natural that *Izvestia* of the 3rd should have returned to the attack; and, recalling that 'among the events which had a beneficial influence on the life of the Russian people' and also 'on our Russian art' it is important to consider the 'liquidation of the aftermath of the personality cult', should have recalled Lenin's teaching on art; especially as Lenin wrote a great deal on the subject and anyone, whatever his tastes, can be sure of finding in his work a quotation to support his views. Fortunately, *Izvestia* did not quarrel with Lenin's precept that an artist must have 'complete freedom to exercise his personal initiative, freedom of thought and imagination, of form and content'.

But what *is* surprising is that, in a country which, thanks to Nikita Sergeyevich and his supporters, is gradually restoring public and private rights to its citizens, there are men who long for the old tyranny. . . . In the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* of 5 December a man by the name of Joganson or Yohanson, who signs himself 'people's artist', declared that '*Falk and Sterenberg are alien to him*'. To show what he meant he asked us to admire S. Gerasimov's *Party at the Collective Farm*, a tripe farm no doubt. So what? He has every right not to like Falk and Tyshler.

Cautious Critics

BUT WHY WAIT until 5 December, why wait till Khrushchev had expressed his views? On the same day another paper congratulated Plastov, Deineke, and in particular Laktionov, the great Laktionov, 'who solves a problem in every picture' (a housing problem, a motoring problem, a refrigeration problem, as our journalists say), but came down heavily on Falk once again and on his accomplices: Drevin, Nikonov, etc. (which forced me to think that I didn't look at the exhibition properly, and should have been impressed by these painters, who are not on my list).

So you detest Vaznetsov? Independent thinker that you are, why didn't you say so on 20 November, or on the 29th, or even on the evening of the 30th? (I can only suppose that if Khrushchev had liked this spoil-sport you would still be silent on the subject.)

Whoever you are, Eugene Katzman, 'artist Emeritus' as you call yourself, and 'corresponding member' etc. who spat out all your venom on the second page of *Pravda* against this very Falk—I might have known it!—Tyshler, Kuznetsov, Sterenberg, and all the others whose names you happened to forget (that made the uncertainty harder for those 'others' to bear since it could include every single one of them), allow me to say that you wrote seventeen days too late for me to be taken in by what

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your Stalinist friends called your ' slippery viper's ' sting. Whoever you are, you kept your fine mouth shut and the cap screwed firmly on your pen until Nikita Sergeyevich had enlightened your infallible, your inflexible judgment.

How dare you quote Vladimir Ilyich as your authority? How dare you condemn ' the reactionary art of France and America '? Do you really expect that all art should serve the cause of ' *realist painters, who by their work help the Party to build communism* '? There you are goose-stepping with that regiment of missionaries in jackboots, singing a marching-song in honour of the ' lofty mission of art '. Loudmouthed and full of venom like any litle thug, you babble about ' the ideal '; you consider that your art is ' helping the people in their illustrious struggle for the ideal ', and you are afraid that other people's art ' is obstructing this illustrious struggle '. What a joke! Forgive me, you may be Zhdanov's ideal comrade but what you don't know, or if you do know you choose to ignore, is that Vladimir Ilyich who, happily for socialism, was not in the least like you, when he was in Switzerland one day stopped fascinated in front of a picture of a vase of flowers in a window: ' That is the kind of painting,' he said on this occasion, ' which expresses the happiness I want to bring to the people of Russia.' Yes, you may be Beria's ideal citizen, but it was a vase of flowers, of the roses which Lenin loved so much. Did you know that or didn't you? And, what is more, it was a flowerpiece which exemplified ' the reactionary art of France ': a bunch of flowers by Monet.

As long as Lenin could impose his spirit on the Party there was such a thing as Soviet art and you and your like, spokesmen of majority tastes, did not dominate opinion. That's where the shoe pinches, Master Ali Boron. All you can do is cast your Repin in our teeth. We are aware of this; but we are in a position to assure you that one day soon, one day when even your name will be forgotten, Falk's nude will represent for men of taste the final restoration of dignity to the painter, yes, and even to the Soviet woman. I will add to you, who are so delicately attuned to these tiresome anti-Jewish sentiments, that I do not care for the Katzmans, who, to save their own skins, raise a hue and cry against the Weisbergs and the Sterenbergs. We ' reactionaries ' are like that.

The Hyena's Snout

I HAVE AS MUCH and more to say to you, Mr. people's artist Vano Muradeli. You also made an insidious attack, in a whisper at first, then publicly, to appease your hatred of good musicians, and hypocritically beat your *mea culpa* on someone else's breast. If Muradeli is to be believed it wasn't only the painters that Nikita Sergeyevich had it in for. The musicians, too, would do well to embark on some serious self-criticism, since, ' unfortunately ' certain ' abstract tendencies ' were showing their hyena's snout (the hyena was my idea, but you must admit you

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wish you could still write in this style, the good old style of the good old days of the *Belle Epoque*).

Obviously, even if it had been written on 29 November, I could hardly have approved of an article which condemned A. Volkonsky, the most gifted of young Soviet composers and an excellent harpsichord player, whose special fault was that he had perfected his talent at the Paris Conservatoire before returning to his forsaken fatherland. ' Even though, apart from his Mirror Suite, none of his works has been played ', you piously fear that his ' anti-realist tendencies ' may ' accelerate the rhythm ' of the offensive against ' realist art.' But the fact that it was published on 17 December makes your deposition what it is: sneaking cowardice. It was on 16 November that my friend with the Beautiful Soul should have committed himself to ' the high ideological standard of music '. The 16 November; not 16 December.

In its issue of 4 January *Pravda* welcomes that little runt Laktionov in his best form to its pages. With intrepid courage he strikes a mortal blow at poor Falk and leaves him too dead to care; he strikes also at Sterenberg, who perhaps cares a little more. Falk made a big mistake, I agree. He had been on the left-wing since 1917, when Gerasimov, already his enemy, was flourishing in the Tsarist ranks; Gerasimov, who with the invaluable Briulov, or Brullow, was one of the spiritual fathers of Laktionov. Laktionov demands the good, firm, honest liquidation of all Muscovite painters who are not content to paint coloured photographs of petty-bourgeois foolery. More of a cop than the good, firm, honest Sénécal himself,[3] he demands the destruction of all his colleagues.

Well, my dear Sénécal, I bet you a thousand rubles that one day Falk will have a place, a place of honour, in the *Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, and you will have these four lines: ' *Laktionov, a reactionary painter with petty-bourgeois tendencies; by taking advantage of the personality cult he tried to conspire against the good painters of his day and even made a further attempt in 1963; his work consists of a few naïve paintings of the Patriotic War* '.

Mr Serov's Intrigues

ODDLY ENOUGH there was hardly any reference in the press to the man who was most involved in the Old Riding School intrigues. He's no fool, this man, who is the pet aversion of all thinking people in Moscow. I mean by this Mr. Serov (he already knew who I meant). Everyone knows, and everyone says that, having been beaten in the Moscow elections, and forced to take himself off to an obscure corner of the Urals, he swore he would have the blood of the insolent Muscovites. He is every bit as talented as Gerasimov and Laktionov and, as he did fairly well for himself in the happy days of the Personality, he is doing everything in his power to restore for his own ends the cult of that Personality.

[3] A character from Flaubert's *L'Education Sentimentale*.

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With this in view, he cunningly contrived the Old Riding School scandal, and induced the 'abstractionists' who were exhibiting their work privately to appear before the authorities. Taking advantage of the scandal, he had himself made president of the Academy of Fine Arts without any competition and there hopes to break the back of everyone who is any good as a painter or sculptor.

He has already done a great deal of harm. The people who are preparing the Kuznetsov exhibition now feel that they will have to postpone it; anyone who was hoping for a Falk exhibition must go on hoping. Because of this unrelenting Stalinist, poor Madame Falk no longer dares to go every day, as she did at first, and sit on her stool in front of her dead husband's paintings, enjoying the revenge which was his at last.

The worst insult that Serov paid the Soviet Union was to offer a really first-class excuse to those who loathe socialism. 'Didn't anyone tell you that as far as Stalin and Khrushchev are concerned it's six of one and half a dozen of the other! There is no place for art in a socialist country' (whereas, naturally, under Franco, Hitler or Salazar). . . .

But Serov still thinks he is living in the great days of Zhdanov. Or rather, he did think that; for in spite of the fact that he appointed himself president of the Academy, he has since received a letter from one of his colleagues (I think we understand each other) which made it quite clear just what people think of him. No doubt he will continue to air his views; the telly will peddle his Personality and what he uses for thoughts, but if he thinks he has won he is wrong.

He knows that as long as Khrushchev is alive he won't get away with his evil intentions. When he shamelessly suggested to Nikita Sergeyevich that the Old Riding School should be closed or the paintings of the corrupt artists taken down, he was disappointed. It was even decided to call a meeting of all those concerned: Stalinists, liberals, even the abstract painters. The discussion lasted for hours on 17 December and the question was argued hotly. Did they discuss Falk with Sterenberg and Tyshler during the *Belle Epoque*? It was out of the question. But on this occasion, Evtushenko, Ehrenburg and others spoke on behalf of the victims; the abstract painters defended themselves, and sometimes with considerable acidity (for instance, when Khrushchev asked someone how he managed to buy his materials he replied 'Why, naturally, like everyone else, I steal them! ').

The Old Riding School affair was entirely contrived by Serov and his followers, all of whom were Stalinists and equally worthless as painters. It caused the liberals, and still is causing them, much anxiety. This is understandable when we find the signature of Alexander Gerasimov, the most persistent persecutor of the talents which the *Belle Epoque* brought to light, reappearing in the *Pravda* of 12 January.

The incident could only have proved serious enough to satisfy the hopes of those who set the trap if it had been one of a series of moves to re-establish Stalinism. In fact everything remains unchanged in Soviet

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society, and the process of destalinisation is becoming more clearly defined and establishing itself. The First Secretary personally encouraged the publication of *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* and soon at least one other book will be appearing with his blessing which reveals the facts about Beria's prison camps.

Better still: if you consider intellectual life as a whole, almost everything shows signs of this evolution.* At the very moment when Serov appeared on the scene an audience of some twelve or fifteen hundred were congregating in Moscow for a recital of anti-Stalinist poetry. During my stay in Leningrad two plays, *The Shadow* and *The Dragon* were telling the little father of the people what they thought of him in no uncertain words. The Institute of World Literature is soon going to publish the complete works of Lunacharsky, and Mandelstam is being reprinted at last. I foresaw it in 1958 and said as much. This time it's definite: I was told by a friend of the poet, the one with whom he sought refuge from his pursuers for the last time, just before he disappeared. No one who has been able to compare, as I have, the typewritten thesis on Rimbaud which Balashov produced in 1944 with the study by the same scholar on the same poet in volume III of the *History of French Literature*, which is being published by the Academy of Sciences, could deny the progress that freedom has made. Who would have thought a few years ago that Albert Camus' *La Peste* would soon appear in an unabridged edition? A book by a renegade! The fact that I rejoice does not mean that I like the book. I said how little I thought of it when Camus was still alive, but I am glad the Russians are publishing it because for them it represents the lifting of a taboo.

The Progress of Freedom

HOW CAN WE WORRY too much about Katzman's nonsense about the 'reactionary painting of France and America' when we study the catalogue of recent translations? Within a few days the Soviet public bought out 50,000 copies of the *Roman Bourgeois*; at ten kopeks a volume half a million copies of Joseph Bédier's edition of *Tristan et Yseut* sowed the 'reactionary' myth of passionate love among the Russian people. There's no use looking for Boileau, who has just appeared over there translated into verse: the 50,000 copies of the edition vanished into thin air immediately and so did the 50,000 copies of Voltaire and the splendid catalogue of that 'reactionary's' library, with a preface by Alexeyev. At about the same time as Mr Postupalsky was doing his translation of Leconte de Lisle, Mr Antokolsky offered Soviet readers the first edition of Rimbaud which has ever appeared in Russian (it was Rimbaud whom Gorki, on the basis of M. René Doumic's judgment, condemned as 'decadent'). I even know someone who, for some time, has had ready for publication

* Professor Etiemble's article was written before Mr. Khrushchev's speech of 8 March 1963.—*Editor.*

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a collection of all Paul Valéry's poetry; he considers that the time is almost ripe. La Bruyère is soon to be translated and so is *Les Liaisons Dangereuses*. At any rate you can see the extent of the pernicious 'reactionary' influence of France.

How can we explain the Old Riding School affair and the fact that Nikita Sergeyevich fell into the snare set by the people whom he must know to be his worst enemies: the Stalinist painters? Does he really believe that abstract art is an ideological weapon of the West? He knows as well as I do, if not better, that American speculators entice young Moscow painters to daub so-called abstract paintings on their canvases, that they pay thousands of dollars for them and sell them at much higher prices in New York with the seductive label: 'Abstract art: direct from Moscow.' The First Secretary of the Party knows as well as I do, if not better, that some of these painters exceed the Leninist dose of vodka, the exact hundred grams, and idly dream away their time until the next thousand dollar order which will enable them to give up vodka for whisky. And then what? Leave them to it, the painters who drink that whisky will dash off a Christian-realist Mary Magdalene, a police-realist Beria tomorrow. No, abstract art is not an 'ideological weapon' of the depraved West. In Poland, a socialist country, they rival us with abstractions, tachisms, action painting, washes and other 'reactionary' techniques. You can see them at the museum in Lodz.

I will go further: to condemn abstract art as 'alien' is to revert to Stalinism. In that case it would be necessary to destroy all the Russian ikons: everyone knows the part played by Theophanes the Greek in the birth of this art. Michael Alpatov once explained very well all that this painting owes to classical Greece. In 1842 Ivanchin Pisarev wrote of the *Trinity* that it could have been attributed to Sante Croce or Perugini. Having studied a fifteenth-century Apocalypse which hung in the Kremlin and which until then had been neglected, Alpatov found all sorts of indications of Italian influence at this period. Just as a man who tried to live on nothing but his own fat would starve to death, so all art declines and dies if it attempts to live on itself. It is Marx who claims that all national art henceforth belongs to the whole human race, who should profit by it. A Marxist cannot, without contradicting himself, condemn the influence of foreign painting on Russian art.

But a Russian Marxist is still a Russian. When he boasts of his cultural inheritance, how could he forget Belinsky and Chernyshevsky and all those who a century ago maintained that the purpose of art was not beauty but edification. For abstract art will never glorify the wounded heroes of glorious wars and the ample-bosomed women of the kolkhoz.

The Weight of Russia's Past

IT IS THIS CULTURAL inheritance which explains the accusations of 'formalism' which the Stalinists made against the good artists. Read the study by Pierre Pascal of *Contemporary Russian Thought*, and

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you will see that there is a permanent temptation. Zhirmunsky, who was formerly suspected of 'formalism', is today, and how justly he deserves it, admired in France, the Soviet Union, and everywhere else as one of the greatest comparative scholars of this century. If he is a member of the Academy of Sciences, if he was applauded at the Budapest congress, how is it that what now seems acceptable in literature is still suspect in the plastic arts? It is not enough to say that for a Stalinst scribbler all beautiful painting is formalist, and all bad painting is socialist-realist (a purely verbal equation and therefore specious). For, while the Zhdanovites were cooking up the Old Riding School affair, the Hermitage was showing several Yugoslav painters, among them about ten canvases signed Ivan Gueneralich: for instance a pink horse grazing in the snow to the amazement of two peasants hiding behind a tree. His work has great charm, and is full of imaginary animals and fantastic forests, worthy of the 'douanier' Rousseau; and hence it is as unlike socialist-realism as possible. But all of it is attractive and much of it really beautiful. Formalist, and how! Coinciding as it did with Marshal Tito's visit, I agree that this piece of audacity may have had a slight diplomatic significance. But there is no diplomatic explanation for Eisenstein's drawings which were on show in a Moscow gallery at the same time; sometimes graceful, sometimes harsh, they always have a definite formalist quality. But good, very good drawings, so good that the friend who was with me wondered whether that was where the greatness of the film director lay and not in his films, which he found a bit static. As far as I know, Laktionov has not yet cried 'murder!' Can it be that the formalist controversy is not concerned with form? Did Serov ingeniously manage to confuse the issue, like the time they put innocents on trial in Moscow?

I think this must be what happened. Forty years of official atheism have not cured this people of prudishness (they have probably made it worse). When he forced Khrushchev to look at Falk's nude, Serov knew that the crude figure would shock the Russian's modesty. The plump moulded flesh of Lot's daughters as François de Troy painted them, with their thighs straddling those of the old sugar-daddy can be shown in Leningrad; artificiality makes the incest acceptable. But this Venus Anadyomene by Falk, conceived in the same spirit which inspired Rimbaud's. . . . I realised suddenly that this was one poem which was not included in Antokolsky's collection, and I remembered that when Annensky translated the *Chercheuses de Poux* (Looking for Lice) he called it *Pixies on the Comb*. To this extent Judaeo-Christian and bourgeois prejudices still oppress a society which is trying, and thinks it has succeeded, to free itself from them.

But we must remember the stir which the *Olympia* and *Déjeuner sur l'herbe* created here in France.

In the country of the revolution the arts are developing more slowly than anywhere else in the world. There are always ten Gerasimovs ready to sign the Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, and the short Russian

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renaissance only lasted twenty years, from 1900 to 1920. Change, for heaven's sake! They want change! Instead of being content to paint those graceful peasant women which Venetsianov did so prettily in 1937, I mean 1837, with their sickles and their hair parted straight down the middle and wound into bandeaux which kept every strand in place, that dangerous innovator Falk, who was already running risks on the left when we were already obedient to Stalin-otets, as formerly to Tsar-otets, dares to paint in 1937 as the Rouaults, the Derains, the Picassos, the Braques and all those well-known 'reactionaries' painted in Paris in 1907. Anyone can see from this that Falk with his indecency, is also, and for that very reason, a *futurist*.

What hope is there for us? That Lenin regains the upper hand; for he knew that the writer, the painter, the musician, must be free, completely free, free to master his profession, to make mistakes and, finally, free not to imitate in 1962 the good old painters of 1862, even though they are Russian. Besides, what is expected from Khrushchev is not a judgment on literature and the arts. Like Lenin he can make mistakes. But if he thinks of himself as a Leninist, he must surely remember that Lenin could recognise talent, even in a white guard. We are not talking about white guards now, but simply of Soviet citizens who do not want to go on painting like the traditionalists of the nineteenth century. We are talking of men who, historically speaking, may be backward in relation to European art, but are a century—a whole infinity—ahead of Laktionov. The tyranny of the Personality could neither bend nor unbend their conscience, and at the very moment of terror they erected images of beauty which will be the glory, in the future, of the Soviet Union.

The main thing that the Old Riding School affair proves is the extent to which official art in the Soviet Union is bogged down in tradition, not the best tradition of the ikons, of Kandinsky, or Chagall, but the tradition of Repin, Briulov, and Venetsianov. As a Polish acquaintance once said to me in this connection: 'Be patient! The windmills of God turn slowly'. May the wind of freedom already blowing speed them up a bit.

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FROM AMIS TO WAUGH

British Novelists as seen in Moscow

Ronald Hingley

WHEN Kingsley Amis' novel *Lucky Jim* was published in Russian by a Soviet journal (*Inostrannaya Literatura,* 1958, vols. 10–12, translated by T. Ozerskaya and N. Treneva) an important cultural—even political—event seemed to have taken place. Not that the novel is necessarily a great masterpiece, but as a piece of cheek, in a wholly admirable sense, it has few rivals. It is a superb sneer at the expense of established authority, pomposity, stuffiness, improving platitudes and clichés of thought, word, or feeling. It might therefore be described as one of the most un-Soviet works ever conceived. What could possibly have induced the Soviet authorities to let loose this dangerous material in Russia? Its publication (so it was argued at the time) must be a landmark on the road towards the 'liberalisation' of Soviet Russia which so many Western observers believe to be just round the corner.

The trouble is that this particular road is now littered with such landmarks, but still shows few signs of taking the traveller nearer to any destination. Other literary portents followed *Lucky Jim*—one was the publication of John Wain's novel *Hurry on Down* (translated by Ivan Kashkin, *Inostrannaya Literatura,* 1960). Thus the situation quickly changed from the time when James Aldridge was virtually the only modern British novelist acknowledged in Russia. Graham Greene was one of the first important contemporary writers to become a known (or at least partly known) quantity, and he was followed by others, including Sir Charles Snow and Miss Iris Murdoch. It now became possible to discuss with one's Soviet friends the kind of modern English novel which one read for pleasure.

These and other contemporary British authors received considerable publicity in Russia. Articles about them have appeared in the press, and some of them have found their way into manuals of literature. But until recently they had not been properly *processed* in the traditional Soviet manner—that is, they had not been thoroughly masticated, ingested and regurgitated in supposedly palatable form by any professional Soviet literary taster. This situation could not last for ever, and what had previously been done for Chekhov, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy has now been done for Sir Charles Snow, Graham Greene, Kingsley Amis, John Wain, John Braine, and many others. The result is a fascinating document and a wonderful illustration of the workings of the Soviet mind—*Angliiskii roman poslednego desyatiletiya* (*The English Novel of the Last Decade,* 1950–1960, by V. Ivashova, Moscow, 1962).

This is a long and thorough work which reflects a decade's hard reading by its author. Ivashova seems to have read nearly all the novels

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published during her period by nearly all British novelists with any claim to importance. The only notable omission seems to be William Golding, who somehow escaped the dragnet. (It is just possible that I may have missed any reference to Mr Golding, but Ivashova regrettably does not supply an index, and I am not going to read through the whole book again to check this point.)

Ivashova's book appears in an edition of ten thousand copies, which means that it is more accessible to the Soviet reader than most of the novels which she discusses. This British material is, of course, not at all readily available; only a small fraction of it has appeared in translation, and though many Russians can read English, most of our recent novels can only be obtained in large libraries. The only Soviet citizens who have ready access to the material in bulk are researchers in the field of modern English literature. Others must content themselves with the few titles which have been made available, and with the fact that Ivashova gives clear instructions as to what they are to think of each of our main fiction-writers, so that there is no real need for them to read the actual works.

TO have processed, and in effect devitalised, this varied body of material is a considerable intellectual achievement—especially as the material itself is so lively. We may have produced few (or no) really great writers in the fifties, but we certainly have produced stimulating and original work which bears the stamp of individual personality. As one professionally concerned with current Soviet literature, a rewarding but relatively austere field, I have regularly turned for recreation to the lusher pastures afforded by Messrs Waugh, Snow, Wain, Greene, and their colleagues. Being so un-Soviet in spirit, these writers afford relaxation to the specialist in matters Soviet. But it is all too easy to get these two cultures, the Soviet and the British, isolated in separate compartments of the mind—hence the fascination of studying in detail the impact on the Soviet mind, as represented by Ivashova, of our own writers.

Ivashova operates an elaborate and rigid system of symbols which are entirely alien to non-Marxists, but which will be familiar at least in general terms to readers of this journal. She has this advantage over many such readers, and over some of the authors whom she discusses as well—that she feels herself to be in direct touch with revealed truth. To her, as is inevitable under Soviet conditions, criticism consists in applying certain given axioms and predetermined criteria. These may be most conveniently indicated in a specimen questionnaire which might perhaps be sent out to British novelists of the sixties in case she contemplates a sequel in ten years' time:

Answer Yes or No

1. Does your book express a dislike of America? Or if not, do any of the characters produce any good, quotable anti-American sentiments? .....

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2. Do you dislike 'modern' devices (such as those of Virginia Woolf, James Joyce and other authors of forty years ago) in art? Do you dislike 'abstract' painting? .....
3. Do you portray a wide range of social groups and classes in your book? .....
4. Are your heroes constantly obsessed with the idea of struggling, dying on the barricades, etc., and do some of them, preferably, march in the front ranks of the Aldermaston marchers along with all that is finest in progressive British youth? .....
5. Do you write with deep warmth about any simple British workers? .....
6. Do you mercilessly lash:
   (a) British capitalist tycoons? .....
   (b) British colonialists and imperialists? .....
   (c) British intellectuals revolving in a doomed circle of narrow personal interests? .....
   (d) the British lower middle class obsessed with money-grubbing and hoisting itself up into a higher social category? .....
7. Are you a fighter for peace—that is, do you support Soviet foreign policy? .....

Though Ivashova does apply a set of mechanical criteria, along the lines indicated by this questionnaire, in assessing British novelists, it must be said in fairness to her, that she applies it gently. It is true that if you score no 'Yeses' at all you will receive scant notice from her. But you do not have to get anything like ten out of ten to be taken seriously. According to your score you will fall into one of three main categories.
Low Score (0–2): This will put you beyond the pale, along with Evelyn Waugh, Aldous Huxley, Lawrence Durrell, Iris Murdoch, L. P. Hartley, P. H. Newby, William Cooper, Angus Wilson, Anthony Powell, George Orwell and Virginia Woolf. Also among writers who are not British or not novelists: Camus, T. S. Eliot, Freud, Kafka, Joyce, Auden, Spender, Colin Wilson.
Medium Score (3–6): This puts you in the 'more in sorrow than in anger' category. You can do better than this, it will be implied, along with Sir Charles Snow, Graham Greene, Kingsley Amis, John Wain, and John Braine.
High Score (7–10): You are 'in', along with James Aldridge, Basil Davidson, Herbert Smith, Sean O'Casey, and Jack Lindsay.

Ivashova groups her authors in ascending order of political acceptability, implying in the characteristic Soviet manner that political and literary merit are to be equated. In following her study we may conveniently keep the same order, which means that we begin with the 'beyond the pale' group.

In discussing individual authors I hope to be forgiven for employing, in sub-headings and occasionally elsewhere, what may seem a childish procedure—that is, English authors will be quoted by transliterating the Russian forms of their names back into Roman characters. The point

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here is that Ivashova's comments on many of them are so wild and strange that one seems to be reading about someone of whom one had never heard before. This typographical device will, it is hoped, convey some of the atmosphere of her book.

BEYOND THE PALE

Evlin Vo (Mr Evelyn Waugh)

' Among openly reactionary writers highly acceptable to the ruling classes in modern Britain is Evelyn Waugh. . . . Though Waugh's novels . . . contain no direct attacks on all that is forward-looking and progressive [Has Ivashova read *Scott King's Modern Europe*, one wonders?] their tendency is to slander man. Directly or indirectly Waugh humiliates and discredits man, emphasising his animal characteristics which allegedly constitute " human nature " '.

Waugh's novels of the fifties, as we read later, ' represent an amalgam of pornography, Catholic superstitions, and various forms of concealed or open anti-Soviet propaganda '. Most deplorable of all Waugh's novels is *The Ordeal of Gilbert Pinfold*. The hero, Mr Pinfold, is a sadist and alcoholic, who impresses reactionary critics because of his complete contempt for human dignity and reason, and for man's creative gifts as a struggler and builder of life.

Oldos Khaksli (Mr Aldous Huxley)

Grouped with Waugh is Aldous Huxley, who proclaims the thesis that man is a dirty animal, basing this (an additional offence) on the teaching of Freud.

Dzhordzh Oruell (George Orwell)

A fanatic of reaction. His filthy, hate-ridden lampoon *Animal Farm* can be easily deciphered as a malicious slander on the Soviet way of life. In his Utopian novel *1984* Orwell tries to slander communist society and discredit the bearers of progressive ideas.

Entoni Pouell, Engus Uilson, Lorens Darrel, L. P. Khartli, Pamela Khensford Dzhonson (Messrs Anthony Powell, Angus Wilson, Lawrence Durrell, L. P. Hartley, Miss Pamela Hansford Johnson)

Some of these can write well, and one of them (Miss Hansford Johnson) even gets a pat on the back for her progressive convictions. But the trouble is that they are all revolving round in the tiny world of their characters. They are concerned only with private situations and never give a wider social perspective. They leave out the ' socially typical ' (i.e., their portrayal of character cannot easily be squared with Marxist stereotypes about grasping tycoons, etc.). L. P. Hartley's trilogy *The Shrimp and the Anemone* is influenced by Freud. Angus Wilson writes about the ' fashionable ' problem of homosexuality, and has depicted the

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Middle Age of Mrs. Eliot outside space and time. Lawrence Durrell may be popular with the bourgeois reader, but his themes are excessively threadbare and he shows poverty of thought. Anthony Powell can write quite well, but he has been influenced by Proust.

Ayris Merdok (Miss Iris Murdoch)

A sad case. Influenced by existentialism and the early Sartre (not by the more recent Sartre, which would be all right). Even wrote a book on Sartre. Is a pseudo-realist. Fixes her attention exclusively on the inner world of her heroes, which is not governed by any laws apart from the subjective urges of the characters themselves.

So much for the first category of modern British novelists processed by Ivashova. All these have been relegated, as it were, to a critical Inferno, and Ivashova's message to them is a clear 'Abandon hope, all ye who enter here'. All these 'no-hopers' or literary *dokhodyagi*, are dealt with summarily. None of them is worth wasting good Soviet ink and paper on.

CANDIDATES FOR PURGATORY

Now we come to the second category—authors who get much fuller treatment, in fact a chapter apiece. These are the inhabitants of Ivashova's Purgatory—a brigade of promising lads for whom there is still hope, but who could do a lot better if they tried.

The Case of Charlz Persi Snou (Sir Charles Snow)

Sir Charles Snow is the first writer in the book to be tagged with the sinister label 'fighter for peace'. 'The ardent fighter for peace and for the idea of the peaceful coexistence of countries and peoples Snow, an important public figure, is proceeding in the direction of an ever deeper and truer understanding of the processes and phenomena of contemporary social life.' Again, at the end of the chapter devoted to him, Sir Charles is called 'one of the most active fighters for peace in modern Britain'.

To call Sir Charles Snow a 'fighter for peace' (that is, in the Soviet use of the phrase, a supporter of Soviet foreign policy), is surely an unjustifiable calumny. His relations with the Soviet Union form a whole saga of their own, and cannot be considered in detail here, involving as they do all sorts of scattered material—interviews in the *Daily Worker*, articles (unknown to the English reader) in Russian and satellite publications, and so on. This material reveals a certain genial complacency on Sir Charles's part, together with a tendency (apparently) to regard himself as a kind of bridge between East and West. His posture has also been politically naïve in the sense that he has on occasion regurgitated official Soviet hand-out material (e.g., the slogan that the Soviet Union is 'catching up' the West in material prosperity). And his pronouncements reveal a deplorable degree of insensitivity to the crucial issue of

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freedom which divides East and West. Obviously, his comments on Russia are hampered by limited knowledge of the country and its people outside the world of official hand-outs, goodwill receptions, and the like, and in any case his record as an arbiter of matters Soviet is nothing to be proud of. But he has never, so far as I am aware, committed the ultimate baseness of underwriting official Soviet peace propaganda. It therefore seems that Ivashova has been unfair to Charles Percy here. When she claims that his novel *The New Men* ' actively serves the cause of peace ', this means little more than the fact that parts of it can be quoted out of context in the interests of Soviet propaganda—which is true of almost any book ever written.

Sir Charles is also awarded high marks for ' unmasking the inhumanity of imperialist aggression ', for being a straight ' realist ' who doesn't mess around with modernistic fiddle-faddles, for depicting the ' spy mania ' so widespread in England, and for laying bare the provocational tactics of warmongers and enemies of the USSR. He also rates high on ' goomanship ' (this is my translation of the Soviet term *gumanism*, generally rendered ' humanity ' or ' humaneness ' and perhaps the most meaningless term in the whole vocabulary of Soviet criticism—which will perhaps excuse my translation). Charles Percy, we are told, was always strong on goomanship, but with the passage of time his goomanship has gradually lost its ' abstract ' character.

However, he still has a lot to learn. ' Not everything about the society which surrounds him is equally clear to Snow the Artist '. ' Though Snow has deduced the need for making a definite choice, he has not finally broken with the world which he has so sternly condemned '. In fact, Snow had better pull his socks up. It's all very well for him to fill his novels with scientists, diplomats, tycoons, pedagogues and so on, but in his pages ' there are no English working men, no representatives of the millions of humble toilers who form the basic population of Britain. The people has been left out. So his picture of modern Britain remains incomplete '. This absurd suggestion—that every work of fiction stands and falls in so far as it approaches a Marxist manual of sociology—is also applied to other writers in Ivashova's analysis.

Charles Percy has let the side down in other ways as well. He writes novels about England in the twenties without mentioning the General Strike of 1926. He can write of the late thirties without bringing in the shameful events of Munich. And then, what is one to think of a man who can set a novel in the early forties and say nothing about the heroic struggle of the Soviet people during the Second World War? And what on earth is the use of writing a novel as progressive as *The New Men* if you only use the word ' fascist ' once—and then with ' incomprehensible indecisiveness '?

Ivashova's comments on Sir Charles include one delightful tit-bit. Claiming that ' bourgeois ' critics in Britain have greeted his novels with ' polite restraint ', she explains this by the fact that ' his services to the

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state ' have prevented them from treating Sir Charles as unceremoniously as they would have wished. (Dr Leavis' celebrated lecture on Sir Charles Snow does not come within Ivashova's period.) In typical Soviet fashion, she conceives Britain as an authoritarian state on Soviet lines, but with a different lot of manipulators (the capitalists and bourgeois) in charge. There is frequent reference to ' bourgeois ideologists ', with the suggestion that these are controlled by a central agitprop apparatus.

Be this as it may, Charles Percy's rating remains a fairly low one: quite promising, but could do better if he tried.

The Case of Gream Grin (Mr Graham Greene)

Ivashova's handling of Mr Graham Greene follows more predictable lines than her treatment of Sir Charles Snow. Mr Greene's whole career is depicted as a preparation for the two novels *The Quiet American* and *Our Man in Havana*. In Russia, where Mr Greene's other novels are little known, these two had already been widely publicised. The reason is, of course, that in the first of the two the misdeeds of American intelligence are eloquently castigated, while in the second the notorious British Sikrit Servis is splendidly ridiculed. (' A central place in the subject-matter is occupied by the unmasking of the stupidity and noxious uselessness of the famous Sikrit Servis—i.e., of British Intelligence, which invents cases and bases its discoveries on the invented and inflated evidence of paid spies active in various remote parts of the world.') These novels have been found useful by Soviet internal propagandists, since they provide valuable confirmation from an impeccable source that British and American intelligence organisations actually exist—something which the rank and file Soviet citizen would hardly be likely to take on trust on the word of agitprop alone.

All this is very useful, but is counterbalanced by Mr Greene's claim to be a Catholic, which is almost as bad as being a Freudian, a Proustian, or a disciple of James Joyce. ' However, Grin did not become a proper Catholic, and of this all his books written after his " conversion " provide eloquent witness.' The point that Mr Greene is a bogus Catholic is argued at some length. ' The portrait of Louise [Scobie's wife from *The Heart of the Matter*] is painted with merciless irony. And the reader feels that this irony extends much farther than the portrait. It is also directed against Louise's beliefs.' Again, the novel *The End of the Affair*, should be regarded ' objectively speaking ' as Mr Greene's most anti-religious novel.

Above all, it is argued, Mr Greene's ' enormous sympathy for people ' (one of the routine cant phrases of Soviet literary processing) marks him off from other Catholic writers. ' This love of Man, charity towards his weaknesses and faith in his strength, cut across Catholic teaching about sin and the treatment of Man by decadents ' (such as Huxley, Waugh, etc.). So Grin scores high marks for goomanship.

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Mr Greene's politics have changed over the years. 'His movement to the left is an unarguable fact.' He has long shown anti-fascist feelings, has depicted the corruptness of capitalism, has unmasked colonialism, and the preparation for a third world war (this last allegedly a theme of *Our Man in Havana*). However, we must not lose a sense of proportion. 'It is still too early to speak of any decisive break which may have taken place in the writer's work after *The Quiet American*. A loud note of political scepticism sounds in parts of the book, and in places ideas alien in principle to the Soviet reader are formulated.' The fact is that Grin stands at the crossroads. Moreover, his latest work to be considered, *A Burnt-out Case*, is a step in the wrong direction, being politically negative and sceptical, though 'it does finally discredit the legend about Grin being a "Catholic"'.

In the middle of all this rubbish one does seem to detect a few notes of genuine admiration for Mr Greene's work, irrespective of the extent to which it can be linked up with clichés about colonialism, goomanship, and so on.

The Irate Youth ('Angry Young Men')

The concept of 'Angry Young Men' is treated with portentous seriousness by Ivashova. At one time their doings, according to her, 'agitated Britain' (*volnovala Angliyu*), a remark which surely argues an exaggerated impression on her part of the intensity of British intellectual life. She is, however, aware that the term now sounds out of date and that the phenomena which it purports to describe are no longer with us. (The Angry Young Men have now been replaced by (a) Teenagers (*tiyney-dzhery*) who dance Rock and Roll, and (b) Aldermaston marchers.)

The movement of the Irate Young is described as 'a revolt without a programme'. They denounced Britain as they saw it, which showed they had plenty of good sense, but they did not know what to replace it with, since life in the Soviet Union was hidden from them by systematic lies and misinformation disseminated by the British Labour Party. The 'Angry' movement was really a product of the 'Labour Welfare State', the illusory nature of which was discovered by millions of simple people in Britain who had been led into error by Labour propaganda.

The Irate Young Ones not only could not see a barricade on which to fight, and if necessary to die, but weren't even looking for one. (That all 'honest' citizens in 'capitalist' countries are permanently seeking a heroic death is one of the quainter items in Soviet mythology.)

The Angry Ones had to go forward and become communist party members or at least Aldermaston marchers, or else they had to capitulate and make terms with 'bourgeois' society—which is what they all unfortunately did, as Ivashova points out in a rare burst of rhetoric. 'Amis capitulated when he brought out the book *I like it Here* in 1958 and the novel *Take a Girl Like You* in 1960. John Osborne also trod the path of compromise. . . . Robert Conquest, too, capitulated when, in 1958,

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he brought out the verse collection *Return to Life*: *Poems from behind the Iron Curtain*. John Wain, who had shown more promise than all the writers among the Irate Young, brought out his novel *A Travelling Woman*, which marked a retreat from the " big " realism of his first works, and then demonstrated political instability and a contradictory outlook by printing a more than ambiguous article in the *Observer* after his return from the Soviet Union in 1960.'

There is a glimmering of political tolerance in the inclusion of Mr Wain among the Purgatorial group of writers, despite the straight talking which he did about Soviet conditions in the *Observer*. Conversely, Miss Pamela Hansford Johnson (whose frequent comments on life in the Soviet Union must certainly have been less unwelcome to her Soviet hosts than Mr Wain's), has nevertheless been put firmly in her place in the Inferno, thereby being separated from her husband, Sir Charles Snow.

The Case of Kingsli Emis (Mr Kingsley Amis)

Mr Amis has a sense of humour (as Ivashova must have detected with a section of her brain which she did not otherwise employ when writing her study), although his farcical scenes are not always ' examples of faultless artistic taste '. But Amis' heroes are unable to raise themselves to the level of serious struggle. They are indifferent to society and to the problems which agitate society. In *Lucky Jim*, ' Dzhimmi Dikson is portrayed as a person lacking any principles and convictions. . . . There is absolutely nothing heroic in the portrait of Dzhim. He neither can nor will raise himself to the level of conscious protest '. Dzhim's comic escapades never begin to look like a ' serious revolt '. The novel is somewhat redeemed by the satirical portrait of Bertrand. This constitutes a merciless sneer at the self-confident representatives of Western European Bohemianism, at artists who imitate transatlantic abstractionists.

A similar satirical attack is described as one of the main virtues of Mr Amis' second novel, *That Uncertain Feeling*, which Ivashova regards as his most important work. Here she seems to have mistaken what was in fact directed against Dylan Thomas (if I am right) as an attack on T. S. Eliot and Christopher Fry, which is perhaps to give Mr Amis more credit than he deserves, since Eliot and Fry are officially disapproved figures, while the party line on Thomas has not yet been declared.

Incidentally, I am fascinated by the way in which Ivashova's methods inevitably seem to lead her to evaluations opposite to my own more casual judgments. Apart from *I like it Here*, whch I could not read at all, I found *That Uncertain Feeling* the weakest of Mr. Amis' novels. In Ivashova's assessment, Mr Amis, like many other authors, ' stands at the cross-roads ' at the moment. His novel *Take a Girl Like You* (1960) represents a decline. Its poor qualities are not redeemed by calculated eroticism and an abundance of ambiguous situations. How sad, when only a few years ago the day seemed near when Mr Amis

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' would arrive at consciousness of the necessity for active and effective protest '.

The Case of Dzhon Ueyn (Mr John Wain)

Ivashova seems a little more human and less gooman when discussing the works of Mr Wain, whom she assesses highly—so much so that an occasional flicker of maternal solicitude seems to break through the crust of Marxist-Leninist jargon. For Mr Wain is yet another sad case . . . and how sad it must indeed be to see so many variants, from Charles Percy Snow onwards, of the same encouraging progress towards the ' crossroads', only to be followed by retreat. This is saddest of all in the case of a really promising lad like Wain. ' Though he is not a Marxist, and often expresses erroneous judgments and comes to hasty conclusions, Wain is nevertheless unconditionally progressive in the general direction of his critical thought.' ' Wain's political convictions are contradictory and very unstable.' But he is ' objectively ' on the left. ' He hates the rule of the money-bag, the insolent arbitrariness of the warmongers—the imperialist aggressors. He was always among those who came out actively against the inspirers of the Cold War.' Another good mark—he dislikes ' modernism ' and ' abstractionism ' in the arts.

These attitudes are expressed both in his novels and in his critical articles. But this is not all. In *Hurry on Down* ' the family of an elderly English working man is shown with great warmth. The head of the family, a skilled worker, his daughter Rose . . . and his wife, a straightforward, honest, simple woman—all these are apprehended as positive personages in the book. Episodic figures of workers and simple toilers are drawn with the same warmth.' Charles Percy, please note.

Mr Wain attacked bourgeois reaction in *Living in the Present*, also a particularly apposite comment on British conditions because of its ' anti-fascist ' tendency. He went on portraying simple toiling men with great warmth in *The Contenders*. But a gradual falling-off is to be observed—to be traced through this novel and *A Travelling Woman*. ' The artist's horizon becomes narrower.' Recently Mr Wain has been capitulating hard. In 1957 ' the retreat begins, as the typical gives way to the individual and even to the arbitrary '.

However—and here at last is a sentiment with which one can agree—Mr Wain is still seeking his true path, and no one can tell where he will go. One of his virtues is his unwillingness to rest on his laurels and his readiness to explore. I can accept this, but where Ivashova sees a gradual decline in his work, I must again disagree, since my own feeling is that it has steadily gained in strength.

APPROVED WRITERS

We now come to the third section of British writers—those who meet with Ivashova's approval. Here connoisseurs of matters Soviet will recognise the name of Dzheymz Oldridzh (Mr James Aldridge), and may also

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recognise Messrs Desmond Stewart, Basil Davidson, and Jack Lindsay. These are writers whose true merits have been concealed from the British public in a deliberate campaign of silence organised by bourgeois ideologists. As Ivashova will readily understand, I am not at liberty to discuss this group of writers at all. Heaven knows what appalling risks I may have run by even daring to mention their names. Moreover, one has one's reputation as a hysterical, reactionary, top-hatted, teeth-gnashing anti-goomanist to consider. I shall therefore cooperate with the conspiracy of silence.

Conclusion

Ivashova's study is disappointing in its lack of freshness and flexibility. Her approach is preferable to that practised under Stalin, at a time when contemporary Western writers were either ignored or abused. But there remains something utterly fatuous, as well as pathetic, about the relentless application of these mechanical criteria with which the novelists concerned were not attempting to conform when they wrote their books. They have been solemnly judged and awarded marks according to the rules of a game which none of them (except perhaps one or two in the approved group at the end) even supposed themselves to be playing—as if chess players were to be criticised for not moving their pieces in accordance with the rules of halma.

In good time Ivashova and her like will find themselves out of a job, since an electronic computer could more efficiently perform the task of assessing the elements of anti-colonialism, goomanship, et cetera in a writer's works, and the result could more conveniently be expressed in a brief mathematical formula than in pages of repetitive and turgid jargon.

Meanwhile the best footnote to Ivashova's labours is provided in her own analysis of part of John Wain's novel *Hurry on Down*. She refers to his picture of the 'Farkles couple, who embody everything which is most characteristic of the British petty bourgeois. . . . The petty bourgeoisie with its unlimited self-satisfaction . . . putting people in pigeon holes and thinking only in ready-made categories. . . . Boring and vulgar, repulsive in their spiritual poverty, the Farkleses see to it that every person carries his own clear distinguishing signs.'

If only de-Farklesisation could follow destalinisation in the Soviet Union.

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MUSIC

Fred K. Prieberg

THE chain of events following the denunciation of abstract art by the Soviet Premier himself indicates that the rapid pace of 'rehabilitation' of certain artistic trends has come to a virtual standstill in the Soviet Union. The interval of tolerance towards new ideas and new forms has ended; once again the personal inclination of composers will give way to the rules of the official aesthetic. Music—as Lenin put it—should be owned by the people and loved by the people; music—as Stalin and now Khrushchev, too, demand—should propagate the pure ideals of the communist creed. However reasonable Lenin's words may sound, they imply a tremendous and successful task of creative education, an education, moreover, that does not centre in the romantic concept of 'meaning' and 'content'. But, in general, no efforts have been made to teach the people the unparalleled values of the isolated creative form that is devoid of any non-musical meaning. No Soviet musicologist will accept that music is 'played' and has the same psychological roots as any other game.

Thus Khrushchev's appraisal of 'partisan' art, which closely follows the teachings of several nineteenth-century Russian writers—and Western theorists, too, for that matter—may find fertile soil not only in the large group of persons uninterested in music but even among musicians, music pedagogues, and students. There are certain indications that the occasional performances of really modern works by Western composers have aroused as much indignation as they did enthusiasm among the initiated; but it was not contemporary concert music that provoked the sudden attack on modernism—it was rather the American type of modern jazz which shocked the ears of the Soviet Premier.

At first, however, he gave 'friendly advice' to the painters and sculptors who had been trying to find new paths by probing current Western styles in the plastic arts. This was in December 1962; at the same time, rehearsals for the new version of Dmitri Shostakovich's thirty-year-old opera *Katerina Ismailova* were being held at the Stanislavsky-Nemirovich-Danchenko Theatre in Moscow, and the thirteenth symphony by this foremost master of Soviet music was in preparation; both these gave rise to new discussions about 'form' and 'content' in music. Several months before, some of the leading publications had raised an outcry against those younger composers who had tried—most of them with some success—to incorporate stylistic traits of twelve-tone technique and noise composition in their works. Oustanding personalities like Andrei Volkonsky, Galina Ustvolskaya, Arvo Piart, and Valentin Silvestrov were severely criticised as ideological weaklings. Naturally, nobody bothered with their compositions as such, as musical inventions

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based on harmony, melody, and rhythm. Instead, the Soviet critics tried to use the slogan 'Create for the People in the name of Communism' as a standard for judging the works, and consequently asked what relation to Soviet reality a dodecaphonic sonata could possibly have.

The composer Tikhon Khrennikov hinted at the direction in an article published late in 1961 [1]:

> Although avant-gardists take music to be a thing in itself, incapable of expressing anything, in reality their work is not at all harmless. It is calculated to stifle the consciousness of man, to excite in him feelings of fear and terror, scepticism and disbelief in the ideals of mankind. Thus this art, calling itself an innovation, is completely disjoined from the great humanistic traditions of classical art, from the thoughts and feelings by which the peoples of the world live.

Like Plato ages ago, the Soviet theorists believe that music has repercussions on public morale and individual character, and thus may be used to help the state in governing the people. No wonder that the composer, striving for freer and more personal expression, is likely to be called a 'rake' and even a 'traitor'. With a few notable exceptions, politicians have a strange attitude to art. This may be due largely to their insufficient education, a problem which is not confined to the Soviet Union, but there the effects are worse than in other countries, and the reason is obvious. The Party plans, organises, and supervises all the artistic manifestations, from the solo concert to a musical lecture tour, from lay composition to the printing of sheet music and music books. By means of a more or less rigid control any deviation can be straightened out or at least punished. The case of Galina Mokreyeva, wife of a young conductor in Kiev, may serve as example.

When she was studying at the Kiev Conservatory, her musical essays frequently got prizes from the students' study circle organised at that institution. She wrote for her diploma a dissertation on Ravel's harmony, of which the conservatory directors disapproved. Later she entered the dissertation for a musicological contest in Leningrad; it was awarded a prize. Deciding on graduate studies at the conservatory, she passed the examination in all musical disciplines with distinction; but for her paper on the history of the Soviet Communist party she only got the mark of 'adequate'. Moreover, the final report described her as 'politically immature'. Thus she was rejected for a post at the conservatory and started to work as a music teacher in a Kiev music school. Just at this time an article of hers about music in the Ukraine, and making comparisons with music elsewhere, was published in the Polish periodical *Ruch Muzyczny* (1 May 1962). The stress she laid on the necessity of formal advance, of the incorporation of Western trends, was too much for the authorities. A Party meeting was held in her music school, and the following sentence passed:

[1] *Sovetskaya Kultura*, 7 November 1961.

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> Since it would be incorrect to entrust the teacher Galina Mokreyeva with the education of the young generation because of her reactionary ideology, we forbid Mokreyeva to give lessons in the upper grades, and decide that she be allowed to instruct the lower grades only, and only in basic musical knowledge.

This meant a reduction in pay by two-thirds. On 26 December 1962, sponsored by the Section of Young Architects, she gave a lecture on ' Music in the Twentieth Century '. Among the audience gathered in the Kiev House of Architects were the young composers Valentin Silvestrov, Vladimir Guba, and Leonid Grabovsky, flanked, however, by several representatives of the Kiev Conservatory Party organisation. These tried to make trouble and demanded that the lecture be cut short, but the audience turned against the intruders.

Now her situation is worse than ever. Higher party officials are trying to isolate her completely and have even demanded that her musicological diploma should be annulled, which would deprive her of any possibility of working in a musical profession. Her story illustrates the kind of thing that can throw an artist far off his course if he fights against conformism. Nevertheless, there is a full-scale contest going on between the unruly artists and conservative party authorities.

The official attacks, nearly always disguised as ' friendly advice ' given to a dear comrade who is about to fall into error, have gained in number and momentum. Most of them are delivered by composers who hold official positions in the Composers Union of the USSR; they represent the older generation of Soviet composers and their work arouses little public interest; they are suffering from a mild form of frustration; the most prominent names among them are Ivan Dzerzhinsky, Vano Muradeli, Serge Aksiuk, and Tikhon Khrennikov. (Rodion Shchedrin, the young Secretary of the Composers Union, does not fall into this category.) Since the beginning of 1962 these persons, together with the musicologists Lev Danilevich and G. Polyanovsky, have been the spokesmen in the case of the State versus Andrei Volkonsky and his companions. Their media are the large newspapers like *Pravda*, or periodicals like *Sovetskaya Kultura* and *Sovetskaya Muzyka*; their political or social reprimands are echoed loyally by cultural publications in the Union Republics, e.g. by *Radyanska Kultura*, the organ of the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture, which published a vehement denunciation of V. Silvestrov in its issue of 10 January 1963—seven days after an attack by Aksiuk on the same composer had appeared in the columns of the Moscow *Sovetskaya Kultura*. This was no coincidence.

The leading character in the campaign against novel styles and technical achievements in music (next to Mr Khrushchev himself), is L. F. Ilichev, secretary of the central committee of the Communist party, who declared that

> In music, for example, we can observe, besides a general movement forward, an enthusiasm for the savage howlings of various foreign

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> jazz styles, and not only foreign ones. We are not talking about jazz in general, but about the cacophony of sounds, which sometimes knocks the listener out, and is called music only by misunderstanding.[2]

Like Ilichev, Mr Khrushchev picked jazz as the hook on which to hang all the other complaints about 'decadent' creative thinking; in denying the existence of any general prohibition of certain stylistic developments, he plainly forgot that the public proclamation of his own favours and dislikes in art amounts to a factual taboo:

> To put it briefly, we stand for melodious music with content, music that stirs people and gives rise to strong feelings, and we are against cacophony. . . . It transpires that among workers in the field of art you can meet young people who try in vain to prove that melody in music has lost the right to exist and that its place is now being taken by 'new' music—'dodecaphony', the music of noises. It is hard for a normal person to understand what the word 'dodecaphony' means, but apparently it means the same as the word 'cacophony'. Well, we flatly reject this cacophonous music. Our people can't use this rubbish as a tool of their ideology (shouts in the hall: That's right).[3]

As Khrushchev's voice droned on and on, it became clear that this was the end of a brief interval of hopeful creative progress in which efforts had been made to assimilate the most inconspicuous formal achievements of Western art. Soviet art thus seems doomed to relapse into the isolation of the Zhdanov era. One of the first works caught by the new policy is Shostakovich's Symphony No. 13, to words by Evgeny Evtushenko; it was given a first performance late in December, and then rewritten to eliminate certain 'ideological shortcomings' of the text. The new version was played by the Moscow State Philharmonic on 10 and 11 February, and was received with stunning applause. In private Moscow musicologists and critics underlined the virtues and values of the composition, and compared it favourably with both the preceding symphonies of Shostakovich; yet no review was published in such an important newspaper as *Sovetskaya Kultura*. When I tried to get a tape recording of the work through the Composers Union, the administrative secretary wrote me (26 March) that Shostakovich 'has not yet completed work on the new version' of this symphony.

THE second plenary session of the Committee of the Composers Union was held in Moscow during the last days of March. Several composers expounded their views about the function of music and the technical principles on which it should be modelled, and the meeting duly and unanimously acknowledged the standard set a few days earlier by Khrushchev and Ilichev, and sent a letter to the central committee of the Soviet Communist party. It contains the following

[2] *Sovetskaya Kultura*, 22 December 1962.
[3] Ibid. 12 March 1963.

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passage, which clearly reflects the present state of intellectual uneasiness and verbal conformism. Similar words were spoken in 1948:

> We ardently approve the annihilating criticism levelled by the Party against the false anti-Marxist theory about the possibility of peaceful coexistence in the sphere of ideology. This theory is in fact a capitulation to bourgeois ideology leading to the vindication of formalist and abstractionist perversions, and furthering in our artistic work the penetration of ideas that are hostile to communism.[4]

The session, devoted to the work of the young composers, shifted all the critical arguments to the political level. The composers did not deal with music as a virtually abstract art, expressing nothing that is non-musical; instead, they underlined the relations between musical art and man—i.e. the listener, not the composer—and demanded that more attention be paid to 'the public'. Nobody cared to point out that 'the public' is not a homogeneous body with identical tastes and capabilities, but an arbitrary classification of a mass of individuals with widely different gifts. Composers should create for the people, in the name of establishing communism; they should communicate with the workers of the Krasnoyarsk hydroelectric plant, with the cosmonauts and physicists. Several speakers accordingly stressed the importance of melody, above all melody derived from the treasures of folklore. Nasib Zhiganov, People's Artist of the USSR, said:

> The spirit of music—I am not saying anything new—always was and will be melody, and once again melody, as long as humanity exists. Everything else—harmony, polyphony, orchestra—is but an aid to melody. Even rhythm cannot be an end in itself: it shapes the melody, gives it character and form, but melody cements the work as a whole.[5]

It follows that melodies should be as simple and popular, indeed as commonplace as possible. Eugen Kapp, for example, complained that the choral song 'I believe in the Party', by the young composer Eino Tamberg, was beyond the reach of lay ensembles and too difficult even for professional choirs. L. Sakharov wanted more vocal music to be written. The primary targets were, naturally, those young composers who were trying to find inspiration abroad and daring to expand the narrow limits of socialist realism. Andrei Volkonsky was once again severely reprimanded. The composer Boris Terentiev even suggested 'that such comrades as Volkonsky should ascend the platform and explain with whom they would rather eat their bread, with us or with somebody else'.[6]

Words like these amount to a threat, but the cultural policy of the Soviet Union always has tended to preserve the indigenous pool of artistic talent, and Volkonsky is a most gifted musician. The composer

[4] Ibid. 2 April 1963.
[5] Ibid. 30 March 1963.
[6] Ibid.

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Gleb Taranov, from Kiev, attacked the unfortunate but remarkable musicologist of that city, Galina Mokreyeva, because of her addiction to twelve-tone music and her immense admiration for Schoenberg and Stravinsky.[7]

Her views are shared by many in the non-Soviet world save perhaps for the over-estimation of Schoenberg; but they do not conform to official music history as laid down by the Party. They are an individual and deviating opinion inside a system of standardised thinking. Also criticised was the young conductor Igor Blashkov, again from Kiev. The senior composer Konstantin Dankevich complained seriously that Blashkov keeps up correspondence with foreign dodecaphonic composers. Indeed he does, and so do other young Soviet artists; for Western musicians and writers, this correspondence is as interesting and instructive as any international contact in the world of art. Blashkov's main shortcoming, however, was not mentioned at the congress. He is the husband of Galina Mokreyeva.

There can be no doubt that modernist music will continue to be written in the Soviet Union, and not necessarily in secluded privacy. Whatever the young composers do, we can be sure that they will scrutinise any move or theory, any indication of the dimension of the new cultural policy announced by Comrade Ilichev. His subordinates are already at work. The new cultural exchange agreement with the USA excludes jazz music, and the Kiev Conservatory has founded a student 'Musical Patrol' that inspects clubs, dancing halls, and cafés for 'anti-artistic music', and advises schools and lay artists about the correct repertory. It is somewhat ironical that at the very same time a new book on modern music was published in Moscow containing an article by O. Leontieva about Hindemith and Orff. It gives an account of Hitlerite musical policy, a topic never before touched by a Soviet writer.

[7] Cf. ibid. 2 April 1963.

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REPERCUSSIONS IN EAST GERMANY

Heinz Kersten

NOWHERE in the Soviet bloc have the disputes on cultural policies conducted in the Soviet Union since last December been so strongly echoed or had such effects on the internal situation, as they have in the GDR. Modelling themselves on Moscow, the Politbureau of the SED and the Presidium of the Council of Ministers in their turn convened a 'discussion meeting' of writers and artists in East Berlin for 25 and 26 March 1963. As at the sixth congress of the SED which had preceded the meeting in the middle of January, all nonconformist currents in East Germany's cultural life were resolutely rejected and the full extent of the differences between the Party leadership and the artists became clear.

The official enthusiasm with which the anti-liberal campaign initiated by Khrushchev and Ilichev has been welcomed in East Berlin is in inverse ratio to the restraint with which the SED leaders had previously reacted to destalinisation in Soviet cultural life. Ulbricht and his followers feel with relief that the Kremlin is evidently returning to a line in cultural policy from which they themselves have never departed. They had always been anxious to screen off this domain from all influences emanating from the other 'popular democracies', and not least from the Soviet Union itself, which was showing a tendency to relaxation in its cultural policy. Nevertheless such influences had steadily gained in strength after the 22nd congress of the CPSU.

The resulting tensions between Moscow and East Berlin were clearly reflected in the controversy carried on at the beginning of last year in the columns of the journal *Kunst und Literatur* (Art and Literature), between the Soviet literary historian Ilya Fratkin, who for some time after the war had been Soviet Cultural Officer in Halle, and the then chairman of the Cultural Commission of the Politbureau of the SED, Alfred Kurella. Writing in the journal published by the Central Committee of the Society for German-Soviet Friendship, Fratkin had advocated vigorous debate, adding: 'We must not believe that some dogmatic formula has acquired the right of indisputable truth only because it was repeated interminably during the years of the cult of personality . . . how indiscriminately and unjustifiably were many different developments in Western art inexorably condemned as decadent during those years.' Fratkin had further listed the titles of several interesting new works of Soviet literature—not one of which has yet been published in the GDR—and had pointed out that they had been 'discussed vigorously and

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received very different, even completely opposed, reviews, but that needless to say no administrative consequences had been drawn from this; in the last analysis the reader was the judge'.[1]

The next issue of the journal carried an article in reply by Alfred Kurella, accusing Fratkin of wrongly interpreting the 22nd congress of the CPSU, and deprecating his action in 'drawing a picture of present-day literary and scientific life in the Soviet Union which practically advocated argument for the sake of argument'. In opposition to the liberal views of his Soviet correspondent, Kurella expressly backed the old orthodox course: an art policy could not forgo 'bringing direct influence to bear on the artistic process, pointing out shortcomings and mistakes in their work to individual artists, and in special cases intervening administratively as well. . .'.

It was only with reluctance that the SED leadership felt compelled in the course of last year to make some concession to the new wave of destalinisation started by the 22nd congress of the CPSU, as it was reflected in the cultural life of the Soviet Union. Some books by Soviet authors were published which, it is true, had been written after the 20th congress of the CPSU in 1956, and had long been surpassed in critical candour by new works, but which were yet bound to cause a sensation in the GDR because they clearly revealed the differences between the artistic opportunities existing in the two countries. Galina Nikolaeva's *Battle on the Way*, Konstantin Simonov's war novel *The Living and the Dead*, and an anthology of poems by Evtushenko became best-sellers. True, by an organised propaganda campaign the SED tried to minimise their impact—the film version of *Battle on the Way* was cut by about a third in its dubbed German version—but in conversation with Galina Nikolaeva on the occasion of her visit last autumn East German writers were strengthened in their impression that their Soviet colleagues were far freer to tell the truth than they themselves were. Yet Galina Nikolaeva does not by any means belong to the literary avant-garde of the Soviet Union, but rather to those in the centre who do not step beyond the bounds of destalinisation drawn by Khrushchev.

THE argument frequently advanced by East German authors that dramatists in communist countries had a better chance of treating delicate themes had already played a part in discussions of the drama. This was how they explained the greater success scored by certain Czech, Hungarian, and Soviet plays with East German theatre audiences. These plays were mainly works like *And that on Christmas Eve, too*, by Blazhek, *The Eleventh Commandment*, by Mesterhazi, and *Irkutsk Tales* by Arbuzov, all of which coupled the description of private conflicts within the communist social order with cautious sociological criticism. Since these plays, like *Battle on the Way* both as novel and film, had the express approval of the SED leadership, and had even been repeatedly

[1] *Kunst und Literatur*, No. 1, 1962.

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held up to East German authors as models of a way of dealing with the problems of socialist reality that was true to life and rich in conflict but followed the party line, there was at times a well-founded hope of a gradual weakening of the domination exercised by dogma in SED cultural policy.

Wolfgang Langhoff, manager of the East Berlin Deutsches Theater, was no doubt guided by this hope when he staged *Trouble and Power*, by Peter Hacks, his *dramaturg* for the East Berlin Festival of 1962, although two previous versions of this play had been rejected by the party. Hacks (born 1928), a convinced Marxist, had moved from the Federal Republic to the GDR in 1955, and had shown great talent in a number of plays rather in the manner of Brecht, interpreting historical events from a Marxist point of view. *Trouble and Power* was the first play in which—responding to the demands made of dramatists by the Party—he came to grips with the problems of East German reality: a glass factory cannot fulfil its plan because the local briquette factory supplies bad quality briquettes; a change for the better is hampered by the manager of the briquette factory who is interested only in reaching his production quota, by rivalries among the party authorities within the factory, and by the resistance of the workers, who earn good wages at the expense of quality. The love of a young worker in the briquette factory for a woman worker in the glass factory finally induces him to support changes in working methods at his factory.

In this play Hacks employs the didactic-dialectical method advocated —mainly between 1957 and 1959—by a number of writers, especially the younger ones, who had been brought up on Brecht. They soon met opposition from the Party, however, because in their determination to help remedy existing grievances they were too frank in depicting on the stage the negative aspects of East German life. Hence also the difficulties faced by Hacks in getting his play going to the point of actual performances and later.

The public performance of the first version of the play put on by the Deutsches Theater in the autumn of 1959 came to grief because of objections by the Party. Revised by direction from above, a second version was presented on 15 May 1960 at the little theatre at Senftenberg in the Lausitz brown coal district, but was quickly taken off. The première of the third version on 2 October 1962 also came up against official party criticism, which was concentrated on two points: Hacks' view of East German reality, and his way of depicting the party and the worker. *Neues Deutschland*, central organ of the SED, wrote (16 October 1962):

> The core of the problem raised by this play is Peter Hacks' failure to discover the dialectic of our life. He tells the audience through the mouth of the new Party secretary in the briquette factory of the way he himself sees things. This shows that for him the present is grey and the future colourful and gay. Whoever tries to envisage communism is to look for the opposite of everything that exists

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now, that is to say, of socialism. . . . The author has the same Party secretary confess at the end:

For
Workers' power, we know, comes before
Workers' happiness. Happiness needs power.
And he alone who stubbornly helps to create power
will enjoy the day when power changes into happiness.

This, if we may say so, is the dialectic of Peter Hacks, but not that of Marxists, not that of socialist reality in the GDR. . . . To us our present life means happiness and joy in the struggle against difficulties and troubles. . . . It is this incomprehension of the dialectic inherent in our development that leads to the misunderstanding in the play of the part played by the Party. I can quite understand the anger felt by many comrades at the distorted picture of a Party organisation drawn here . . . and at the way the author presents the working class.

Although it had taken this negative attitude, it seemed as if the Party was initially still prepared to enter into a genuine discussion on the merits and demerits of the play which even *Neues Deutschland* in its first review had called a 'declaration' in favour of the 'power of the workers and peasants'. The SED paper had even invited a discussion, and in the letters it published it gave roughly equal space to those in favour and those against. Hacks, it was clear, had strong support, especially from among writers and actors. The president of the East German Writers' Association, Anna Seghers, for example, welcomed both play and performance and expressed the hope 'that soon even more plays which arouse as much excitement will be produced on our stages'.[2] In taking this stand, however, she laid herself open to much criticism, both at the Party congress and at the 'discussion meeting' of Party leadership and writers.

A special point at issue were the statements which Hacks puts into the mouth of the new Party secretary, already criticised by the cultural editor of *Neues Deutschland*. These views about the discrepancy between the communist ideal and East German reality, and about the relationship of power and happiness, undoubtedly reflect the opinion of many intellectual adherents of communism. To the Party, however, they appear exceedingly dangerous, and this explains its extremely sensitive reaction. Many functionaries, from Ulbricht down to the lower echelons, have spoken out particularly strongly against this aspect of the play. On the other hand, Jens Gerlach, a young writer, identified himself with these views, and another contribution to the discussion maintained that, though not Marxist, it does represent the opinion of quite a number of people, including Party members, who do in fact hold these mistaken views today.[3]

[2] *Neues Deutschland*, 9 December 1962.
[3] Supplement to *Neues Deutschland*, 27 October 1962.

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The influence of events in Moscow on the debates in East Berlin was evident when in December the Party abandoned the relative tolerance it had up to then shown Hacks' play. A joint statement by Siegfried Wagner, head of the Cultural Section of the Central Committee of the SED, and Kurt Bork, head of the Department for Graphic Arts of the Ministry of Culture, published by *Neues Deutschland* (16 December 1962), cut short the discussion. It had shown 'that what was being discussed were basic political and esthetic problems'. The programme notes of the Deutsches Theatre performance had said: 'The play shows up the causes of many of our mistakes. It shows how we correct these mistakes, and what mistakes we make again in the process of correction.' On this Wagner and Bork commented: 'This point of view is unacceptable to us, whether formulated as a formal proposition or fashioned into a play. We shall challenge it as a matter of principle wherever we meet it.'

The Party leadership had fully realised that in the last analysis the problem raised here was that of destalinisation, which they had always dodged by refusing to engage in a 'discussion of mistakes'. The importance attached by the SED to Hacks' play, as a symbol of the political and ideological differences between the Party and East German intellectuals, emerges from the fact that it was still the subject of extensive criticism at the Party congress and during the 'discussion meeting' with the writers. At the beginning of January, on Party instructions, *Trouble and Power* was taken off the repertory of the East Berlin Deutsches Theater, and shortly afterwards Peter Hacks was dismissed from his post as *dramaturg* of the theatre. The manager, Wolfgang Langhoff, whose policy had frequently brought him into conflict with the Party, and who had also been the target of harsh criticism at the Party congress and the 'discussion meeting', is said to be likely to lose his job at the end of the season.

AFTER the first attacks by Khrushchev and the Soviet press on modern art, the campaign in the GDR against any attempt to free the arts from the dogmatism and schematism of a narrowly-conceived socialist realism became much more intense. To begin with, the supporters of orthodoxy were on the defensive against the demands of the 'liberals', a fact which became clear when the Party leadership ostensibly took over their demands whilst in fact turning their ideas upside down, and charging the oppositional artists with the very mistakes with which these had reproached the orthodox. The SED claimed, for example, to be defending the 'breadth' of its cultural policy against alleged efforts by the modernists to 'constrict' it, and spoke of the 'dogmatism' and 'schematism' of the very forces anxious to overcome these features of Stalinist cultural practice.

This same method of fighting undesirable trends in cultural life was used to criticise *Fetzer's Flight*, by Günter Kunert, a television opera

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shown by the East Berlin television service. It is the story of a young lad fleeing from the GDR to the Federal Republic on a goods train. During the trip he has a scuffle with the guard who falls off the truck and is run over. A visit from the victim's widow in the refugee camp finally induces him to return to the GDR. The argument was completely in line with official propaganda. What was new was the form. A young director, Günter Stahnke, for whom this was one of his first jobs, and Werner Bergmann, one of the best cameramen of DEFA, the East German film company, had shaped the material in an expressive anti-naturalistic style full of pictorial symbolism. In a wave of prescribed criticism reminiscent of the anti-formalism campaign of the Stalin era, which made particular play with an appeal to 'healthy popular feeling', Kunert was accused of 'schematism'. *Neues Deutschland* set the tone of the attacks (23 December 1962):

> Now we know what this kind of 'anti-schematist' means by art: severe constriction, limitation and demolition of the rich art of socialist realism built on the best traditions of humanism; schematisation; reliance on stereotyped concepts; deliberate denial of every popular aspect of art; subjecting our art and literature to a levelling fashion trick of Western character.

A television film, *Monologue for a Taxi-Driver*, produced by the same team and announced as an experiment, was no longer shown. In this film a taxi-driver helps a girl who is about to give birth. After taking her to the hospital free of charge, he spends a whole day trying to reach the child's father. He keeps on coming up against fresh obstacles and reflects: 'A people of would-be policemen and not so would-be policemen, that's what we are and always have been. Three cheers for us all.' And: 'Let's have no more of this suicidal decency. Let's stop constantly admitting new needs which are not really genuine. Consideration, reasonableness, prudence, forbearance: they are all shackles, chains which "have never sounded sweeter", chains like snakes that pull tighter and tighter and squeeze the life out of your body. Let's have an end of it. Get back your freedom. Say no. No, no!'

Kurt Hager, chairman of the ideological commission of the SED Politbureau, in his speech to writers and artists of 25 March 1963, asserted that both Kunert's television films were 'imbued with a deep scepticism towards man and his ability to change the world and in the process to change himself, a scepticism alien to our socialist ideology'. Hager discovered in this 'the existentialist philosophy of hopelessness' and a 'reactionary bourgeois conception, based on Jaspers' philosophy, of our era, of the two German states, of social conditions in the GDR'.[4]

Kunert, who had already revealed himself as a nonconformist lyric poet in 1956, the 'year of the thaw', and had originally been the protégé of Johannes Becher, the late Minister of Culture, is one of the most

[4] Kurt Hager, 'Parteilichkeit und Volksverbundenheit in unserer Literatur und Kunst', *Neues Deutschland*, 30 March 1963.

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talented of the young East German poets. At the age of 34 he has an intellectual style, frequently seasoned with ironic wit, which is hardly in keeping with the demands of the supporters of socialist-realism for 'being party-minded' and 'staying close to the people'. Hager described Kunert's latest poems as 'nihilistic' and 'barely concealed attacks on our Republic'. The following richly symbolic verses (published in *Weltbühne*, 2 January 1963), aroused the Party's particular displeasure:

King Xantos of Tharsos,
from the day of his birth
blind,
Forbade
As an unnecessary luxury
The making of what people
Call lamps.

The worms also
have their own domain: the soil.
Whoever
else wants to live there must
be dead.

Kunert's poems are not exceptional. At the 'discussion meeting' Hager admitted that in the field of lyric poetry 'the abandonment by several authors of socialist positions had been particularly noticeable'. The functionaries had long felt that especially those poems were suspect that showed individuality of form. 'Politically hostile aims', said Hager, 'are given the form of dreams, topical criticism assumes historical garb, or the form of a parable, and there is a proliferation of new symbolisms.' At the same time the Party ideologists inveighed against 'artificially exaggerating the problem of the generations', as had been done by a number of young poets: 'The old people are said to be "behind the times". If only the "impatient" angry young men could take a hand; they are prepared to raise the banner of "truth", that is so heavy a burden, and they would do everything differently if only they were allowed to.'

THIS touches on a problem that, just as in the Soviet Union, is causing the party increasing concern; in the world of the arts it is today most clearly reflected in lyric poetry. Here again there are parallels with the Soviet Union, where poetry seems to serve as a kind of escape valve for public opinion, which explains the tremendous impact made by such young poets as Evtushenko and Voznesensky. The SED seems to be afraid of similar developments in the GDR. There were some signs of this at at an evening of lyric poetry arranged by the East Berlin Academy of Art in the middle of December. The secretary of the section for Poetry and Language, Stephan Hermlin, had through the press invited young unknown lyric poets to send in unpublished poems for a public recital. Some 1,250 poems had been received, of which Hermlin then

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recited about fifty. Many of them showed considerable promise; and some which deviated from the customary pattern and were concerned not only with personal themes but dealt critically with current problems as well, evoked vigorous applause from the large audience.

The official reaction, however, was distinctly negative. *Sonntag*, the weekly journal of the Cultural Association, published an article (6 January 1963) sharply attacking Hermlin and castigating the poems recited at the Academy as embodying 'a dislike of our environment'. At the Party congress Kurt Hager endorsed the criticism, saying that the evening had been 'misused to attack the central organ of the Party' and 'to disseminate poems permeated by a spirit of pessimisim, ignorant carping criticism, and hostility towards the Party'.[5]

It was therefore felt to be advisable for the Party to take over the organisation of such functions in the future, otherwise they might develop as they had in the USSR, and become forums for the expression of political opinions, part of the process of destalinisation. The SED was, in fact, largely successful in achieving its aim at the evenings of lyric poetry organised before the Party congress by FDJ, the youth organisation, in conjunction with the Writers' Association, in East Berlin, Leipzig, Halle, Dresden, and Rostock. The publicity given to these functions by press, radio, and television, and the way those lyric poets were singled out who wrote in a Party spirit, were designed to guide the activities of young authors into channels agreeable to the SED. There might also have been the idea that this was one way of discovering the malcontents among the younger poets, for even on these evenings some of the poems aroused the functionaries' distrust. The SED district leaders in Leipzig and Halle once again made a point of dealing with the 'uneasiness' that had been expressed by some of the authors. *Einheit*, the theoretical organ of the SED central committee, also dwelt at length on these disturbing tendencies in the work of young authors. Hans Koch, who holds the Chair of Art and Literature at the Institute for Sociology attached to the SED central committee, noted that there was a 'critical' and 'angry' trend, influenced in part by the work (not so far published in the GDR) of Franz Kafka.[6]

There are indeed some very remarkable talents emerging among East German lyric poets, with a markedly individual poetic handwriting. The thematic and formal single-track character of socialist realism has been abandoned, empty pathos is shunned, and the personal sphere has been rediscovered. Even the titles betray this: 'Rehabilitation of the Ego', 'Picasso: Sylvette in the Easy Chair', or 'Jazz me Blues'. The fairly numerous poems which come to grips with the present show a sober engagement and unequivocal impatience with dogmatism; while urgently pressing for change, they take a positive attitude towards the socialist order. The most talented of the young lyric writers include

[5] Supplement to *Sonntag*, No. 4, 1963.
[6] *Einheit*, No. 3, 1963.

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Reiner Krisch, Günter Wünsche, Bernd Jentzsch, and Volker Braun, all of them under thirty.

THESE young poets are not tainted or corrupted by Stalinism; in many respects they are trying to find their way back to the revolutionary ideals of the twenties and to employ as their own the artistic forms of that period. It is therefore not surprising that some of the older writers, whose artistic values derive from the same period, when humanist impulses first led them towards communism, should sympathise with their young colleagues. The evenings of lyric poetry at the Academy were symptomatic in this respect. The East Berlin Academy of Art has always been a stronghold of 'liberalism' in East German cultural life; among its members are writers for whom the twenties or the years of emigration were artistically the most fruitful period. The SED had repeatedly criticised the Academy's attitude towards official cultural policy, and the 'ideological brinkmanship' of some of its members. But a revision of the statutes, and the proclamation of a 'Socialist Academy of the GDR' in the spring of 1962 did not produce the change desired by the SED. At the Party congress in January 1963 the Academy was again the target of vigorous attacks. Some communists in the Academy, for example, were charged with 'denying party-mindedness in art'.

After being subjected for years to criticism, the journal published by the Academy, *Sinn und Form*, was purged. The chief editor, Peter Huchel, a non-political lyric poet of repute, was replaced at the beginning of this year by Bode Uhse, a story-teller converted from nazism to communism in the early thirties. He is one of the group of 'Mexico emigrants', like Anna Seghers, Ludwig Renn, and Alexander Abusch, and has always conformed to the Party line but has not attracted attention during the last few years. During the sixteen years when it was the only literary journal in the GDR, *Sinn und Form* managed to maintain a high level unaffected by everyday politics; with contributions from reputable foreign authors, it served as an intellectual bridge between East and West, a function which the SED had come to dislike more and more in the last few years.

As secretary of the section for Poetry and Language of the Academy, Stephan Hermlin was also a member of the editorial board. This sensitive 50-year-old lyric poet has been a communist since his early youth, but he has never been able to bring his artistic ideas, influenced as they have been by Eluard and Aragon, into line with the SED's cultural policy. For many years now he has published no work of his own, and has therefore been criticised more and more frequently by the functionaries. The evening of lyric poetry which he arranged at the Academy was the last straw; he was removed from the post of secretary of the section for Poetry and Language, and succeeded by Alfred Kurella, who until the Party congress had been chairman of the Cultural Commission (since dissolved) of the SED Politbureau. That the anti-modernist Kurella lost

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the influential Party post he had held up to then—he was not re-elected to the Politbureau, of which he had been a candidate member—can probably be attributed to the failure of his efforts to overcome the sustained opposition of many writers and artists to the SED cultural policy which he represented.

The second centre of opposition, after the Academy, is the Writers' Association. It was the chief target of criticism at the 'discussion meeting' of the Politbureau with writers and artists. It was clearly implied in Walter Ulbricht's speech that over the past year there had been a vigorous demand for genuine destalinisation, and he referred in this connection to developments in the Soviet Union. In Berlin writers had spread the news that 'a period of thaw had now arrived, and as part of the struggle against the cult of personality socialist realism could not of course be used or taught any longer the way it had been. Formalism and other trends would have to be able to exist side by side "on a basis of equality"'. Ulbricht said it was no accident 'that people who inclined towards nihilistic views and ideological coexistence used formalism and abstractionism as weapons in their struggle against the socialist ideology'.[7] The SED leader demanded a complete change in the work of the committee of the Writers' Association, and particularly of its Berlin organisation. The work of the secretariat and the editorial staff of *Neue deutsche Literatur*, the journal published by the Writers' Association, had been violently criticised even before, at the 'discussion meeting', by Günter Görlich, a writer responsible for matters affecting the younger generation within the Association. On a number of occasions recently the journal had printed poems by young authors of the kind which had now been censured. The January 1963 issue carried a spirited defence of *Trouble and Power* (by then unambiguously condemned by the Party) from the pen of a member of the editorial staff, and Wolfgang Joho, the chief editor, a novelist and journalist of middle-class background who has been a Communist party member since 1929, deprecated restrictive dogmatic views on the nature of literature and its task.

After the latest attacks *Neue deutsche Literatur* seems likely to follow *Sinn und Form* in having to change its editorial staff. Changes of personnel were made in the secretariat of the Writers' Association shortly after the discussion meeting. Otto Braun, an old communist who had been rebuked for his neutral attitude, was replaced as first secretary by the young and ambitious Günter Görlich. The influence of the party apparatus in the Association will be further reinforced by the co-option as secretary of Willi Lewin, until then head of the literary section of the cultural department of the SED central committee. On 5 April 1963 the presidium of the Association adopted a resolution—sent to Ulbricht as a message of greetings—accepting the decisions of the SED congress and announcing that the 'serious differences of

[7] *Neues Deutschland*, 4 April 1963.

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opinion' in its ranks had been eliminated. More than rhetorical meaning need not be attached to this statement; further changes of personnel are not at all unlikely. On the other hand, such measures are bound to exacerbate even further the conflict between the Party and the writers, and this cannot really be the Party's wish. After all, many old comrades, who have faithfully followed the Party line for years, have already joined the ranks of the opposition. The only unconditional support for the line of the SED leadership comes from the literary mediocrities whose rise was favoured by the conditions obtaining under Stalinism, and who, if the hitherto accepted criteria of socialist realism were revised, would have to fear for their position. Here again there are distinct parallels with the situation in the Soviet Union.

There is no doubt that the anti-dogmatists in East German cultural life have had to accept a severe setback which is intimately connected with Soviet developments. Comparisons with the anti-liberalisation campaign of 1957, which terminated the brief thaw in the GDR, suggest themselves. Then, too, the SED leaders hoped they had eliminated the anti-Stalinist forces among writers and artists. The events of the past year have proved them wrong. This time, again, the dogmatists will probably achieve only a temporary success. Poland and Hungary remain valid examples of the possibility of a more liberal communist cultural policy. The Soviet Union, too, even after the return to a stricter line, offers different standards of comparison. At the meeting with writers and artists Ulbricht expressly rejected the proposal that books dealing with the Stalinist terror should be published in the GDR. But even in East Germany the clock cannot be turned right back. A comparison of the present situation with 1958 shows that there has been some relaxation in a number of sectors of cultural life. Admittedly, progress is less than in the rest of the bloc, and it may cease altogether for a time. At what point movement will start again will depend very much on how things develop in the Soviet Union.

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RECENT HUNGARIAN WRITING

George Gömöri

LAST YEAR BROUGHT a radical change in Hungarian literary life. Until then much had been said but little done in this sphere; since then, aided by the impact of the twenty-second congress of the CPSU, Hungarian writers have seen a rapid improvement in their situation, and something like a return to 'normality'. The Party has loosened the reins of ideological control, without relinquishing, however, its self-arrogated right to give 'guidance' to the writers, and without ceasing to warn them about their duty to exercise restraint on certain matters while allowing a great deal of outspokenness on others. As quite a few writers availed themselves of the opportunities of freer expression and freer debate, something like a second thaw began to take place in Hungarian literature. This is a much slower and more cautious thaw than the first one was in the mid-fifties; it is also much better controlled by the authorities. All the same, things have been improving of late for Hungarian writers, and a radical reversal of the present more lenient line seems unlikely. The improvements of the recent past can be discussed under three headings: the return of the exiles, the attempt to tackle 'difficult' subjects, and the ferment amongst the young.

The return of the exiles

WHEN THE DISBANDED Hungarian Writers' Association was formed once again in 1959, Jozsef Darvas, addressing the plenary meeting, attacked the group of poets who 'formerly belonged to the Party'. At the time these poets were still refraining from publication. They had more than one reason for doing so—some of their best friends and most distinguished colleagues were still in prison. Step by step the regime abandoned its intransigence towards the rebel writers; first the poet Zelk was released, and in 1960 Tardos, Hay, and Tibor Dery. All these writers, with the exception of the playwright Gyula Hay, have since reappeared on the literary scene. Zelk left prison a sick and broken man, while he was in gaol his wife died. He was, incidentally, the only one of the sentenced writers who recanted for his participation in the 1956 events. Tibor Tardos began to write again in 1961, and has published a number of excellent reports and short stories. Tibor Dery, whose name is not unknown in the West, made his way into print in the September 1962 issue of *Uj Iras* (a Budapest equivalent to *Novy Mir*) with a vaguely self-critical short story (also published in *Encounter*). Since then Dery's stories have continued to appear in various periodicals—including a Hungarian-language monthly published in Yugoslavia—and in March 1963 a collection of his selected short stories was announced in Budapest. He is touring Western Europe at present, giving well-attended lectures in Vienna and Hamburg—another sign of the changing times in Hungary.

The unusual thing about Dery's new collection is that, side by side with his new stories it contains a number of older ones, dating from the years 1954–56. It includes the moving 'Love', which is about the

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release of a prisoner and his return home, based on first-hand accounts of rehabilitated 'Rajkists' and social-democrats. In the more recent stories the 1956 rising and its consequences are frequently recalled, although more on a personal than a political level. Dery's real interest lies in the exploration in depth of human relationships, such as the attachment of an old peasant woman to her cow ('The cow'), or the play-acting of the wife of an imprisoned writer for her dying mother-in-law ('Two women').

Apart from Dery another ex-communist, another former champion of the anti-Rakosi rebels, has reappeared: Laszlo Benjamin. His book of poetry *The Fifth Season* (Otodik evszak) was hailed as a great achievement of socialist poetry. There is no doubt about Benjamin's genuine socialist convictions, which forced him into silence in the first few years after 1956; what seems extraordinary is that he was allowed to include in his book many earlier poems which are the most outright attacks on Stalinism and on the moral standards it introduced in Hungary. Although he was later criticised in the Party daily for losing his 'sense of proportion' through the moral shock of learning about Stalin's crimes,[1] the fact remains that some of his bitterest poems, written in early 1956, are now reprinted in Hungary.

Writings on 'difficult' subjects

IT WAS PERHAPS ON THE SO-CALLED 'difficult' subjects that in recent months Hungarian writers have produced their most interesting work. Some of these subjects were officially banned or non-existent (Soviet forced labour camps); others were treated according to the tactical requirements of the Party; others again were simply ignored. Hungarian newspapers had just started writing about Solzhenitsyn's *Ivan Denisovich* when the January 1963 number of *Uj Iras* published a short novel by Jozsef Lengyel. The story, entitled *From Beginning to End*, was about a Siberian camp and was based on the author's personal experiences; a work in its contents not unlike Solzhenitsyn's, but very different in style and presentation.

Lengyel is a veteran of the Hungarian communist movement. He was born in 1896, worked on the staff of the *Red Gazette* during Bela Kun's Soviet Republic of 1919, and emigrated after its collapse. For some time he lived in Austria and Germany, but finally settled in the Soviet Union. In 1937 he was arrested and spent the following eighteen years in prisons, forced labour camps, and compulsory residence in Siberia. These years provided him with a wide range of experiences and matured his talent as a writer.

This was not the first time that Lengyel had recalled his years of suffering: he has been publishing stories with a camp background since February 1962. One of these, 'Yellow Poppies',[2] takes place under the Arctic skies of Norilsk, and allows a glimpse, unprecedented in Soviet literature, into the horrors of forced labour camps. Another story by Lengyel recalls the days of the Purge in the Soviet Union, telling about the fate of an old scientist who was arrested and tortured to confess

[1] *Nepszabadsag*, 7 March 1963.
[2] *Elet es Irodalom*, 17 March 1962.

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anti-state crimes. The old man does not give in; at the end of the story he disappears. The story ends with his rehabilitation after the twenty-second CPSU congress.[3]

From Beginning to End is, on the other hand, not a single episode but a fairly complete story of the author's Calvary. Solzhenitsyn tells us only about *one* single day in a camp, and that in the last years of the Stalin era. Lengyel, on the other hand, tries to compress *all* his 'lost' years into an entity—his story unfolds through dramatic episodes that characterise the general situation at the time in question. He gives a short but unforgettable description of a prison cell where he spent a few weeks: the room was intended for twenty-five persons, and there are 275 people crowded together there. There is hardly any air to breathe; some die of heart attacks, others go insane. Life in the camp is depicted through such episodes as the life-and-death struggle between inmates for a piece of bread, or the search for grass to eat.

> In early spring people start eating grass. In the camp area the grass never grows higher than half a centimetre. The grass-pickers are there already at dawn, they crawl on all fours, almost lying on the ground. . . .

The grass is usually cooked in water but those who are too eager to fill their stomachs, eat it raw. People die of starvation by hundreds, although they eat practically anything they find: potato-peelings, boiled oil-cakes. Eating becomes an obsession and bread an almost mystical substance.

The outstanding virtue of Lengyel's novel is its merciless sincerity. His camp is a more hopeless, more thoroughly dehumanised place than Solzhenitsyn's. Lengyel is not a Russian peasant unjustly arrested, he is a foreign communist, a political refugee, arrested for no reason at all. Ivan Denisovich might reconcile his personal resentment with a traditional Russian resignation; Bela Kun's follower cannot. And, significantly, his deep moral indignation against the inhuman aspects of the Stalin era is shared by many old communists, one of whom, while rejecting an unwarranted attack on Lengyel's sincerity by another critic, writes: 'It is not enough to reveal the phenomena of the personality-cult; there is need for a more thorough and deeper explanation of the conditions that made its birth and lasting impact possible.'[4]

The Rajk affair, the biggest political show trial of communist Hungary, has also found a chronicler in the person of Gyula Oszko, a former officer of the Hungarian police. Oszko's article, published in the February 1963 number of *Kortars*, reveals the inner struggle that is going on in the mind of almost every 'framed' communist: is it possible to remain a communist in spite of this? Oszko answers in the affirmative, although he duly records the disillusionment, the complete loss of faith of his cell-mate—another 'Rajkist'—and confesses that during his five years of imprisonment it was sheer hope in the future (and not in the Party's ability to correct itself) that kept him alive.

The more open-minded policy of the Kadar regime enables some writers to have a new look not only at the abuses of the Rakosi era but at the events of 1956 as well. Erzsebet Galgoczi's remarkable short

[3] *Uj Iras*, November 1962.
[4] *Elet es Irodalom*, 16 March 1963.

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story, 'Upside down',[5] is a product of this new look. The hero, a certain Martinko, presides over a village council, and while 'carrying out the Party's orders', seriously infringes written and unwritten laws alike. He is hated and feared; in a word, he is a typical Stalinist functionary. During the uprising he is cornered by a crowd of drunken peasants, and under threat of more serious injury, he is forced to do a handstand. The handstand humiliates Martinko immensely, because at the bottom of his heart he knows the *meaning* of the crude joke: the people want him to face reality, not to judge it from an upside down position. Later on this truth finds conscious expression in an argument with a former friend, a police officer, who in the heated October days was driven out of the factory 'by the counter-revolutionaries'. At this point Martinko denies the assertion that honest communists were driven out of *every* position and cries: 'Those who want to hurt me are not necessarily counter-revolutionaries! I am not identical with socialism!' The moral is clear: the natural resentment of the people against dogmatic functionaries cannot be equated with counter-revolution. This opens the way towards a positive revaluation of October 1956, still a sore point for many Hungarian communists.

Ferment amongst the young

IN RECENT MONTHS A NOTICEABLE ferment has been at work among young writers and artists. Their demands could be formulated in two sentences: they want to be treated more like adults and have a greater say in the affairs of their own society; they want to form literary groups which bring together poets and writers of similar views and aspirations. Both demands were put forward at the Young Poets' Conference at Pecs, 25–26 January 1963, one of the most fascinating literary gatherings of recent years. It was on this occasion that the talented poet Sandor Csoori asked: 'Why can't we acquire a role similar to that of Evtushenko and his friends? They have influence because they discuss vital questions, such questions as are left unanswered by politics.'[6] While most young poets feel that the present situation of Hungarian poetry is unsatisfactory, they offer sharply differing solutions. The majority of speakers at Pecs demanded freedom of competition between literary groups within the framework of socialist literature; the poets of the 'Fire-dance' group,[7] on the other hand, spoke for 'unity on the basis of common ideology', i.e. Marxism-Leninism. Since then the spokesmen of the Party on cultural affairs have also given their views on the 'conflict of generations' implicit in the Pecs demands; they gave a rubber-stamp approval to the unpopular views of the Fire-dance group. It should be noted here that for the youngest poets Dery and Benjamin are more genuine representatives of socialist literature than the noisy newcomers of the 1957–59 period, who got preferential treatment from most critics at that time.

It is still hard to tell how gifted the young poets now challenging the Fire-dancers are, but it is possible to state that some young talents have

[5] Ibid., 5 January 1963.
[6] *Elet es Irodalom*, 2 February 1963.
[7] A group of poets formed after the 1956 rising; it boasts more 'Party-minded' than talented members.

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had a rejuvenating effect on Hungarian prose. Lajos Galambos, Endre Fejes, Karoly Szakonyi and others have infused new blood into narrative prose; their outspoken social criticism and passionate affirmation of the overriding value of truth and human dignity, so often trampled down in recent Hungarian history, makes them well worth reading. There is a certain affinity between them and the young generation of Soviet prose writers, the Kazakovs and Aksenovs.

None of these young writers are 'modernists', although Fejes has been successfully experimenting with a less parochial, more succinct style. Modernism is still anathema in Hungary; so is its philosophical counterpart, Existentialism. Those who claim that there is complete creative freedom in Hungary are wrong; Khrushchev's assertion about the impossibility of ideological coexistence was duly echoed by the Hungarian ideologist, Szirmai, in a recent speech.[8] Even the now condemned 'administrative methods' of the Zhdanov period reappear from time to time: there is the case of Gyula Hernadi, a young writer of considerable talent whose first novel was rejected by the Party press as 'existentialist' and 'not true to reality'. This novel was bought by French, German and Spanish publishing houses, but Hernadi's second novel has not been accepted for publication by the state-controlled publishing houses in Hungary. Anomalies of this kind help to emphasise the limits and shortcomings of the new and more generous cultural policy now being practised in Hungary.

[8] *Nepszabadsag*, 30 March 1963.

Arnold Buchholz

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J. M. Bochenski in *Studies in Soviet Thought*

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DOCUMENT

'The Provocateurs of Survey', by R. Samarin. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 18 April 1963

(We have not thought it worth while to answer Mr Samarin at length. Those who, unlike all but a very few of Mr Samarin's Soviet readers, have access to Survey *No. 46 may see for themselves how seriously he distorts the intention of the articles which he criticises. His article concerns us mainly as an example—not by any means the worst which has come our way—of the bullying tactics now being used against many of the most original and independent-minded writers and artists in the Soviet Union. Praise from Western critics is represented as proof in itself that their work is unhealthy and unpatriotic.)*

Wash-houses! Wash-houses! Doors slam!
Old women go jumping into the snow. . . .

I READ these lines, translated into English without rhythm or rhyme, and was horrified, imagining the fate of the old women who jumped into the snow direct from a bath house. What made them do it? Then I understood that this was an attempt to translate the cheeky poems of the early Voznesensky (if such an expression can be used about him), written before he learned to pose to newspaper photographers and to give abroad interviews in doubtful taste. We know that Voznesensky speaks of communal baths and young Siberian girls, 'wenches' [baby], in a good tempered, sly and enthusiastic sense, and not of grandmothers [babushki] and of 'wash-houses' as Mr Forgues, the translator, apparently 'understood' it.

I thought that the transformation of Voznesensky's 'Siberian nudes' into respectable matrons who jump into the snow was simply explained by a poor knowledge of Russian. However, when I considered the peculiar reasoning which Mr Forgues attaches to his free translation,[1] I realised that it was not a question of his ignorance of Russian, but of quite different considerations. Mr Forgues sees in Voznesensky's cheerful poem a certain development of Mayakovsky's theme in 'The Bath House',[2] which is carried out, moreover, in an Aesopean mode, by hints. The author attempts to convey to his readers the truly astonishing thought that 'Bath House' is an anti-Soviet work and that this attitude is also present in Voznesensky. Mr Forgues' commentary is also written mostly in hints, with grimaces and half expressed statements, but its provocative sense is obvious.

1 The English translation of this verse is indeed faulty, and this is the only well-founded criticism which Mr Samarin makes. In fairness to Pierre Forgues it should be said that he wrote his article in French and has no share in the responsibility for the English translations.

2 No connection between Voznesensky's poem and Mayakovsky's 'Banya' is made in Pierre Forgues' article. Evidently Mr Samarin has misunderstood the passing reference to Mayakovsky.

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The same spirit permeates the whole of the January number of *Survey*, an English journal devoted to contemporary Soviet culture. It can be seen from the title-page that its object is to survey the USSR and the countries of 'Eastern Europe'. It has been known for a long time for its systematic attacks on socialist countries. The slanderers and provocateurs of *Survey* are particularly shameless because they pretend to be a sort of avant-garde of the 'free world', 'socialists', 'Marxists', 'democrats', and 'liberals'. Under these pseudonyms Trotsky's rabble successors and various kinds of 'liberal' fauna of all shades among the intelligentsia who specialise in anti-communism, appear in *Survey*.

Thus, the January number is camouflaged as a platform for liberals and high-souled mourners, who are concerned about the development of Soviet culture. Among the authors, next to A. J. Campbell, who is modestly introduced as a person 'who has made several visits to the USSR', and G. Stuckow, 'a student of Soviet affairs now living in Germany', there are, unfortunately, university teachers from France and England and brothers of the press. A mixed crowd. However, the presence of sages with degrees among the authors, cannot conceal the strong smell of cheap sensationalism in this journal. The interests of its true masters can be seen from some frank confessions scattered throughout the number.

For the gentlemen from *Survey*, Soviet art is particularly interesting as 'one of the few sources of information about the moods of the Soviet people', says Mr Willetts, the author of the introductory article, hesitantly entitled 'New Directions?' It appears, however, that 'information' serves *Survey* for disinformation, for falsification and for slander. The current attempt at disinformation, which finds expression in its January number, consists in presenting Soviet culture today as a battle-field of irreconcilable conflict between the 'older generation' and 'youth'.[3] According to the journal it appears that in the Soviet arts an inert mass of 'reactionaries' and 'conformists' is confronted by a few 'progressive writers' and 'revolutionaries'. It is not difficult to be numbered among the latter on the pages of this journal. It suffices to criticise any one of the writers who follow the Leninist line in literature. On the other hand, he who proclaims that he wishes to use his talent in the service of the people, stands a very good chance of being cursed and numbered among 'reactionaries'. Such declarations are not liked at all by the *Survey* senate, which equates patriotism with 'philistine nationalism'.

Had the articles in *Survey* been of a scholarly character, it would have been possible to put up serious arguments against them. In some bourgeois critics, the achievements of Soviet literature evoke not only confusion and annoyance, but also the desire to understand the essence of the processes which are taking place in our culture, even when they do not sympathise with them. But the authors of this English journal are different. That is why we are forced to convict them, not argue with them.

Times have changed. It is not possible, as used to happen in the old days, for *Survey* simply to pass over the achievements of Soviet

[3] On the contrary, it is clearly realised that this is an unreal dichotomy. The point is made, for instance, in H. T. Willetts' article.

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literature and art. The collectors and suppliers of 'information' are forced to mutter through their teeth that our art personifies humanist ideals and that the CPSU calls for this. They cannot deny that more collections of poems are printed in the USSR than anywhere else, that after the XXth and XXIInd Congresses there has been fruitful progress in drama, in pictorial art, in cinema and everywhere else. While fleetingly mentioning this, the 'surveyors' do their best to prove that the present mighty growth of Soviet art is taking place in spite of the development of Soviet society and the policy of the Party. That it expresses some sort of hidden 'oppositionist' stream.

These absurd positions cannot be maintained without obvious juggling with facts; therefore *Survey* declares that a decline of socialist realism is taking place. Its manifold forms, which have so richly appeared within the last few years, the development of creative individualism, the courage of artistic search, true innovation, the appearance of new subjects which emerge from the gigantic development of communist construction in the USSR—all this the journal's falsifiers declare to be a departure from socialist realism.

They see, in the wealth of recent artistic development, a blurring of the division between socialist and critical realism. Should a Soviet poet write a poem on the great power of the artistic word, this apparently 'contradicts the aesthetics of socialist realism'. It is worth noting that *Survey* does not dare any longer to maintain that socialist realism is a fiction. As it is unable to convince anybody that socialist realism does not exist, it hastens to bury it in a profusion of grand phrases and unsupported declarations. Aware of the shakiness of its proofs, it does not conceal that the authors who interest it most are those whose writings can be interpreted as direct or allegorical criticism of the 'system', that is, of the foundations of Soviet society.

I have already quoted one of the examples of such 'allegorical' interpretation in the sorry case of 'old women' and 'The Bath House' by Mayakovsky. In addition to everything else, this shows pure ignorance. There are, however, more striking examples of this so-called 'interpretation' of Soviet literature and the events of literary life. *Survey's* peeping Toms try to find in every poem, in every story or article, oppositionist allegories of the most astonishing kind. When, however, their supply of these runs out, they remember the anti-Soviet lampoon of a certain Tertz who, according to Trotskyist publications, lives in the USSR, or that of the notorious manufacturer of 'canards' Monsieur Tatu.

You should see how the peeping Toms of *Survey* burn incense before those in whom they are particularly interested, before those in whom they have divined a propensity to self-advertisement or a childish desire to show off, as for instance in the case of Evtushenko written up by Mr Forgues. How clearly we see in his article the inducements used abroad by shady press agents to circumvent and fool some overgrown young geniuses. However, taking all this into account, the barely concealed contempt for the 'young' and 'progressive' who are encouraged to bait the 'reactionaries' still seeps through in *Survey*. At one point

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Willetts scornfully calls the stories of young authors 'sloppy novelettes',[4] at another Forgues, in an attempt to show himself an expert on our life, says that some poets are rowdies. After 'admiring' the laurel wreaths with which *Survey* crowns some of our writers in gratitude for their naiveté and exhibitionism, and apparently as a sign of encouragement, one stops laughing about the ignorance and dishonesty of foreign 'interpreters'. That is when the whole great and deeply human sense of the lesson given to us in March by the Party is most clearly seen. It is high time we understood that *Survey*, or *Le Monde*, or any other bourgeois publication which is now shedding crocodile tears about the fate of our art, do not care a damn what happens to those whom they praised highly only yesterday. It is not the poetical talents, nor blank verse, nor stem rhymes, nor the truth about the tragic fate of the Soviet people who perished in the years of the personality cult, that interest such foreign 'friends' of Soviet literature. It is characteristic that Solzhenitsyn's story, whose strength was that particular truth, was barely mentioned in *Survey*.[5]

Those writers whom the peeping Toms of *Survey* do not like, who prevent the collection of 'information' and consistently denounce them, are treated very severely. So are those writers who stubbornly and hotly defend the interests of Soviet literature.

Survey knows, however, that its advances and its criticism will be opposed by the *whole* multinational Soviet literature. That is why, while muttering such words as 'thaw', 'frost', 'purge', and other incantations taken from the jargon of irritated petits bourgeois, it is forced again and again to mention, in impotent rage, the *majority* of Soviet writers, artists, and actors, who reject its putrid petty ideas and those of its friends. They have to mention the majority which has once more announced its loyalty to socialist realism and its gratitude to the CPSU for pointing out in time the necessity for a decisive intensification of the struggle against bourgeois ideology.

That is why *Survey* writes with such obvious hate about the policy of our Party in the fields of literature and art. A whole article in the journal, by Hayward of Oxford, is devoted to this question. He and his colleagues tear their hair because their hopes of a crisis in Soviet literature have been disappointed. They are enraged by the principled Leninist line of the party central committee in the management of the great and complicated world of Soviet art. They are disturbed about the fact that the third Writers' Congress has been a symbol of unification. They are seriously worried by the slogan of consolidation proclaimed by N. S. Khrushchev. How pleased Hayward is when he hastens to announce that in spite of a call for consolidation, I. G. Ehrenburg has expressed doubts about the possibility of writers' solidarity in the USSR. The peeping Toms from *Survey*, who creep about the boundaries of our

[4] An unwarrantable generalisation. The phrase was used of Aksenov's work, specifically, and the author of the article was complaining that certain Soviet writers, for instance Aksenov, had been overrated and others comparatively neglected, abroad, because non-literary criteria were applied.

[5] The bulk of the material in this issue of *Survey* was prepared for the press before Solzhenitsyn's story was to hand. Max Hayward, together with Ronald Hingley, translated Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, and H. T. Willetts has translated another of his stories.

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life, are afraid of the solidity of our ranks, their consolidation around the party of Lenin. They are afraid of the Party's far-sighted and decisive policy, its high-minded care for Soviet art. This care manifested itself fully and with human warmth in the days of March, and our creative society supported the just and unflattering criticism and the great demands which the people present to art. We should like to hope that those on whom *Survey* placed its bets have been sobered by all that has passed.

The January number of the journal had apparently already been set up when the editors received information about the visit of members of the Soviet Government to the Manège exhibition. The author of the article on Soviet painting, Mr A. Besançon, was forced to add to it a confused and boring end-piece. We can see from it how the criticism of abstract artists had upset their foreign admirers. We should like to compare this mournful end-piece of Besançon's article with the leitmotif of Willetts' introductory article entitled 'New Directions?' Our critic cannot understand that everything really new in our literature and art is connected with all the new things which happen in our country, which is creating a communist society. The real innovation in Soviet art is fundamentally hostile to the pseudo-newness on which Mr Willetts counts. This is the artistic innovation mounting another steep ascent—which leads to other heights.

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SOCIOLOGY AS A VOCATION

Leopold Labedz

> *In the lecture-rooms of the university no other virtue holds but plain intellectual integrity.*
> —Max Weber, *Science as a Vocation.*

THE new member of the Executive Committee of the International Sociological Association, F. V. Konstantinov, wrote a report on the Fifth World Congress of Sociology which he attended in September 1962 in Washington as the head of the Soviet delegation.[1] In his time Konstantinov has performed many functions, as political commentator, ideological interpreter of Marxism, and until recently the editor-in-chief of the Soviet Communist party's theoretical journal *Kommunist*; but this was the first time he had dealt with sociology. In his report he defined 'the conditions of a genuinely scientific sociology':

> Strictness, objectivity, many-sidedness, good faith—these are the demands which the Party puts before the sociologists and all theoretical workers. In the Soviet Union political figures are armed with a profound theoretical knowledge. They are guided in their activity by the principles of Marxist-Leninist sociology. . . . Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, with all his tireless and versatile activity, shows how to develop creatively the Marxist theory, how to enrich it by new experience, how to link it with practice, how to make use of the laws of social development . . . (p. 17).

Not everywhere are conditions so favourable for scientific sociology. In the United States, for instance, when C. Wright Mills objected to the American policy towards Cuba, 'he was persecuted by the reactionary politicians and died prematurely' (p. 5).

With reference to the Congress itself, Konstantinov wrote[2]:

> It was not easy for us to defend our views from our opponents, enemies, and vacillating people. But we overcame with honour all the difficulties and complexities of the struggle. We were armed with Marxist sociology and truth was on our side. We knew that we represented a great power, the Soviet Union. This inspired us in the difficult and complex struggle with bourgeois ideology.

When Konstantinov said that there is only one sociology, this was taken by some participants to mean that the eschatological frontier between 'Marxist' and 'bourgeois' sociology was no longer stressed. But when, at a subsequent session, Professor Daniel Bell referred to this statement,

1 *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 11, 1962.
2 *V. Mezhdunarodny Sotsiologicheskii Kongress* (Moscow, 1963), p. 13.

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Konstantinov explained that indeed there was only one sociology, namely, Marxist sociology.

Other recollections by Soviet participants at the Congress are equally triumphant about their successes on the battlefield.[3]

> Feldman and Moore (in their paper on 'Industrialisation and Industrialism') repeated, without any arguments or understanding, the hackneyed slander about 'forced collectivisation' and 'compulsory labour' as the 'means taken to solve' the labour-force problem in the USSR. . . . It is quite symptomatic that the 'display of their wares' by Feldman and Moore received no support or sympathy from the audience.

The Soviet sociologists themselves 'convincingly exposed' all these 'sophisms', they 'literally smashed' the arguments of their opponents 'with the help of statistics and other material'. The chairman of the section on 'Education and Formation of Elites', Madam Floud, 'was forced to conclude that Soviet sociologists gave a full and well-founded account of the problem of the Soviet intelligentsia'.

It would be a waste of space to give more examples of the triumphant unmasking of the 'servants of capitalism' by the Soviet sociologists. The passages quoted may not faithfully represent the role of the Soviet delegates at the congress, but they do represent their intellectual style.

At the Amsterdam congress, where a Soviet delegation attended for the first time, there was some novelty in their appearance. At the following congress in Stresa there was still an air of expectation about the development of Soviet sociology. Now, in Washington, these expectations were to be put to the test: Soviet sociologists were at last going to provide information and data about Soviet society based on the 'concrete' investigations to which so many references had been made. But they did nothing of the kind. Western sociologists who were hopefully looking for some new sociological data about Soviet developments were to be disappointed. Instead, the Soviet delegates repeated their customary eulogies about everything Soviet and this became so boring that finally Raymond Aron asked them whether they had *any* social problems in Soviet society.

IT would however be misleading to conclude from this that no change in the field of sociology had occurred in the Soviet Union between the Stresa and Washington congresses. When attending such congresses Soviet delegates are duty bound to engage in an ideological struggle with 'bourgeois sociology' and to present, for both patriotic and doctrinal reasons, the most immaculate picture of Soviet achievements. This turns all of them, including the non-professionals, into simple propagandists. But at home the situation is more complex and the roles more differentiated: there they stress that their activity is or should be directed

[3] *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 11, 1962, p. 26.

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'towards the amelioration of practical problems',[4] the same problems which almost disappear from sight in the eschatological battle abroad.

What then are the main characteristics of the developments in the field of sociology since about 1958–59?

In respect to 'bourgeois sociology' the attitude has remained intransigently hostile, in line with the principle that there cannot be any coexistence in the field of ideology. Their knowledge of the subject they criticise has slightly improved, but remains painfully limited. This applies not only to the ideological functionaries, like Fedoseyev or Konstantinov, 'nominated' sociologists, but also to those who now specialise in sociology and to writers who purport to study 'bourgeois sociology'. Whatever the theoretical orientation of the particular Western sociologist in question, the conclusion drawn from an examination of his work is monotonously similar; only his political orientation can sometimes make a difference in the harshness or relative lenience of the assessment. Occasionally mildness can be displayed, on account of such extra-sociological factors as the attitude towards 'peace appeals', unilateral disarmament, or Cuba. But in the realm of theory, where such considerations are not operative, the judgment is simple and definite:

> In Parsons' analysis the conclusion is reached that without 'the American way of life', without the bourgeois state and capitalist business, without the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the existence of a social system, of social life, is altogether impossible. Such are the trivial conclusions attained by functionalism, conclusions limited by the bourgeois framework.... According to Merton, functionalism may now 'serve equally well [as a vehicle] for ideological poison or for ideological nectar'. By such reasoning, the functionalists break completely with science.... To say that social life can be integrated on the basis of any 'values' or 'interests' means to liken society to a football which can be sent in any direction, if it happens to be one where the 'values' may, for instance, be 'interesting' to the American monopolies.[5]

Bourgeois sociology continues to be presented simply as a reflection of capitalist interests:

> Frank admissions about the social significance of American sociology were made by Professor B. Barber of Columbia University. He stressed that the government and the capitalists support sociological investigations.[6]

Whether it is empirical, positivistic, or historical, 'bourgeois sociology has been in a state of crisis in the last few years'.[7] Some Soviet comments,

[4] Cf. Robert K. Merton & Henry W. Riecken, 'Notes on Sociology in the USSR' in *Current Problems in Social-Behavioral Research* (Washington), March 1962.

[5] M. Sh. Bakhitov, *Amerikanskaya funktsionalnaya teoriya obshchestva* (Moscow, 1962), pp. 40–41. Cf. also N. V. Novikov, 'Ideologicheskii smysl teorii sotsialnovo deistva', *Filosofskie Nauki*, No. 4, 1961, p. 54.

[6] B. A. Chagin in *Voprosy Marksistskoi Sotsiologii* (Leningrad, 1962), p. 54.

[7] V. S. Semonov in *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 11, 1962, p. 31.

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repeating critical Western arguments about certain aspects of contemporary sociology, are not altogether off the mark. But they are more concerned with the inexorable phrase 'Even so and so is forced to admit . . .' than with the argument itself. Ironically, at the same time as some Western objections to the 'quantification mania' are quoted, and the mathematical models of Lewin, Dodd and others criticised, Soviet sociologists themselves are now told that 'mathematics and its methods can give real results only on the basis of an analysis of all aspects of real social processes with the aid of various scientific methods in the light of the materialist theory of social development'. Once the obstacle has been removed, the mathematical 'Model Building in Sociological Research' can go very far indeed:

> One can surely foresee the compilation of a balance for the utilisation of people's lives: a balance of resources and their utilisation, expressed in man-days of life, work, rest, and self-cultivation.[8]

A 'balance for the utilisation of people's lives' will be a great contribution to social planning, but fortunately this splendid vision, in the best tradition of Huxley and Orwell, is still far off. The claims made at the congress that mathematical computers are used on a large scale in Soviet sociology are to be taken with a grain of salt. One cannot get out of a computer more than is fed into it. In the meantime it is the 'concrete sociological investigations' which are to help the Party in its social engineering. 'Sociological investigations should lighten the road for the practice of building communism.'[9] This, according to G. V. Osipov and M. T. Yovchuk, is being done by the study of the following areas[10]:

1. Investigation of the general laws of the growth of socialism into communism.
2. Social problems of building the material and technical base for communism.
3. The problem of the development of communist social relationships.
4. Problems of the development of the ideology and culture of communist society, of the formation of the new man and the all-round development of the personality.
5. Applied social research.

It is misleading to define the general orientation of Soviet 'concrete sociological investigations' as 'practical empiricism', an effort to obtain just enough systematic information on which to base recommendations for policy and action.[11] It may or may not be practical, but it certainly is not empirical in orientation, and it is strange to see the Soviet type of 'mirror image' perception now displayed by the American sociologists

[8] P. P. Maslov in *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 3, 1962.
[9] B. P. Rozhin in *Voprosy Marksistskoi Sotsiologii*, p. 18.
[10] *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 12, 1962, p. 23.
[11] R. K. Merton and H. Riecken, loc. cit.

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projecting their familiar concepts on an unfamiliar situation. Investigations whose basic results are invariably known in advance, and research which can only confirm what has already been proclaimed by the Party, are not exactly empirical in orientation. Therefore it is incorrect to suggest, as Merton and Rieckman do, that 'since the differences between manual and mental workers in the USSR have not been erased, this becomes a prime target for research'. There is no such causal connection. All Soviet research on this question consists in 'proving' that such differences are in fact disappearing, and the findings always miraculously confirm it. It is not without reason that these investigations are called 'concrete' and not 'empirical'. They are designed to uphold a dogma, not to test hypotheses.

THIS is not to say that such investigations may not yield new data on the Soviet social scene, however limited their scope may be because of all the historical inevitabilities of social change postulated by the doctrine. Nor is it suggested that 'concrete' investigations, by the mere fact of dealing with the concrete phenomena of social life, may not act corrosively on the purity of the doctrine. But this is precisely what the Party is trying to avoid by imposing a rigidly controlled doctrinal orientation designed to make them strictly instrumental in helping to improve economic performance and social control, while rendering them ideologically innocuous and therefore politically safe. This is a far cry from 'practical empiricism'. The label is not applicable to Soviet sociological investigations.

At present 'concrete investigations' are conducted in the following places:

Moscow. In the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences there is a section for sociological research under G. V. Osipov. It is concerned with the study of the 'new forms of labour and daily life'. Investigations were made in factories and enterprises in Moscow and Gorki on the rationalisation of work, the adjustment of workers to the conveyor-belt system, and the factors affecting the efficiency and productivity of labour, such as the level of education, the character and length of work, and so on. Another study has been conducted in a Moldavian village which had previously been studied by Rumanian sociologists.

Another Moscow centre, the 'Laboratory of Sociological Studies', attached to the philosophical faculty of Moscow University, is concerned with the problem of 'the abolition of the differences between mental and manual labour', and with this in view investigated the social effects of automation in the Moscow Ball-bearing Plant No. 1. A study of management is in preparation. The laboratory has also conducted an investigation of the resettlement problem in one of the newly created agricultural sites in the 'virgin lands' in Kazakhstan.

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Leningrad. The 'Laboratory of Sociological Studies' at Leningrad University is doing research into workers' attitudes and the effect on them of technological change. About 2,000 workers answered a questionnaire. It was quite an elaborate questionnaire, and although it avoided some sensitive areas, was quite competently done in line with Western methodological practice. If the answers were candid, it must have elicited quite an interesting amount of information. Nothing has so far been published.

A new 'Institute of Human Studies' is shortly to be established in Leningrad to coordinate the work of sociologists, economists, psychologists, and educationalists.

Urals. The philosophy department and the sociological laboratory of the Ural State University published a study of the rise in the cultural and technical level of the working class based on an investigation in several enterprises and factories of the Sverdlovsk *sovnarkhoz*.

Another investigation on changes in the educational level of the working class was conducted in the Karaganda coal mines. A heavy concentration on the problems of industrial efficiency is reflected in other studies: one on the adaptation of work to the rhythm of automated machine production; another on the conditions of work and automation by the Moscow Institute of Labour Research, and so on.

Sociological laboratories either exist or are being established in Kiev, Voronezh, Novosibirsk and Rostov. Pedagogical Institutes conduct some school studies.

The only 'Institute of Public Opinion' was set up by the paper of the Young Communist League, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. It started as a purely journalistic venture and then established contact with the Academy. It has conducted five opinion polls on subjects ranging from the attitudes to peace to the problems of marriage and divorce. A survey on the profile of contemporary youth based on answers by 18,000 people has been recently published by B. Grushin and W. Chikin.

Other subjects studied in Soviet 'applied social research' are time-budgets and leisure activities, and what is called 'education in atheism and the survival of religious beliefs'.

ALL this sounds impressive enough. But it looks different when not only the scope but also the methodology of these investigations is subjected to scrutiny. Whatever snippets of information can be derived from them, few of these studies would pass the most elementary methodological tests in the West. Apart from the Leningrad enquiry already mentioned, the other studies were not carefully prepared and none of them deals with the question of representativeness; to disregard this makes the basic predetermination of the results easier to handle.

In an article on 'Methods of Sociological Study of Specific Phenomena', M. N. Rutkevich and L. N. Kogan, put the problem succinctly, if somewhat obliquely:

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> Bourgeois sociologists conduct interviews with persons selected at random, and sometimes 'prepare' the desired result by the selection of those to be questioned. . . . For Marxist sociologists conducting interviews or gathering data through questionnaires, it is unthinkable to pose questions provocative in nature, designed to suggest a particular, desired response, or demeaning to human dignity.[12]

But the Soviet interviewers also have their problems, as this 'simplified' dialogue quoted in an article on 'The Methodology of Studying Religious Survivals' testifies:

> *Interviewer*: Will you tell me, please, do you believe in God?
> *Answer*: Well, how can I tell you . . . I don't know myself whether there is a God or not.
> *Interviewer*: And do you go to church?
> *Answer*: When do we have time to go to church?
> *Interviewer*: Then why do you keep ikons?
> *Answer*: My parents hung them there. Why should the corner be empty? Let them hang.

The researcher concludes that this is a person 'of wavering faith'.[13] It takes a great deal of ingenuity to argue, as the author of the article does, that it depends on the interviewer whether the responses of religious persons 'come as close as possible to what they actually think', without mentioning that the lack of candour in responses is a result of the state's policy towards religion (which is taken as a premise and a point of departure of the enquiry itself).

It is obvious that, despite the boast that 'concrete investigations are nothing new for Marxism',[14] Soviet sociologists have a lot to learn, even within the limited framework determined by the Party; and it is now admitted that they may borrow from 'bourgeois sociology' some of its techniques, provided that they 'show the falsity of its theoretical constructions'.[15]

The question arises why the decision to introduce 'concrete investigations' was taken in the first place, despite the dangers of ideological erosion which they may present. The answer is not entirely clear, but it is indicative:

> Life itself, and in particular the needs of construction of communism, imperatively demand the development of concrete sociological investigations.[16]

This answer may perhaps be elaborated. To maintain Party rule and to preserve its authority it is necessary to control social change in the USSR. This means both the ability to engineer change and to adapt to it. The first depends on manipulating motives and incentives, and this in turn depends on the means available for influencing the situation. The present stage

[12] *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 3, 1961.
[13] L. N. Mitrokhin in *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 3, 1962.
[14] *Filosofskie Nauki*, No. 5, 1962, p. 21.
[15] *Kommunist*, No. 2, 1963, p. 103.
[16] V. P. Rozhin, *Vvedenye v marksistskuyu sotsiologiyu* (Leningrad, 1962), p. 30.

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of Soviet social and economic development made the mass terror economically less practical and politically more risky. To maintain the Party's dominating position, when Stalin's authority disappeared, required more subtle means, the balancing of social forces rather than total control over them. And to maintain economic growth the crude Stalinist combination of big stick and very small carrot was no longer suitable. In this situation the Party leadership needed more information for devising suitable political motives and economic incentives, and sociologists are there to provide it. The shift from control by naked terror to control through such additional means as 'voluntary organisations' and 'self-government of the masses' requires some knowledge of the working of primary groups in society which are no longer completely atomised. Under Khrushchev the Stalinist 'revolution from above' is supplemented by manipulated 'control from below', and, as an organisational corollary of this, the 'permanent purge' is replaced by permanent reorganisation.

Admittedly, it is an unstable equilibrium. But precisely because of this, more 'concrete' information on the social and economic background is necessary in order to maintain it through the establishment of suitable incentives, appropriate motivations, and new mechanisms of control.

It is extremely unlikely that the new Soviet sociologists will provide more than marginal elements of such information. Not just because they are too crude in their methods to realise such a technocratic dream, but basically because Party rule itself renders impossible too close an insight into the workings of a society which is continually adapting itself to this rule through informal organisation. The potentialities of 'concrete' investigations are thus circumscribed not only by ideological considerations, but also by the nature of the social realities with which they have to deal. The legitimacy of the Party rests on the myth of a classless society. This myth is not only socially but also sociologically relevant. As long as it prevents social reality from coming to the surface, the basic elements of the situation are not susceptible to 'concrete investigations', which are thus limited in more than one way.

There is little doubt, however, that 'concrete investigations' will increase the amount of information on Soviet society, even though not all of it will be published. In the Soviet Union it will be interpreted ideologically; sociologically, it will still have to be studied from outside, where those who study it are not prisoners of a sociological myth.

Social change in the Soviet Union must be studied for its own sake and for its wider implications. The evidence is scanty and unsatisfactory, but there is no choice but to use whatever is available. Paleontologists are not in a better position. And counsels of methodological perfection will not prevent the curious from asking for tentative answers. Where they cannot be given, relevant questions themselves contribute to understanding.

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The current and the next number of *Survey* are partly devoted to the Soviet social scene. The present issue deals with some general aspects, without of course aiming at comprehensiveness. The next issue will be more specifically concerned with the position of the Party vis-à-vis various social forces, groups, and categories.

The Soviet intelligentsia, the working class, the peasants, are all changing and the Party has to adjust itself to the new situation. How does the change in the Soviet social structure affect the Party's composition? How does the November 1962 reorganisation affect the respective roles of the *apparatchiki* and the managers? How does the primary Party organisation operate in the new social setting? These specific questions are related to the more general ones: Is the shift from state to social totalitarianism compatible in the long run with an industrial society? And how does it affect the informal organisation of society, that submerged part of the iceberg? These problems are some of the questions which will be analysed in our series of articles.

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Contents—Vol. XV, No. 4, July 1963

Financial Crisis and the Future of the United Nations .... NORMAN J. PADELFORD
Political Modernization and Political Culture in Japan ..... ROBERT E. WARD
EURATOM: A Study in Coalition Politics ..... H. L. NIEBURG
Some Aspects of the "Value" of Less-Developed Countries to the United States ..... CHARLES WOLF, JR.
Unconventional Warfare: Framework and Analysis ..... ANDREW C. JANOS

Review Articles

The Revival of Diplomacy .....STEVEN MULLER
The Theory of Developing Politics ..... FRED W. RIGGS
"Retreat from World Power": Processes and Consequences of Readjustment ..... HAROLD AND MARGARET SPROUT
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SOVKHOZ KUBAN

Allen Ballard

THE state farm 'Kuban' lies deep in the fertile belt of land which stretches directly southwards from Rostov and ends in the foothills of the Caucasus. Some thirty years ago the towns surrounding this sovkhoz—Maikop, Tikhoretsk, Kropotkin—were the scenes of bloody struggles between Cossacks resisting collectivisation and Bolshevik forces bent on establishing the Party's authority in the countryside. Today, the 'Kuban', some of whose workers are the sons and daughters of Cossacks who rose against the Reds, is one of the best state farms in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev himself has congratulated its director, Leonid I. Maksimov, for his success in raising crop yields, and few Western agricultural delegations visiting the USSR are permitted to leave without having spent a day observing the operation of this model farm. Thus it was quite natural for Professor G. M. Loza, Rector of the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy, and my adviser, to choose this farm as the place for me to spend May of 1960 studying the actual administration of a state farm.[1] The model status of the farm mattered little, since my primary interest was to observe how it was managed and the attitudes of the workers towards each other, their supervisors, and the regime. It also seemed to me that an inspection of this outstanding state farm would provide a partial answer to the question of how successful the Soviets have been in transforming the sovkhoz peasantry into replicas of urban workers.

This farm is one of the few sovkhozes which can claim the distinction of having been directly organised on an estate seized from its former landlord. Indeed, some of the older workers on the farm still remember the landlord who, 'fearing the wrath of the people', is said to have fled to Paris after the Civil War while his son, who 'treated the peasants like humans', made his peace with the Bolsheviks and at last report was a bookkeeper in some Soviet factory. Their small manor house, its staircase creaky and rickety, its rooms dark and gloomy, now serves as the administrative headquarters of one of the farm's five divisions. Across the courtyard from the house are low, barracks-like, adobe buildings formerly occupied by the servants of the landlord. Today they house sovkhoz workers and their families.

When the party downgraded the role of state farms during NEP, the sovkhoz was turned over to a German concession which operated it until the Soviets resumed control at the beginning of the collectivisation drive.

[1] I was studying at the Academy under the US-Soviet graduate student exchange programme. I wish to thank Professor Loza for his kindness in arranging the trip, and Mr Maksimov, his chief specialists, and numerous others on the 'Kuban' for their warm hospitality during my stay there. Not once was I refused permission for interviews, and the director himself allowed me to spend three days travelling around the farm with him.

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The peasants in the surrounding areas were not markedly friendly in their attitudes towards the farm. One man, now a work brigade leader, recalls how OGPU units skirmished with roving bands of armed Cossacks who in the early 1930s attempted to make away with the sovkhoz's grain and cattle. The farm's own labour force and party organisation, according to him, was not much better than the Cossacks. The accuracy of his memory is supported by a report in *Pravda* (28 April 1933), which stated that one-third of the workers and administrators of the farm had been fired for wrecking activities and pro-kulak sympathies. In the same year, and on the same charges, 100 of its 150 communists were purged from the party's ranks.

The farm recovered from the effects of the purges and was on its way to becoming a viable economic unit when, during the war, German troops, advancing southwards into the Caucasus, almost completely destroyed the farm's machinery and its livestock herds. By 1943, with the Germans repulsed, women and young boys, cultivating the soil with hand tools, had put the farm back into operation. After the war, the 'Kuban' suffered from the same neglect as the rest of Soviet agriculture under Stalin, and although frequently cited in the late 1940s and early 1950s as a model sovkhoz, in actual fact much of the work on the farm—including sometimes the sowing of grain seed—continued to be done by hand. It is only during the Khrushchev period that the farm has attained its present level of mechanisation, which, as will be seen, still leaves something to be desired.

TO a springtime visitor arriving at the farm today, there is no visible trace of its unhappy past. Instead the visitor, particularly if he has spent the winter in Moscow's greyness, would almost surely be overwhelmed by the greenery, warmth, and spaciousness which characterise the farm. So striking is its beauty that it becomes aesthetically impossible to believe that anyone would want to run such a farm in the same manner as a shoe factory. And indeed, it falls far short of reaching this degree of efficiency, if only by reason of its enormous size. For the 'Kuban' occupies 35,000 acres of land, of which 26,000 acres are ploughland. It has a population of 5,000, of whom 1,500 constitute the permanent work force. During the harvest these workers are aided by 800 additional labourers drawn mainly from among the families of the farm's employees. Some fifty-five supervisors are charged with different degrees of responsibility in directing the operations of the farm. The 'Kuban' is centred on the *tsentralnaya usadba*, or central homestead, which houses the main administrative offices of the farm, motor pools and repair shops, an eleven-year school, cafeteria and recreation club. Fanning out at various distances from the central homestead are the five divisions of the farm, each with its own headquarters building, which is usually surrounded by living quarters. On a dry day, the first division is only a five-minute

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drive from the central homestead, but the fifth division is a good twenty-minute ride from the same place. When it rains, the dirt road connecting the divisions to each other and to the centre are so deep in mud as to be impassable to trucks, jeeps and tractors. As is true in the majority of state farms, most workers prefer to live in the divisions closest to the central homestead because of its proximity to the main store, cafeteria and club of the farm. On the 'Kuban' in 1960 only the fifth division and the centre of the farm maintained cafeterias for the workers.

Yet by and large the employees on this farm live far better than the average Moscow factory worker.[2] The sovkhoz sells meat, vegetables and wine to the labourers at cost price, and the main cafeteria daily serves meals featuring such items as fresh eggs and a green *borshch* so full of vegetables and meat as to be unmatched by the best Moscow restaurants. Most of the workers live in clean, neatly-kept, whitewashed barracks, which are divided into one and two room apartments. Some possess their own homes, usually constructed out of wood and built with the help of loans extended to them by the farm. Sanitary facilities, however, are limited to outhouses, and drinking water still comes from an outdoor spigot shared by several families. Many women still wash their laundry in the traditional manner, pounding it vigorously upon the rocks in a stream which flows through the farm.

Along with such manifestations of continued backwardness, there are signs of the spread of urban culture. Some workers own bicycles and short-wave radios, while others have saved enough money to buy Czech-built motorcycles. A swineherd, living alone in a hut next to a pig-pen, had three items in his room—an old army cot, a battered table, and a gleaming new motorcycle. The bookshelves of the general store reflect the extent to which urban reading habits have also come to the 'Kuban', for here one can find works by Hemingway, Remarque, Ilf and Petrov, Esenin and Vercors.

The top administrators of this farm, in marked contrast to some of their subordinates, were competent, knowledgeable and dedicated to their work. Maksimov, the director, a heavy-set, short and balding man of forty, bears no resemblance to the factory communists, ignorant of agriculture, who were sent into the sovkhozes as directors in the 1930s

2 Some wage and salary figures as of 1959 (old rubles): Director, 30,000 rubles in salary plus 25,000 rubles in premiums; chief agronomist, 26,000 rubles in salary plus 17,000 rubles in premiums; chief bookkeeper, 27,000 rubles in salary plus 20,000 in premiums; division chief, 16,000 rubles in salary plus 5,000 in premiums; tractor drivers, 13,000 rubles per year; animal husbandry workers, 9,600 rubles per year; field hands, 6,000 rubles per year. The reader might want to compare these figures with the wages on state farms of the Ukraine in 1956. In that year, permanent workers on all its sovkhozes received an average yearly income of 5,424 rubles, while engineers and technical personnel, who composed only four per cent of all employees on state farms, averaged 12,000 rubles per year. Cf. V. M. Rabinovich, 'Zarabotnaya plata i ee sovershenstvovanie v Sovkhozakh' (unpublished dissertation, Moscow University, 1957), p. 206.

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to discipline the often unruly state farm labour force.[8] Nor does Maksimov appear in particular need of a political overseer to inspect his management of the farm. His chief motivations (besides the obvious one of money), seem to be a concern for the well-being of his labourers, pride in his work, and a love of the soil. Born in Gorky, Maksimov served as an aviation mechanic during the war and immediately upon demobilisation enrolled at the Timiryazev Academy, where he received his diploma in 1948. Between that time and 1955, he served as an agronomist in several state farms, finally rising to the position of chief agronomist who, on most grain sovkhozes, is charged with the day-to-day direction of all crop-growing activities. Since 1955 he has been the director of the 'Kuban'.

Maksimov works hard. His day begins at six o'clock with an inspection of the motor pool, and telephone checks with the division chiefs to see that all is in order; it ends at eight in the evening, when he confers with his chief specialists to evaluate the day's work. In between his day is occupied with such things as telephone conferences with his superiors in Krasnodar, field inspection trips, purchases of machinery and construction material, signing work orders and bank drafts, and listening to the complaints and requests of workers. In addition to all this he is expected to make appearances at party meetings, production conferences, and amateur nights in the sovkhoz club, and to supervise the operation of the cafeteria and stores. In short, Maksimov is not only the director of the farm, but also the unelected mayor of a rural community. He performs both functions well and is as capable of listening sympathetically to a worker's request for a pay advance as he is of berating, in the best Soviet style, careless or negligent subordinates. He is highly respected by his assistants and the labourers, although a few complained that he was sometimes over hasty in punishing the inefficient.

Maksimov's senior specialists, all of whom have counterparts in the divisions, seem to be thoroughly in control of their particular areas of responsibility. The chief agronomist for the past ten years, a man whose knowledge of agriculture was widely admired by the workers, had retired a month before my arrival at the farm. His interim replacement was an attractive young woman of thirty who had been born and raised on the farm, educated at the Krasnodar Institute of Agriculture, and then had returned to work as an assistant to the chief agronomist. She made no pretence of liking her temporary role as the director's chief aide, and was eagerly awaiting the arrival of her replacement who would be assigned to the farm by the Krasnodar authorities. In the meantime, according to the director, she had been doing a highly competent job. A middle-aged

[8] Typical of directors in the early 1930s was one man who had spent the previous fifteen years as political commissar in the cavalry. In his inaugural address to the assembled sovkhoz workers, he said: 'I am deeply convinced that this sovkhoz is loaded with hostile elements. When I was here for a month's practical training last year, I personally unmasked six kulaks concealed in important areas of sovkhoz production' (*Sovkhoznaya Gazeta*, 6 December 1933).

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war widow, with sad eyes and a warm smile, directed livestock breeding operations on the farm. She was particularly adept at exposing the numerous tricks used by animal husbandry workers to pad the figures listing the daily increase in weight of the pigs or calves. Maksimov and the chief bookkeeper, I was repeatedly told, were on unfriendly terms, since the latter was constantly raising financial objections to the director's pet projects. The bookkeeper, a kindly, alert man of forty-five, obviously impressed with his own importance, was able to reel off from memory the previous week's grain and meat output in each division, the wages paid to the workers two months earlier, and the salaries and bonuses of all the chief administrators.

INCOMPETENCE and sloth, however, characterised the work of several, but not all, divisional managers and technicians. The head of the fifth division, for example, seemed to make a regular practice of disobeying and misinterpreting orders from the director and chief agronomist. He had supervised the spring planting so haphazardly that most of the division's fields had to be ploughed up and replanted two weeks later. A year earlier the director had ordered all divisions to use a new and supposedly more efficient method of labour and tractor organisation, but this man openly continued to use the old method. The agronomist in yet another division did not seem upset at the sight of a field, just mown for hay, where a tractor driver in haste to fulfil his norms (calculated on the basis of acreage covered by the machine in a given time), had left half the grass standing. One livestock specialist in another division, a forty-five-year-old party member, was barely literate and was unable to control the high-school graduates who, in some cases, served as the brigadiers in charge of the twelve-women teams tending the hog and cattle herds. When the chief animal husbandry specialist, with good reason, scolded her for the filthy conditions in a hog barn, she quietly answered that dirt was normal in places where pigs lived. And when it was pointed out to her that a brigadier had been inflating the figures on weight increases in pigs, she wearily sighed that one person could not possibly oversee everything. Four weeks earlier, she had been ordered to Krasnodar, 120 miles away, to represent the sovkhoz at negotiations with a wine trust. Without informing her superiors, she simply decided not to go. Her reasons: 'I have never been to a large city like Krasnodar, and would have no idea how to buy a bus ticket to get there, or how to register at a hotel once I arrived. Besides, I'm not educated enough to talk with those city people'. Fortunately, the farm has recently been receiving an influx of bright, college-trained agronomists who are slowly taking over positions of authority in the divisions.

Because of unreliable supervision at the field level, frequent tractor breakdowns, and poor internal communications, Maksimov and his chief

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aides personally intervene in many of its important field operations.[4] On one occasion, I drove with Maksimov to the scene of a tractor breakdown. As we approached along a road lined with high trees planted as windbreaks, I noticed the tractor standing idle in a field. At first, no human beings were in sight, but suddenly the director drew up alongside what seemed to be two dusty burlap sacks lying in the shade of the trees. Upon closer inspection, the sacks turned out to be the tractor driver, a lean, tall, hawk-nosed Georgian, who, the director said, was one of his best workers, and his assistant, both sound asleep. An hour and a half earlier a disc on the tractor's seed drill had fallen off, making further planting impossible. The tractor driver had had to wait twenty minutes before the division chief—riding in a horse-drawn springless cart—even discovered there was a breakdown. He had then gone off in his cart to fetch the division's mechanic (a half-hour ride), who after another thirty minutes arrived, again by horse and buggy, only to find that he did not have the necessary tools to repair the drill. Maksimov's arrival preceded that of the mechanic by five minutes, and after a ten-minute discussion between the two of them and the tractor driver, Maksimov put the disc in his car and drove off to the repair shop, where he had another tractor dispatched to the field.

On the afternoon of another day, the director and I arrived at a field where a tractor team, sowing a new type of hybrid corn, had been made idle when a link in the chain used for measuring the straightness of the furrows broke. It was one and a half hours before the division's mechanic, in a horse-drawn wagon, arrived to repair the link, a five minute task. While waiting, the director, chief agronomist, division chief, and division agronomist talked with the workers about plans for future housing and better ways of utilising the tractors. After the repair was made, the tractor drivers, concerned about the loss of pay due to the breakdown, hastily drove off across the field without properly adjusting the tractor's drill. Of all the supervisors present, Maksimov alone noted the fault. He halted the tractor by tossing a stone at its cabin, and himself made the necessary adjustments. Had the tractor been permitted to continue, the corn would never have grown to its full height.

[4] One illustration might provide some insight into the reasons for the frequent machine breakdowns. When Khrushchev was in Iowa, he had been impressed by a self-propelled feed mill, a machine resembling a cement mixer, used to combine crushed corn and corn cobs with molasses to make feed for livestock. He ordered one for experimental use in the Soviet Union and it was delivered to the 'Kuban' soon after my arrival there. Since the operation manual was written in English, I was asked to translate it into Russian. For three and a half hours I did so, emphasising to the chief engineer specific instructions about warming-up periods, oil levels and other peculiarities of the diesel engine which powered the mill. But when I had finished the translation, the engineer asked me one question: 'Where is the starter?' I pointed it out to him and he immediately started up the motor without making any of the checks called for in the manual. A day later the mill was being used to chop grass, although the instructions specifically stated that it was to be used for crushing corn and corn cobs. The machine clogged up with grass and stopped functioning. In a few days the chief engineer was complaining about the 'poorly constructed American diesel engine'.

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Most of the men who form the backbone of the farm's workforce—tractor drivers, combine operators, mechanics—have been employed there for over two years, in contrast to the usual high labour turnover in sovkhozes. But only about half of the skilled workers were born in the region. The rest, including two mechanics who had emigrated to the United States after release from German prisoner-of-war camps and then had returned to the USSR, were from all sections of the country, but predominantly they were Great Russians and Ukrainians. A striking difference was evident in the attitudes which the workers of different generations took towards their superiors. Some of the older men, while boasting of their exploits as 'red partisans' during the Civil War, still bow and scrape, hands twisting nervously behind their backs, when they talk to the director or one of his assistants. The majority of the workers do not appear to be intimidated by the presence of authority. Many are veterans of the second world war (at times it seemed as if every man had been present both at the battle of Stalingrad and the fall of Berlin), and still hold warm memories of encounters with Americans on the Elbe. Moreover, a goodly number of the men who run the farm's machinery have at one time or another worked in city factories, and it is only in the period since Stalin's death that they have returned to the countryside, some openly in search of 'peace and quiet'. Whether it is due to their broad backgrounds, to some equalitarian strain in their upbringing, or to innate traits of the Russian people, the fact is that these workers do not react like robots to orders given them by their superiors. The words, 'You are a big boss, but I am also a man', were used more than once by the tractor drivers. Indeed, they seemed to argue with their foremen about everything: from the way in which a particular field was to be ploughed to the fact that their wages had not been properly calculated. And in some few instances, I was told, some individuals have simply refused to work unless their norms were lowered.

Nor is the director himself shown any undue deference. The men in a construction gang building a mechanised chicken coop did not bother to rise when their smoke break was interrupted by his appearance. Their foreman took the occasion of the director's visit—with his workmen nodding approval and adding their comments—to announce that the job could not be completed before the winter frost unless he was given more men. Maksimov insisted that the chicken coop be finished without additional help by the middle of the summer, as called for in the farm's plan. But as the director walked away, the foreman was still saying, 'September at the earliest'. A few days later, when Maksimov attempted to interrupt a speaker during a production conference, he was told, 'I have the floor and the right to speak. Please have the courtesy to wait until I have finished'. Maksimov fell silent.

LEST the reader gets the impression that anarchy abounds on the farm, it should be made clear that wages are the primary source of discipline. The workers are daily reminded that such things as housing,

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clothing, the quality of the food in the cafeteria, social security benefits, and new school buildings for their children, all depend upon their productivity. The tractor driver, earlier described as sleeping while his tractor was broken down, *was* visibly upset at the prospect of losing half a day's wages. But he himself could not repair the tractor, so he slept. And when three consecutive rainy days stopped the hay-gathering on the farm, most of its population, from schoolteacher and cafeteria workers to field hands and brigadiers, were gloomy and depressed.

The connection between productivity and privileges is apparent everywhere. Once, as I sat in the office of the farm's trade union chairman, a pale, thin mechanic with a rasping cough pleaded for a one month rest cure at a Black Sea sanatorium. The chairman replied that the union's fund for sending the workers to rest homes was low because the farm's financial surplus the year before had not been high enough to allocate more funds for trips to sanatoria. And he added that the money remaining in the fund had to be given to workers whose production records were better than that of the sick man who stood before him. In another case, the tearful wife of a sick tractor driver begged the union to pay him full sick benefits. The sovkhoz has a rule that workers who fall ill can receive monthly benefits equal to their average earnings during the previous two months. However, this man, after a month's illness, had returned to work, but his low state of health had cut his efficiency and wages in half. Three weeks after returning to work, he suffered a relapse; as a result, his sick benefit amounted to 300 rubles per month which, as his wife pointed out, was not enough to keep a family of four. The union chairman, although sympathetic, declared that had the man's productivity been higher, he would have received greater benefits. That, he said, was the law, and there was nothing he could do about it. It should be noted that most disciplinary offences connected with work are punished by heavy fines which often take such forms as demoting the worker from a first-class to a second-class tractor driver, or of transferring him for two or three months to work as a field-hand.

The farm's livestock are usually cared for by women, many of whom, in the thirty-five to forty age groups, are without husbands because of manpower losses during the war. Their weatherbeaten faces, too wrinkled for their age, and their spiritless eyes seem to reflect both the loneliness of their lives and the long hours, sometimes as many as sixteen a day, spent with or near the hogs, chickens, and cows. Although they only work eight hours a day, they begin their tasks at five in the morning and are finished only at nine at night because their hours have to be geared to the feeding and milking times of the animals. Women also compose the bulk of the lowest paid stratum of workers, the field hands who labour in teams of thirty or forty at such tasks as weed clearing or vine pruning.

It is the young people who present the major disciplinary problem on the farm. This, I was told, is because the school drop-outs, i.e. the

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more backward students, make up a large proportion of those under eighteen entering the farm's work force.[5] Despite an eleven-year school system with a curriculum specifically designed to ensure a steady influx of skilled workers for the farm, almost half of the graduating seniors go directly on to institutes and universities. Of the remainder, some of the more talented and energetic, armed with high school diplomas, go off to the cities in search of work, while others become tractor drivers, mechanics, and minor clerks at the 'Kuban'. It seems, however, that the young people who choose to remain on the farm, while at first pleased with the size of their pay cheques, very soon become aware of the limitations on the earning potential of a farm worker. But it is already too late, particularly for those without a full secondary education, to change to another occupation without suffering a sharp reduction in income. For many, their only marketable skill is the ability to drive a tractor or combine. The realisation that they are, in effect, bound to the sovkhoz, is often accompanied by a growing awareness of the monotony and grayness of rural life. Their consequent frustrations and resentments are manifested by calculated disobedience, lateness in arriving at work, and, most frequently, by prolonged bouts of drinking.

One day, for example, an angry division chief strode into the director's office waving a list with the names of five tractor drivers, all under twenty-one, who had been drunk and absent from work for periods ranging up to four days. In another instance, a young mechanic, barely able to sit on his chair in the cafeteria, crowned a two-day binge by abusing the Komsomol secretary with a rich and inventive selection of Russian profanity. It took the verbal persuasion of the party secretary and the physical efforts of two strong men to remove the youth from the cafeteria. Such manifestations of public disorder are usually punished by the village soviet, which makes liberal use of its powers to give 'hooligans' a fifteen-day sentence of forced labour on some community project. Offenders, of course, are also liable to face Komsomol or Party action.

Positive efforts to combat the sense of ennui among the younger people are made by the sovkhoz club, which weekly sponsors dances and from time to time imports troupes of touring entertainers. But the vaudeville groups, from what I saw, were mainly composed of down-and-out performers whose presence would not be tolerated on the stages of the big cities. More effective in distracting the youth is the large and well-organised sports programme which emphasises soccer, basketball,

[5] In 1956, sixty per cent of the tractor drivers in the grain sovkhozes of the Stavropolskii Krai, not far from the Kuban, had an education below the level of the fourth class. Another 35 per cent had a 5–7 class education. But, interestingly enough, of those with a 1–4 class education, over 40 per cent were young men under twenty-five. In six sovkhozes of this region in 1955 and 1956 almost all the workers fired for failure to observe labour discipline were youngsters under twenty. The Soviet scholar who has made the most careful study of sovkhoz cadres concluded that 'The level of political education work among the youth is low. The young labourers do not like to work in sovkhozes'. See G. V. Milner, 'Izpolzovanie rabochego vremeni i proizvoditelnost truda mekhanizatorov sovkhozov v svyazi s izmenieniami sostava rabochikh' (unpublished dissertation, Moscow, 1959).

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and track and field. The soccer matches with neighbouring state and collective farms are the most popular spectator events on the farm, and indeed it was rumoured that the 'Kuban' was not above luring star soccer players from other farms with offers of good jobs and housing, and plenty of practice time during the season.

WHAT of the political attitudes of the workers? As far as I could see, their views on Khrushchev, capitalism, bases surrounding the Soviet Union, and the position of the Negro in the United States, were no different from those held by Moscow workers. There were a few individuals who, while praising the standard of living at the 'Kuban', complained that the mass of the peasants still lived in dirt, poverty, and ignorance. It should also be noted that in the midst of the U-2 crisis some of the workers, according to a party propagandist who came to correct them, held the 'mistaken view' that Khrushchev should not have broken off the Paris talks, but should have continued in order 'to save the peace'. One middle-level supervisor seemed resentful that the section of the KGB charged with investigating 'economic crimes' still maintained a careful watch on the activities of the farm's workers and administrators.

The 'Kuban' has a large party organisation of about three hundred members, run by a full-time salaried secretary who is not an agricultural specialist and previously was assigned to party work in industry. He performs the three traditional party functions of organisation, propaganda, and agitation. About his first role I found out very little, except that he is daily in conference with the director and is deeply involved in questions of the assignment of party members to the various sections of production. I was, however, able to see him perform as a propagandist and agitator, the former at a production seminar of the farm's supervisors, the latter at a mass meeting protesting the U-2 flights over the Soviet Union.

The production seminar followed a pattern familiar to anyone who has ever read through the pages of *Partiinaya Zhizn*. After the party secretary opened the session, a division chief endeavouring 'to connect closely science with life' read a long report on the latest techniques for cultivating sugar beets. Through it all the trade union chairman read back copies of *Ogonyek*, the Soviet equivalent of *Life*. After a short discussion period, the party secretary reported that he had just returned from the Permanent Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow, where his eye had been caught by a display on the successes of the Riazan Oblast in raising its milk production. Particularly impressive, said he, were the achievements of a seventy-two-year-old woman who had found a new and more efficient way of increasing milk yields. Could not this same system be tried at the 'Kuban'? Nobody bothered to answer. The director toyed idly with a pencil during most of the talk, while the trade union official continued to read his *Ogonyek*. Indeed, it was only when

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Maksimov finally took the floor and lashed into his subordinates for their inability to translate 'all this talk about science' into practice that the meeting came to life, with accusations and counter-accusations of inefficiency and ignorance being traded back and forth among the assembled administrators. In this respect the production seminar achieved one of its aims, that of eliciting information about bottlenecks on the farm. But nothing further was said about the seventy-two-year-old Riazan milkmaid.

At the U-2 protest meeting held in the club before a predominantly female audience the party secretary demonstrated his role as agitator. He opened the meeting with an uninspiring speech which sounded as if it had been digested from the previous day's issue of *Pravda*. He then announced that three speakers had requested permission to address the workers of the farm. The first was the secretary of the Komsomol organisation, whose speech was no more full of fire than that of the party secretary. But the last two speakers, one the son of a father killed in the war, and the other widowed by the same war, began to play on the audience's feelings with such questions as, 'How many of us are without husbands? How many children without fathers? How many of our loved ones lie buried between our green fields and Berlin?', and in a few seconds the meeting was transformed from a ritualistic protest against American policy into a genuinely felt outpouring of anti-war feelings. Several women, faces wet with tears, begged for and received the chance to speak, and their accounts of suffering during the war charged the audience to such a pitch that the final resolution, sponsored by the party secretary, 'condemning the provocative and war-like action of the United States', was approved with an enthusiasm only to be equalled by that of a Southern Baptist convention voting to outlaw sin. But I left the meeting with the impression that their anger was directed not so much against Francis Powers as against all the impersonal forces which seemed to threaten them with a repetition of their wartime miseries.

In general, agitational work seems to bear little relation to the selected vignettes in party journals. Most of the party members whom I met were rough and ready types whose ideological training seemed very limited. One communist, both a livestock brigadier and a 'Hero of Socialist Labour', was struck dumb when the chief animal husbandry specialist informed him that he was to address a district production meeting on the following day. His first reaction was, 'Why me?' When pressed, he protested that he was a practical man and knew nothing about agitation. He reluctantly consented to attend the meeting when the specialist agreed to write the speech for him: 'Our brigade is now struggling for the Banner of Brigade of Communist Labour. In the last year our productivity has increased by twenty per cent, etc.'

To draw broad conclusions about the nature of Soviet agriculture from a month's stay on a sovkhoz would be plainly irresponsible. This does not, however, invalidate a few observations on the 'Kuban' itself,

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bearing in mind that the Soviets regard it as an outstanding example of the 'highest form of socialist agriculture', the state farm. First, it seems that little political opposition to this form of agriculture remains among the workers there. The only evidence of Cossack individualism is seen when the sovkhoz club issues Cossack uniforms for amateur-night performances. Moreover, the farm workers do seem to view the world through the same ideological prism as other Soviet citizens. It is also clear that the terror-instilled discipline used during the thirties has been effectively replaced by wage discipline. Most important, despite all its difficulties the farm is a going concern able to provide a comfortable standard of living for its workers.

At the same time, the 'Kuban' mirrors, to some extent, the general ills of the Soviet countryside. First, there is the absence of sufficient capital investment, which is evident in all areas of the farm's operations, from the failure to pave the roads to the necessity of repair personnel using horse-drawn transportation. Something is wrong when a modern tractor has to stand idle for two hours while waiting for a mechanic to arrive by horse and buggy. Second, the farm suffers, as do most kolkhozes and sovkhozes, from a scarcity of capable supervisors at the middle and lower levels of administration, a lack whose effects are greatly compounded by the 'Kuban's' huge size. It is sufficient to note that a division chief directs the operation of an establishment almost ten times as large as the average American farm in the grain growing areas of the Mid-West in order to understand the need for competent managers at this level. In their absence, the incentives offered to the tractor drivers become all important in determining the farm's economic success. But there is a constant clash between their desire to fulfil their norms in the assigned time, and the need to maintain quality standards. All too often, the conflict is decided in favour of the former.[6] Moreover, the wages of the tractor drivers, although high in comparison to those on other farms, still are not high enough, for example, to give them the incentive to buy out of their own pockets the simple tools which would be necessary to make minor repairs, e.g. the joining of links on a broken chain.

Finally, it should be clear that the Soviets, even in this advanced farm, have not solved the problem of the conflict between the city and the village. Tension still exists between the easy-going, poorly disciplined nature of the Russian peasant and the party's demand for factory-like

[6] To ensure higher standards of quality, the wage payment system on state farms has recently been revised. Twenty per cent of the earnings of all workers in grain farming are now deducted monthly and held by the sovkhoz until the harvest yield in their assigned section has been established. If the yearly production plan has been met, the workers receive the deducted sums after the harvest; if the plan has not been fulfilled, then appropriate deductions are made from the sums withheld by the sovkhoz. See G. Z. Kalpin, 'Trud oplachivaetsya po novomu', *Sovkhoznoe Proizvodstvo*, March 1961. Difficulties in implementing the new system have been caused by the fact that sovkhoz managers shift tractor drivers from one area to another, thus making it difficult to fix the responsibility for poor yields in any particular sector of the farm.

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efficiency. The 'Kuban' does not measure up to the dreams of the Soviet planners who in the 1920s envisaged 'factories in the fields' and peasants as depersonalised and disciplined as lathe operators. Massive injections of capital might change the picture, but at present the 'Kuban' remains a farm, not a factory.

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Corrections

Eugene Kamenka writes: An unfortunate error appears in the published version of my review of Mr Bogomolov's *Filosofiya anglo-amerikanskovo neo-realizma* ('Interpreting Neo-Realism', *Survey*, no. 47, pp. 171–4). On page 172 the text represents me as writing 'There is no shortage of eminent Western philosophers in Germany, Italy, and France with a much *fuller* grasp of the Anglo-American philosophical tradition than Mr Bogomolov's'. What I actually wrote—perhaps not too legibly—is that there is no shortage of such philosophers with a much *poorer* grasp than Mr Bogomolov's.

Professor Peter Wiles writes: On the first line, page 82 of the last issue of *Survey*, for '75 per cent. in 1959' read '64 per cent. in 1960'.

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SOVIET MEDICAL INSTITUTIONS

A Visitor's Notebook

Mark G. Field

The following are working notes of some interviews and visits I made to medical people and institutions in the course of a study trip to Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Poland in the spring of 1961. I want to express my thanks and appreciation to the Division of General Medical Sciences, the National Institute of Health, for their grants and to the Russian Research Center at Harvard, which provided the necessary services and cooperation to make this part of the study possible.

Kiev: The Pechorsky District Polyclinic

We were received at short notice by the director, a large woman with an oval face, full lips, slightly protruding eyes, and blonde hair severely knotted at the back. She seemed on edge most of the time, and kept sighing, particularly when she said something that did not quite ring true. She gave the impression that the whole interview had been imposed upon her without her agreement and that she gave us the time only because she had been told to do so; when we apologised for interrupting her work, she said that after all we were guests, and that one must take care of guests. But these seemed to be formulas she felt impelled to repeat without much conviction.

The Pechorsky district consists of ten sub-districts and is serviced by the polyclinic which provides out-patient care as well as by a hospital. The hospital and the polyclinic are administered jointly, the polyclinic is thus considered a department of the hospital, though they are physically separate.

The polyclinic operates on a two-shift basis and is open 13 hours a day, the workday of the physician being officially 6½ hours. It has 20 sub-district physicians plus a complement of specialists to whom patients are referred for consultation and specialised care. Patients also have the right to request visits to specialists and consultants. Each sub-district physician is said to have a load of 12 to 15 patient visits a day, spending half of the time seeing people at the clinic and the other half visiting them at home (for house calls, the norm is two visits per hour). If necessary, specialists will also go to patients' homes. When the need arises, the patient is hospitalised in the district hospital, or at the Kiev City Hospital (which apparently services patients from the entire city). Physicians normally spend part of the year in out-patient work, and part of the year at the hospital doing in-patient work. This is the result of Order 870 issued by the Health Ministry in 1947, when it had become clear that physicians who worked exclusively in out-patient clinics lost touch with advances in medicine and gave inferior care. In this clinic,

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it is a six-month rotation: half a year at the clinic, the other half at the hospital. Elsewhere the rotation might be different: nine months at the clinic, three in the hospital. But the purpose of the order is clear: it is to give clinic (out-patient) physicians a chance to work in the hospital, and not the other way round. The original intent of the decree was to have physicians work in out-patient clinics and hospitals simultaneously (for example, spending the morning at the clinic, the afternoon at the hospital). This apparently did not work out, and the rotation system was introduced instead.

How does a patient obtain medical care? The patient is assigned to the sub-district where he lives, and reports to either one or the other physician in charge of that particular sub-district. The patient either comes directly to the polyclinic and asks to see his local physician (or, as the case may be, a specialist). The registrar locates his file (called an ' ambulatory card ') or makes a new card if this is the patient's first visit, and then gives him an appointment to see the doctor. The appointment form usually consists of a priority order, i.e., a place in the line of waiting patients, marked on a blank (*talon*) that is given the patient. When completed and collected at the time of the actual visit, these serve as the basis for a statistical evaluation of the clinic's activities.

Should the patient be unable to come to the clinic, a request for a house call is made to the clinic either by telephone or by a personal visit by a relative, or by placing a request in a special box at the entrance to the clinic. There is a girl at the clinic whose job consists of taking these phone calls. She asks the caller for the name and address of the patient; whether or not the patient has been treated or seen at the clinic; does the patient have a high temperature; is this an emergency. The name of the patient is then entered in the register with the physician's name on it; when the physician starts on his house calls, he consults the register and returns it later to the clinic indicating that the patient has been seen, and what kind of action has been taken. Presumably the same happens about the written requests, except that there is no opportunity to ask whether there is or not a temperature. Patients with a temperature are urged *not* to come to the clinic but instead to ask their physician to come to their home, to cut down the danger of contagion. The director of the clinic also puts a great deal of emphasis on the so-called *active* visits. An active visit is simply a visit to the patient's home taken at the initiative of the physician and not at the request of the patient. The clinic director apparently felt this was a major advantage in the organisation of rational medical care for the population, and not one of the most elementary aspects of professional work in which it is understood that the physician decides on his own what to do for the welfare of his patient.

The clinic also has a physician and a dentist on duty when the clinic is closed at night to provide round-the-clock medical care.

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In addition to their regular clinical duties, physicians have to perform health education work, give lectures to the public, carry out large preventive measures (such as vaccination). Once a year a medical commission examines all the children of the district under the age of sixteen, and also examines workers in occupations that are particularly dangerous to health. Tuberculosis, the director told us, is not an important problem any more.

Kiev: The Ukrainian Health Ministry

This morning I had an appointment at the Ministry of Health of the Ukrainian Republic. More specifically, I talked with Mrs Nina Vasilevna Kucher, head of the Department of Medical Care, and her assistant on statistics. My first question concerned the position of the Republican Health Ministry vis-à-vis the Ministry of Health of the Soviet Union. She indicated that the two have different jurisdictional areas of activity. The Republican Ministry and its subordinate health departments deal with health work in their own regions. The Health Ministry USSR, on the other hand, defines and standardises medical care all over the country. Mrs Kucher also indicated that now the Ukrainian Health Ministry has more power, more initiative than it had before because of decentralisation. This does not mean, however, that the USSR Ministry has lost its importance. On the contrary, it has a great deal of coordinating work to do, as well as the setting of norms and standards. One of its most important obligations, of course, is the solution of problems that the Republican Ministries cannot solve by themselves, such as questions of therapies, medicines and drugs, forensic medicine, regulations, etc. All this is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health USSR. The basic 'ideology' (she used that word), the basic methods, originate in Moscow. The Republican Health Ministry cannot move ahead or lag too far behind because all the medical work is inspected and supervised by the Health Ministry USSR.

The Ukrainian Health Ministry controls medical work in the Republic and the Ministry of Health USSR regulates the country as a whole. Changes in administrative structure: in the countryside they have eliminated the district health department (*raizdrav*) which has been taken over by the district hospital. The head of the district hospital is also the head of the district health department. He has a deputy to administer the medical institutions under his jurisdiction: this deputy is also a kind of inspector. This step is seen as permitting the unification of all medical work in the district.

I asked several questions on distinctions between jurisdictions and duties of the ministries of health and of social security and welfare, and whether this was, or was not, a problem. She said, for instance, that prosthetic work is still the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Welfare. The sanatoria now belong to the unions. (Four years ago when I was in the Soviet Union the big campaign was to turn all the sanatoria over

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to the Health Ministry as best qualified to assume responsibility over these medical institutions. Now a reverse process is taking place.) The sanatoria are returned to the unions, although the (republican) health ministries still keep jurisdiction over all the children's sanatoria and tuberculosis institutions. Mrs Kucher explained this change as part of the reshuffling of administration, natural in a growing system. She said that the health ministry, or ministries, were not capable of maintaining those sanatoria (somehow the explanation did not ring true to me). At the present time the health authorities are responsible for the financing of medical installations in factories, although my understanding was that this was the responsibility of the factories themselves.

To my question as to the structure of the administration of the Health Ministry of the Ukraine, she answered that it had three sections, one for cities and industrial institutions; one for rural institutions; and one for specialised types of medical assistance.

To my question about *feldshers*, she replied that the *feldshers* are still useful in the rural districts. The *feldsher* is said to combat illness and to be the direct *helper* of the physician. He stands at the most advanced point, he is the vanguard of the medical system. The rural district hospital, for example, has its own *feldsher* stations at the periphery, so that patients do not need to come to the district hospital for such simple procedures as injections or small checkups. He goes to see the *feldsher* who will give him his shot; in addition the *feldsher* can look after the sanitary arrangements of the area under his jurisdiction. She indicated that the general opinion is that in some of these questions and problems the *feldsher* can do as well as the physician. But she stressed time and again, that the *feldsher* helps and does not replace the physician.

Women in the medical profession: She felt that the success of the medical system in the Soviet Union in protecting the health of the population was due, to an important degree, to the women. They could successfully use women in medical care. Women are used to social work and life. She did not see any problem in this question.

At the completion of medical school all physicians receive assignments to work at the periphery, but this is not too difficult, since, starting with the third year, medical students engage in some kind of clinical practical work. These assignments last three years.

Kiev: Emergency medical care

This morning a woman employee of the Intourist office had what looked like a heart attack or seizure. Intourist called the emergency service and after a brief conversation and argument they agreed to come and were there within fifteen minutes.

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Odessa: The Filatov Institute

This morning we visited the Filatov Institute. Our tour began in the office of the late Professor Filatov, where pictures of Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev stared at us from the walls. I understand that there are special studios where artists do nothing but paint reproductions of classical paintings (one sees them hanging mostly in hotels and restaurants) and I presume portraits of leaders (reigning or dead) who remain on the approved list (one sees them in all offices). Filatov's office has remained pretty much the same as it was when he died in 1956; his desk calendar, under a glass dome, is still on the desk open at the day of his death, and his white coat (covered with plastic) hangs from a coat hanger. There is also a marble bust of the professor, and a scale model of his grave. We were told that Filatov, in addition to his work in science and medicine, was also deeply interested in the affairs of his country and had been a deputy to the Soviet. The government, in gratitude for his services, had given him four orders or decorations.

The staff of the Institute consists of 68 physicians and 100 medical personnel. There are no medical students, only physicians who are sent to the Institute to raise their qualifications. Staff members also go to work in the countryside, so there is a constant flow of personnel at the Institute. The chief physician who showed us around is a lady doctor named Budilova. The director of the Institute is Dr Puchkovskaia, a collaborator of Filatov. Eighty-five per cent of the personnel are women and all chiefs of departments are women.

The Institute has usually from 200 to 350 patients. There are twelve experimental laboratories as well as an animal farm (vivarium) with 2,500 animals available for research. It was emphasised to us that treatment is free, and that 90 per cent of the patients are Soviet citizens, and the rest are foreigners. Foreigners who desire treatment or consultation can write to the Ukrainian Health Ministry under whose jurisdiction the Institute is placed. Foreign patients come from all over the world, from France, England, Italy and so on. (Later we saw a woman patient from Bulgaria.)

The work of the Institute is connected with several academies (I presume they meant the Academy of Sciences USSR and its republican affiliates, and the Academy of Medical Sciences USSR). Administratively the hospital has a director who has three deputy administrators: one for scientific matters (research), one for medical services (clinical), and one for housekeeping. One of the basic problems they are working on is blindness caused by cataract. To treat this condition you do a corneal transplant. Until Filatov came on the scene, this was an extraordinarily difficult operation that only a few very skilled eye surgeons could perform. Filatov developed a set of simple instruments that make it easy to operate on the eye and do not injure it. Now any ophthalmologist can perform this operation. Filatov also came to the conclusion that eyes from cadavers could be used for such operations. He proposed a method of

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conserving these eyes from five to seven days and found that these eyes were better than eyes taken from live human beings. They obtain these eyes only from people who were in good health at the time of death. The eyes are removed two hours after death. A great deal of explanatory work has been done by the Soviet health authorities, so that there is no difficulty in obtaining these eyes, and people often offer them to help relatives. Since there are not enough eyes available in Odessa, they receive the eyes from other cities from which they are sent in special refrigerated containers. Filatov's slogan was: 'There are no hopeless cases', and '(medical) pessimism at a patient's bed is fruitless'. They are therefore performing operations on patients whose cases have been given up as hopeless elsewhere. Medically they act as a court of last resort. They divide their cases into five categories. In the first (superficial or incipient cataract), the success rate is 90 to 95 per cent. In the second category, when the cataract is fairly large and already has its own blood supply, the success rate is 87 per cent. In the third category, when the cataract has complications and adhesions, the success is up to 72 per cent. In the fourth category, when there are complications and secondary glaucoma, the rate of success is up to 50 per cent; in the fifth category, when the case is considered hopeless and they have to perform a subtotal transplantation, they have 11 to 15 per cent rate of success.

The Institute employs many people who where blind before and who recovered their sight there. These ex-patients are very useful as they have experienced blindness or near blindness and know what it is. Patients may stay up to one year at the Institute, particularly those that you must re-educate to see. Since the subject was blindness, I asked them if they did work on sensory deprivation. They said that such work was not being done there but at the Hirschmann Institute in Kharkov.

How do patients obtain access to the Institute? Patients may come directly to the Institute polyclinic (an out-patient facility), which sees an average of 500 patients a day. These are mostly light cases, but if the doctors find it necessary, they can be sent to the Institute for in-patient treatment.

Patients also come from all over the Soviet Union and from abroad; they are sent by their doctors, particularly the ophthalmologists. The physicians send details to the Institute and the Institute tells them when and if to send the patient.

Until Filatov came along, ophthalmological work on children was quite rare. He encouraged this work and made it easier. It is a pity, they said, that in some countries children grow up blind because doctors wait for them to become adults before they operate. When an individual does not see for a long period of time, it is difficult for him to use his eyes again once he has regained his vision. It is hard work to teach them. The youngest patient on record for a transplantation was a child eleven months old. For a so-called 'layers' operation, the youngest patient was only two months old.

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They said they had told us about only one aspect of the work of the Institute; but it was working in all areas of ophthalmology. They felt that their most important work was on the transplantation of tissues. Filatov apparently demonstrated that when some living tissue is separated from the organism and is put into an unfavourable environment, it develops substances called 'biogenic stimulators'. If this tissue is then transplanted again, it stimulates the entire organism. They also use injections made of extracts of tissues containing biogenic stimulators. They also use vegetal tissue, such as aloe. The living tissue they use is often placental tissue. You can conserve, sterilise, and use these tissues for transplantation. Tissue therapy can be used not only for eye diseases, but for many others. They gave me a book that Filatov had written and which has been translated into English (*My Path in Science*) and I read the chapter on these biogenic stimulators. To the layman, they seem too good to be true; Filatov felt they had a beneficial effect upon the entire organism, and would cure all types of diseases including mental disease (schizophrenia). This smacks of charlatanism.

Odessa: Nursery school

The nursery school is for 80 children, mainly the children of the workers of a nearby rope factory. Children up to the age of three are accepted. Some of them stay overnight five days a week because the parents work at night. Parents supposedly can come at any time to see their children but they usually come at a prearranged time. On Saturday at 2 p.m. the children are given back to their parents until Monday morning. The youngest child they have is six months old, but a child of three months can be left. Their day starts at 7.30 a.m., and ends at 9 p.m., with an afternoon nap from 1.40 to 4 p.m., and walks from 10 a.m. to noon, and from 5.20 to 7.20.

The visit had been arranged, perhaps by design, during the afternoon siesta, so that we had no opportunity to see the children at play. We saw them sleeping in fairly large rooms, 32 beds each, lined up in regular rows, with only the heads visible, the boys with their hair shaven, the girls identified by a ribbon. A nurse hovered over the children, ready to comfort back to sleep any one who woke up or cried. But no child cried while we were there; one or two tossed around in bed and then went back to sleep. The sight of these children, all looking alike, made it difficult to believe that each one belonged to a different set of parents. This impression of uniformity, of the casting of each child into a rigid mould, was confirmed in some of the discussions we had with the nursery personnel, particularly the lady doctor who was the director. We asked what they did about capricious and emotionally disturbed children. The category 'emotionally disturbed child' was not understood by the director. As to capricious children, she said they based their approach to the children on Pavlovian theory. The nervous system is at the basis of the entire human organism and of behaviour. The nervous system is

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just one more organ that must be given a rest, hence the importance of sleep. They never beat a child, never deprive him of food. They might put him into a corner and deprive him of play with the other children for a while. This would be enough punishment for the capricious child. We tried again to find out what happened to the disturbed child, and again the answer was evasive or oblique. She described, instead, the steps taken before the child was admitted to the nursery school. It is seen at home by a visiting nurse who finds out about his character. At the nursery school, they first try to give the individual child the same regimen as at home. Then they slowly get him accustomed to the school regimen. They try not to make the experience too strange for the child. In addition, they give the parents advice. If a child does not behave, they try to talk to the family and do all they can to quiet the child. Even the capricious children become used to the regimen. They all observe the quiet period of rest. All this is based on Pavlov. The children subordinate themselves to the regimen and they have no problems. They try to calm the child, give him what he wants. We asked about the training of personnel who work in this nursery; we were told that they are nurses who have taken a special course. We asked what steps they took about gifted children. They said they tried to discover in which direction the child's gift lay (musical, acting, etc.) and then encourage that gift not only in the nursery school, but also at the time the child is moved up to the kindergarten.

School fees: These depend on the salaries of the parents. The lowest payment is 1·50 rubles a month, the highest is 8. The nursery is only for the children of working parents. The plant is planning more nurseries, since there are not enough places for all children.

We tried to find out what they felt were the differences between the child brought up by a mother and the one brought up in a nursery. The child brought up in a nursery, they said, is better developed, better trained, more organised than the one brought up at home. They believed the new boarding schools are better for children than letting them wander by themselves in the streets or without parental supervision. The boarding school is not obligatory, each family deciding for itself what it wants to do. They think the boarding schools are popular; they are better prepared to bring up the children because they have good teachers and better conditions than can often be found at home, particularly if both parents work.

One problem at the nursery school, they say, is that they run into 'Monday morning behaviour', in the sense that some parents tend to spoil their child over the weekend. When parents do not observe the regimen of the school, school personnel talk to them. They try to teach them to behave 'in more rational ways'. They advise parents not to upset the child too much by exposing him to stimuli that would make him less manageable during the rest of the week. In other words, both parents and child are expected to conform to the norms of behaviour and conformity established by the school, which stands ready, as the

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case may be, to educate parents as well. The nursery school therefore occupies a strategic position in the process of indoctrination, since it is able to shape the personality and inculcate values almost from the beginning of the 'socialisation' process of the future adult member of Soviet society. From the nursery school the child proceeds to kindergarten, then to elementary school, and possibly to boarding school. One of the implications of this process is that the family has lost, or will continue to lose, most of its personality-formation functions. In one respect, this arrangement may well lead to an equalising process in that all children (once the arrangement is universal) could receive the same opportunities to develop their talents and gifts.

The nursery school, at the same time, fits very well with the needs of Soviet society to relieve both parents of the care of the children, and particularly the mother, whose time can be freed for more important work at the plant or the office. The scheme is really majestic in its simplicity. A woman becomes pregnant. She is given two months' paid leave before and after childbirth; then she resumes her work and the child is placed into this training and indoctrinating factory which is the nursery. This has all the inescapable logic of the assembly line, and its same chilling implications. Is this the new world of the future? Is this the brave new world of the automated individual? Certainly the approach to the child as manifested in that nursery was consonant with this idea. The emphasis was on taming, curbing, moulding, training. The search for talent, it seems to me, did not seem to loom very large when compared to the regimentation and standardisation. Equally chilling were the playrooms we saw. We visited the place when the children were asleep; the playrooms were absolutely spotless. All the toys and playthings were lined up, arranged in perfect order, and seemed hardly used at all. It looked inhuman and unchildlike. As the father of four children, I found it extremely difficult to believe that children had used these toys in 'normal' play. Finally, this kind of arrangement raises important questions, the most important being the impact of such an upbringing upon the personality, upon creativity, inventiveness, initiative, and so on.

At the same time the nursing personnel are very tender and 'mother-like' with the children, this counteracting to some degree the typical impersonality of the institution. I asked the director whether the Soviet Union was returning to some of the ideas of Engels on the family (which had been applied, but without much success, in the early years after the Revolution), but she did not seem to know about this and could only repeat that they were following Pavlovian theories.

We left the nursery disturbed and depressed by what we had seen. Now that I thought about it, these children, all alike, sleeping in serried ranks in their lined-up cots, seemed the products of the same test-tube. Perhaps the Russians will beat us yet to 'instant' babies. 'Just add a pint of blood, and shake by the feet. . . .'

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Kharkov: Interview with sub-district physician

The physician, a fairly attractive but extremely serious and humourless lady in her early thirties, began by explaining to me the territorial organisation of medical care.

Each city district (*raion*) is divided into sub-districts of 3,000 to 3,500 adults. There are an additional 800 children in each one. There are 20 sub-districts in her district. For each there are 6·3 medical staff positions of different specialities: 1·5 positions in internal medicine, 1 in pediatrics, 0·5 in obstretrics-gynaecology, 0·5 in tuberculosis, 0·25 in ophthalmology, 0·25 in neurology, 0·25 in dermatology, and 0·5 in surgery. The district clinic is administratively part of a hospital. All these physicians (including the internists who serve as general practitioners) have their offices in the district clinic.

Typical day of a sub-district internist: She spends her first three hours seeing patients at the polyclinic, i.e., between 8 and 11 a.m., or 11 a.m. to 2 p.m. The norm is six patients per hour. She says this is not excessive because she knows all or most of her patients. Chronic patients do not usually come on their own, but must be called in or visited at home. Each physician has a visiting nurse who calls upon patients at home. Only acute cases come to the clinic. The patient who comes to the clinic goes directly to the registrar where each individual has his own medical record. All women after the age of 30 must have a routine examination to detect neoplasms, particularly cervical cancer. After three hours spent at the polyclinic she goes to visit patients. The norm is a half-hour per home visit. Yesterday she did 11 to 12 visits altogether. She says she plans her day as she feels is most convenient. They have two cars at their disposal for visits. There is a duty physician for five sub-districts who works at night. The physicians who are on night duty are not the ordinary sub-district physicians, but special physicians assigned to this work (in other words, she does not have to assume this responsibility herself).

Hospitalisation: All the patient needs is for her to fill in a blank requesting the hospital to admit him, or she can call the emergency service.

Medical certification: She can give an excuse for three days and for three days thereafter, but for not more than ten days altogther. If the illness lasts for more than ten days, then the patient must be seen by a special commission. But the patient receives a salary on the basis of the medical certificate.

Health education and propaganda: She gives lectures to patients who have the same kind of diseases. She explains the nature of the diseases in a popular way and tells them what kind of a diet they need and what regimen they should follow. She also asks specialists to see the patients in consultation to determine what it is they need. She also gives lectures in factories, with the lectures fitted to the needs of the people there. Nine hours per month are given to this educational work. She also works six

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months a year in the hospital. The salary that a doctor receives is a function of the years spent in medical work. The sub-district doctor earns 108 rubles per month, which is more than some specialists do. Vacation time is 24 working days a year.

Altogether, the impression I carried from the interview was that of a fairly serious but not deep physician who took good routine care of her patients. I certainly would trust her with a bruise or a superficial wound. I would not have wanted her as my internist!

Tashkent: Textile works polyclinic

My appointment at the Ministry fell through, but as a consolation prize I was able to visit the polyclinic of the Tashkent Textile Works. I had an interview with the director, Avram Khamilov. The polyclinic administratively is part of the general preventive-medical institutions of the town. It serves the workers of the textile plant and their families. The primary task of the polyclinic (as well as of all other medical institutions in the USSR) is a preventive one. Each year staff members examine the workers and their families, and if they uncover pathological conditions or indices, they prescribe treatment to prevent further morbid developments. They start therapy from the moment of discovery, either in the out-patient clinic or at the hospital. Their hospital has 400 beds, and four main departments: general (internal) medicine, surgery, gynaecology, and pediatrics-gynaecology. All these institutions ultimately belong to the Ministry of Health of the Uzbek Republic, but they are directly subordinate to the Tashkent City Health Department.

Each of the eight plants of the textile works has a medical or first-aid station staffed by junior medical personnel (nurses, *feldshers*). Each station has a total staff of nine to twelve persons, and since both plant and medical personnel are working on a three-shift basis, each medical shift has three or four people. Medical specialists are also assigned to the textile factory, and to the medical stations there. Physicians usually spend two days a week at the plant medical station and four days at the polyclinic. In addition, they check on safety measures, on the quality of communal food, personal hygiene, and the cleanliness of all places where people are working. They also give lectures, as well as preventive injections or inoculations.

Direct supervision of the state of health of the worker is in the hands of the shop physician, who has up to 2,000 workers or employees on his panel. The shop physician is therefore the occupational equivalent of the territorial sub-district physician. Furthermore, there are regular sub-district physicians in the residential area where the textile workers are housed. They have six such sub-districts. As a result of this system, each and every worker knows exactly where his doctor is, and also the day and the time he is available. All the specialities are represented in the medical installations, and consultations are arranged through and by the shop physician.

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The hospital that serves the plant is also the teaching clinic of the Tashkent Medical Institute, and students in their fourth and fifth years work and study there. Their doctors work four months in the hospital and eight months in the out-patient clinic. Physicians are given every opportunity to improve their qualifications.

Some details on the medical stations: The medical point or station in a plant does not provide treatment as such. It is a three to four room arrangement, including room for a dentist, and a hygiene room for women under the supervision of a midwife. Some of these stations have electro-physiological apparatus for patients who need it (inhalers, hydrotherapy, ionization). These medical stations provide first-aid or emergency care, until the medical emergency services can be brought in. In other words, each plant of the textile works has some medical facilities and a semi-professional staff whom the senior physicians at the polyclinic have trained, and as such they can give emergency medical care until medical personnel can arrive on the scene. Among the junior medical personnel they use are *feldshers*, nurses, and midwives. After five months of pregnancy women are shifted to light work and do not do night work. At the seventh month they are given leave for 56 days and 56 days after delivery. When the child is at least two months old, he may be placed in a creche and every three hours a special bus takes the working mothers to the creches to nurse him; the bus then takes the mothers back to work.

The polyclinic staff consists of 187 physicians and 432 junior medical personnel. Altogether they have 1,004 persons on the staff. Most of this is financed by the health ministry of the Uzbek Republic, but the textile works provides buildings, light, heat, repair, and maintenance. The working hours for physicians are 5½ hours a day at the hospital, 6½ hours a day at the clinic. Junior medical personnel work 6½ hours a day, specialists work 4½, 5 or 6 hours, depending on their speciality. Salaries: Up to five years of work, 80 rubles a month; up to ten years, 90 rubles a month; up to 20 years, 110 rubles a month. After 20 years of work, 140 rubles. It is possible for a doctor to hold 1½ staff positions.

When workers become sick at home the sub-district physician takes care of them. In an emergency they can call the emergency physician. The sub-district physician is based at the polyclinic. The polyclinic itself operates from 9 a.m. to 8 p.m. in two shifts. From 8 p.m. to 9 a.m. each department has its own duty physician; this is in addition to emergency services and personnel. If something happens at night, the duty physician takes over and transfers the case to the appropriate sub-district in the morning.

Every accident at the plant is investigated, and if it is the fault of the administration the injured worker obtains 100 per cent of his pay. If it is the worker's fault, the percentage paid depends on the length of uninterrupted work at the factory and can go up to 90 per cent. If he has worked

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there for only a short time he usually gets from 40 to 60 per cent of his salary.

We then took a quick tour of the polyclinic itself. We first visited the laboratories where the different analyses are made; they do all the work there for the clinic and the hospital, including blood analysis and so on. The technicians, we were told, are all physicians. We saw the office of ophthalmology where the eyesight of workers is checked and glasses prescribed, the women's consultation room where, among other things, courses are given to women to train them in painless birth. Minor surgery is performed at the polyclinic but major surgery, of course, at the hospital. Blood donors are encouraged to give blood four times a year. They receive ten rubles for each donation plus two days of leave at 100 per cent pay, plus four free meals. These days of leave can be accumulated and taken all at once.

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THE SOVIET SCHOOL TODAY

Frederic Lilge

THE reorganisation of Soviet education initiated by Khrushchev under the slogan of 'bringing the school closer to life', became law on 24 December 1958, and is now entering its final phase. Though intended to be completed in five years, it is likely to take longer and to become coextensive with the seven-year economic plan launched at about the same time. The concurrence and interdependence of the economic plan and the school reform are rarely mentioned in the writings of Soviet educationists, who are naturally preoccupied with the educational problems created by the law. Khrushchev himself, however, has left no doubt that the economic plan and educational reorganisation are interdependent. In a speech to a conference of teachers in July 1960, he said, 'We are now solving two historical problems, the creation of the material-technical foundations of communism and the education of the new man. They are in essence one and the same process'.[1]

This identity of purpose was indeed manifest in the design of the 1958 Act. Vocational training and apprenticeship were made an integral part or condition of all education beyond the eighth grade, which now terminates compulsory education. The majority of young people who want to obtain a secondary education beyond this stage are supposed to do so in part-time evening or shift schools while they are employed. A more fortunate minority may continue their schooling in full-time eleven-year schools. Even here one-third of the school time must be devoted to work-training, so that students graduate not only with the usual certificate, but with a job-rating (*razriad*) that enables them to take their places in the labour force. Students who plan to enter an institution of higher learning are required first to work for at least two years, or they may enrol in evening and correspondence courses while they work. Higher education by correspondence courses, like the evening school on the secondary level, is the form of part-time education favoured by the government. Exempted from the two-year labour requirement are the 20 per cent of the most gifted graduates of the eleven-year schools, who may present themselves directly for entrance examinations at universities and institutes to pursue studies in science, mathematics, and engineering.

The combination of work and study, which is the motto of the current reform, has of course a long and well-known socialist pedigree. Marx, and following him Lenin, derived what few educational ideas their work contains from Robert Owen and Charles Fourier. In the early part of this century the idea of the *Arbeitsschule* was promoted at nearly the same time by John Dewey and Georg Kerschensteiner, and by P. P. Blonski in the Soviet Union. Yet with all its high-minded principles,

[1] *Osnovy kommunisticheskogo vospitaniya* (Moscow, 1960), p. 10.

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the operation of the labour school has remained unsatisfactory even in the educational practice of the Soviet Union, which, compared with capitalist countries, seemed to offer it the most favourable opportunity.

The current reform employs some of the ideas and terms of the early experimental period of Soviet education, just as Soviet historians of pedagogy have been free since 1956 to recognise in it certain merits. Still, this attempt at historical continuity has not saved Khrushchev's venture from numerous difficulties. Despite the public discussion preceding it, the reform was adopted too hastily, so that it continues to be plagued by all sorts of troubles even in this late phase. It is a relatively simple matter to convert, as the law requires, former seven- and ten-year schools into eight- and eleven-year schools respectively, and in this respect the reform is not too far behind schedule. It is much more difficult to organise the new work-training programme in the eleven-year schools so as to make it educationally rewarding as well as economically efficient. This requires the cooperation of the Education Ministries, including their regional and local departments, with the corresponding economic authorities. Checks must be provided against the economic exploitation of juvenile labour, and against its employment in routine or poorly organised, trivial types of work. Attendance at evening schools by young workers, even though they have the law on their side, must be secured against frequent obstructions by farm and factory managers bent on fulfilling their quota of the plan. Foremen have to be made available and paid for whatever instruction and apprenticeship training factories provide, and special shops for student workers have to be allocated. Job placement must be properly coordinated with the type of training actually received, and if educational and humanistic principles are not to be entirely sacrificed, vocational advisory services must be introduced on a wide scale to take account of students' individual interests. These are some but by no means all of the problems raised by the educational reform; four years after its initiation, the Soviet educational press reveals that their solution remains the exception rather than the rule. Although notable efforts have been made in one or another locality, and these are dutifully recorded and propagandised, complaints and grievances from all over the Soviet Union are continually aired in the Soviet press.

APART from the proper organisation of the work programmes, other questions have arisen concerning the general effect of the law on student morale and on achievement in the traditional school subjects. These too are supposed to be brought closer to life, but how this is to be done in, say, literature, history, mathematics, or foreign languages, neither the law nor any subsequent directives have revealed. It is left to the teaching profession, with the supposed guidance and advice of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, to find the proper way. Teachers are asked to offset somehow any lessening in the incentive to learning that

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formerly was provided by the promise of a relatively easy access to higher educational institutions directly after high school. It is fairly generally admitted that the reform has had an unsettling effect on academic achievement in many schools. Indeed, a spirit of utilitarianism and vocationalism seems to have invaded them. The desire to acquire a vocation and a well-paid job in industry is said to have become an aim in itself, whereas the purpose of education, as one professor protested, should first of all be to form men, and only secondarily workers or engineers (22 January 1963).[2] Shades of Rousseau!

To judge from the Soviet educational press, and from the *Teachers' Gazette* in particular, many responsible teachers and educators are seeking to turn the current reorganisation into a genuine school reform. They especially ask for greater independence in both teaching and learning. Capitalising on destalinisation, they now openly repudiate certain long-standing defects and abuses, such as rote-learning, dogmatism, and 'formalism', that is, compliance without conviction. Any true liberalisation of the educational process is frustrated, however, not only because the bureaucratic regimentation of teachers continues, but because the amount of straight ideological instruction, to which students respond by memorising the desired answers, is on the increase. Beginning in January 1963, a new course in social studies (*obshchestvovedenie*), was introduced into the last year of secondary education. It covers a simplified and up-dated version of dialectical materialism, describes the foreign and internal policies of the government, presents the new Party programme, and is designed to convince the graduating classes that the growing power and prestige of communism is the chief trend of the contemporary world (27 December 1962). This course comes on top of the already heavy ideological content of history and literature, subjects which a leading Soviet educator says must also be 'brought closer to life' by relating their content to current programmes and policies.[3]

How little the spirit of Soviet education has really changed may be demonstrated by examples of the continued prevalence of percentomania and formalism. Percentomania results from the endeavour of teachers and school directors to report 100 per cent success in annual promotions from grade to grade. Strong pressure is exerted on teachers to keep failing grades to an absolute minimum, since a pupil who fails in more than one subject is denied promotion. Percentomania originated in the early 1930s, when the practices of socialist competition and shock work were carried over from industrial production into education, and successful teachers were awarded prizes in money or goods. At that time the imparting and acquisition of knowledge were made to depend almost entirely on the skill of the teacher and the will of the pupil. The children's writer, Marshak, even wrote a poem admonishing grade repeaters to heed the example of the heroic workers of socialist construction and to step

[2] This and succeeding dates in parentheses refer to issues of *Uchitelskaya Gazeta*.
[3] E. I. Monoszon, in *Sovetskaya Pedagogika*, No. 4, 1962.

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up the pace of their learning. Socialist competition in academic subjects between schools or between different grades in the same school was abandoned after the war because its deleterious effects had become obvious. It continues today between students' work brigades in rural schools, in sports, and in the rivalry between different grades within one school, notably in some of the boarding schools, in maintaining order, cleanliness and good behaviour. Although percentomania has been officially denounced by the Party, there is much evidence that it continues in practice, and for this there are very good reasons.

Nowadays, as earlier, the professional skill of teachers is judged by how few students they leave behind at promotion time in June, and by how few failing marks they give. It is impossible, for example, to win the honour of 'Distinguished Teacher' if one's teaching record over the years shows a single non-promotion (20 June 1961). Since the methods by which a teacher may achieve 100 per cent success are obviously not easy to check, teachers yield to the temptation of being excessively lenient and of assigning a passing grade even when a student's performance leaves nearly everything to be desired. As one writer put it, teachers are led to compromise with their professional conscience. No selection or ability grouping of students is permitted in the Soviet system, and classes in most schools contain a wide range of mental abilities and interest among the pupils. Nevertheless, all are expected to master the subject-matter required by the official syllabus, and the burden of accomplishing this difficult task is placed almost entirely on the teacher. If he fails in it, he is considered to lack interest, enthusiasm, and professional skill. Only secondarily is the blame placed on institutions such as the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences for insufficient interest in research on the practical aspects of classroom teaching and learning, or on the pedagogical institutes for defects in their programmes of teacher training.

IN order to avoid a blot on their records, some teachers resort to dubious means for carrying along the feebler or indifferent students. For example, they may accept memorised answers and copied compositions, find ways of prompting their students in the oral examinations, ask exceedingly simple questions that are impossible to miss. Perhaps the most serious consequence of percentomania is to encourage what in Soviet educational jargon is known as formalism, that is, mechanical learning and memorisation that involve neither interest nor understanding. Although the poverty of this kind of teaching and learning may go unnoticed for some years, it finally comes to light in the secondary-school leaving examination, at which outside officials are present, and above all in the entrance examinations to higher educational institutions and technical colleges. During 1961 and 1962 the *Teachers' Gazette* devoted many columns to a critical discussion of the low level of knowledge, the lack of independent thinking, and the prevalence of rote-learning in the schools. Even though the discussion, in which many teachers participated, hardly

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revealed the ultimate reasons for this state of affairs, it does nevertheless afford some insight into current discontents within the profession.

One of the more candid writers stated bluntly that teachers are actually not permitted to grade objectively. The school director, it is true, is officially instructed to refrain from interfering with grades, but in fact is never at a loss to make his will prevail. If a teacher assigns a failing grade, the director may say, for example, ' All right. Now that you have given a 2, correct it by making the failing student succeed ' (26 August 1961). ' Aren't we fooling ourselves ', one writer asked, ' by asserting that it is the teacher who is always guilty? ' Others pointed out that an increasing number of students cease to exert themselves in school because they know that the reform greatly reduced their chances of being admitted to a higher educational institution directly after graduation. When a teacher refers to this growing indifference to scholastic achievement to explain why a certain percentage of his grades is low or failing, he is told, either by the director or by the school's pedagogical council, that he has failed to awaken the students' intellectual interests.

Some further illustrations of the teacher's dilemma may be of interest. A history teacher in the Kalinin region complained in the *Teachers' Gazette* (25 March 1961) that the same students who made bad grammatical errors in their history papers were receiving passing or higher marks from the teacher of Russian. When the history teacher brought this to the attention of the director and asked his advice on how to mark students with a poor command of Russian, the perplexing answer was, ' Do as you wish, only don't give any 2's '. Another example is an eloquently written, pathetic report of a young apprentice teacher on giving his first school lessons (11 April 1961). Having assigned as homework a composition on Gogol's *Revisor*, he discovered that the students handed in identical papers. Since he judged them worthless as individual compositions, he gave them all 2. The regular teacher who supervised his work was horrified at this drastic measure and revised the marks upward. She justified this by pointing out that none of the papers contained grammatical errors and that stylistic merit and independent thought could well be left to later development. The young man's article ended on a note of resignation. ' You'll learn ', the school director told him, meaning apparently that the educational system has its own logic to which the professional conscience must learn to submit.

The closer connection to be established between school and work training by the 1958 reform would, it was asserted, lead to more meaningful learning and to greater interest in academic work. At first there were reports that this hoped-for invigoration had actually been effected. High-school work brigades on farms in southern regions were said not only to be setting records in high crop yields; the members also became better students because they learned at first hand the relation between science and its practical application. However, such ideal results of combining labour and learning remained sporadic occurrences, and in some cases

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they turned out to have been partly fraudulent. A number of experienced and distinguished teachers wrote that even though the reform must be regarded as a great leap forward, it also raised unexpected problems. A 'Teacher of Merit' bluntly said that, contrary to official reports and statistics, scholastic achievement was not rising (20 July 1961). She declared that a falsely optimistic impression was being created by ministerial connivance, especially in the upper grades of secondary school, whereas the public should be alarmed by the actual state of affairs. Nevertheless, she did not share the opinion apparently held by a good many teachers and parents that the declining intellectual level was caused by the new vocational emphasis. She claimed that in the best schools young people are now given a chance to discover their abilities and interests early, and productive work training helps them mature more rapidly. At the same time she confessed that this experience is far from common. Many students accept the practical direction given to their studies, but do so at the expense of their academic programme. Her overall impression was pessimistic, and as evidence she referred especially to the diminishing number of excellent students who win gold and silver medals at graduation.

GENERALLY speaking, an anti-intellectual climate seems to have spread in the high schools. Young people are even sometimes blamed for interpreting the relation of learning to life in too narrow a sense. They can perceive the applicability of physics and chemistry to industrial work more easily than that of literature. 'What is it good for? You can work without it', one boy commented. During their work training, high-school students may also discover that the factory hands next to them earn good wages even though they may have attended school for only four or five years. Others argue that there is no need to make good grades in school as only the top 20 per cent of all students will be accepted at higher educational institutions directly after graduation, whereas entrance may still be possible with even a 3 record after completion of the prescribed two-year labour service, if good work and character references are submitted. Finally, students know that even though they show little interest or make little effort, teachers hesitate to assign failing grades for fear of damaging their own reputations—they will pull the pupil through with a 3 even at the cost of touching up the records a bit.

The educational press, while reporting these opinions, cannot of course admit that they are wholly valid or justified. To do so would be equivalent to saying that the school reform, however it may benefit the economy in supplying needed juvenile labour, comes close to being a failure pedagogically. Reasons for the decline in the academic interests and achievements of students must therefore be sought elsewhere. One familiar and well-worn explanation is that the old bourgeois, philistine conception of education has not yet completely died out. Many parents seek an education for their children only for the personal and social

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advantages associated with it. Such motives lead to a preoccupation with good marks and proper credentials merely for the sake of gaining admission to higher educational institutions. They thereby reinforce the formalistic approach to learning and engender indifference to the genuine values a socially useful education seeks to promote. This criticism may be true, but it leaves out of account that parents and students make their adjustment to an educational and social system they themselves did not create. The bourgeois notions ascribed to them can hardly have their origin in a social system they have never known. Indeed, Stalin's promotion of a new intelligentsia was accomplished in good part through the reinstitution of the old-fashioned 'learning' and cramming school which Lenin had explicitly denounced and rejected.

Perhaps the central criticism of the school reform that can be made at this stage is that the combination of work and learning has not in any real sense vitalised instruction, but has instead brought about a lowering of intellectual interest and achievement on the part of the average student. This is the conclusion drawn in a lengthy editorial summarising the long discussion previously referred to (15 March 1962). It is doubtful whether all the difficulties can be expected to disappear, as the editors seem to think, by euphemistically calling them 'growing pains'. Lifeless scholasticism cannot be simply swept out of the classroom by a chorus of 'anti-Stalinist' voices from the educational bureaucracy and the teaching profession. A close organic relationship between school and contemporary society, such as the now rehabilitated and reprinted theorists of polytechnical education used to urge in the 1920s, is rarely achieved. In vain are teachers and professors told to take notice of 'the stormy currents of life' breaking into their classrooms, to realise that students today are more mature and independent than before, and that the teacher now competes with engineers, agronomists, and foremen who instruct these students outside class in factories and on farms in a more vital and interesting way. There may be new things in life, a professor wrote, but in the schools it's the same old story. For 'the teacher is forced to reason thus: there is no need for any theory or method of education. What counts is to achieve a high percentage of success, no matter by what means' (10 April 1962).

It is obviously unrealistic to blame the teachers, as is generally done, for this stagnation and for failing to strike out on their own and become courageous innovators of new methods that will somehow miraculously eliminate the repeating of grades and the high drop-out rate. The cause of the stagnation is not the delayed response of the teaching profession to destalinisation, but the persistence of bureaucratic and ideological regimentation. Any attempt to excuse the teachers, at least partially, as one writer tried to do, by referring to the force of habits to which they have long been inured, does not touch the heart of the matter. 'In the years preceding the school reform teachers were fed ready-made, detailed lesson plans, outlines, and guides to teaching. Creative thought and

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initiative were thereby deadened. From time-honoured habit the teachers wait for someone above to clear the road for them' (11 November 1961). Perhaps so, but the habits do not persist without cause.

THE same criticism is levelled at the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, which is supposed to offer practical guidance to the profession and to initiate research into the problems the reform has raised. In a recent series of articles, of which the most biting was one by A. Efimov of the Academy of Sciences, the members of the Pedagogical Academy were attacked for their timidity in expressing an independent judgment on controversial subjects, for their reluctance to undertake inquiry without authorisation from above, and for the substitution of a desultory, descriptive empiricism for truly experimental work. It is time, he concluded, to rescue the science of education from routine and to establish a new centre for the study of this subject (20 December 1962). Attacks on the Academy come from other quarters as well, and for more directly practical reasons. Of great concern to Soviet educational authorities remains the large number of failing students who, after repeating several grades and finally dropping out altogether, present the chief obstacle to the realisation of universal eight-year schooling. In an effort to cope with this problem, the so-called Lipetsk experiment has been widely publicised. Apparently by direct intervention of the regional Party secretary, teachers in a number of the better schools in Lipetsk, a town less than three hundred miles south-east of Moscow, were given freedom to plan and conduct lessons in their own way, and to discard the prescribed routine of instruction. In the spring of 1962 the Ministry of Education called a conference at Lipetsk to inspect the new methods and their results. Not only were students found to be alert and interested in their work, but scholastic achievement had risen sharply and a number of schools reported no failing pupils. Teachers and directors throughout the Union were challenged to match these achievements. The Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, however, which had been hesitant to the very last to underwrite the experiment, was chided by the *obkom* secretary for temporising, and in general for being remote from the problems of the classroom teacher (23 June 1962).

The wariness of leading members of the Academy was understandable. An experiment that came off well with a select number of able teachers—the reports on Lipetsk always mention the same two or three names—might well miscarry with the great mass of mediocre teachers, and besides, experiments of this kind should be supervised and controlled by educational specialists. The paradox is that the Academy, as Efimov charged, has scarcely sponsored or initiated any experimental studies since its establishment in 1944, a failure often remarked upon in recent years but so far not corrected. Assertions that only Soviet pedagogy is truly scientific stand side by side in their educational literature with admissions that dissertations and monographs report only descriptive findings and subjective evaluations. The real reason for the absence of objective studies

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remains the condemnation by the Party, as long ago as 1936, of the child-study movement, or pedology. So far the decree has not been revoked, but indications are multiplying that a partial lifting of the ban on objective investigation may be in the making. The low level of *Kandidat* and doctoral theses in education, to which public attention is increasingly directed, is attributed among other things to the absence of experimental work. Finally, a significant article in the leading educational periodical by a prominent member of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences [4] pointed out that the problem of failing students cannot be solved entirely by appealing to teachers to improve their methods. There are social and economic as well as organisational causes, and among these poor living conditions and disordered family life, inadequate nutrition and physical handicaps such as defective speech, sight, or hearing, long distances from schools, and one-teacher rural schools, were specifically mentioned. Most of these conditions were investigated by the pedologists, and now after nearly three decades of prohibition and fear, Soviet educators appear to be getting ready to resume where the pedologists left off.

So long as timidity and routine rule even in the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, the highest educational institution of the country, one cannot expect the pedagogical institutes in which the majority of teachers are trained to be brimming with ideas. All the defects of Soviet higher education, of which there are many, are found in high concentration at these institutes. Students who fail to gain admission to the better or prestige institutes try for the next best, their last resort being the pedagogical institutes. These accept whomever they can get, and since the vacancies, at least in provincial institutions, outnumber the applicants, there is no competitive examination for admission. Many students who never intend to take up teaching as a profession enter these institutes merely to obtain a diploma of higher education. In 1961, 15 per cent of all graduates of pedagogical institutes failed to report for teaching jobs, and in some institutes the figure ran as high as 60 per cent (30 October 1962). It should perhaps be explained that though these teachers' colleges offer certain professional courses, instruction is organised in subject-matter departments. Students therefore graduate as mathematicians, biologists, linguists, historians and so forth. The local and regional branches of the ministries of education do of course try to influence their choice of vocation, and actually graduates of teachers' colleges are required by law to report for teaching assignments. But the law may be flouted and official pressure ignored, with the result that the teacher shortage in primary grades and in rural areas is acute. Young people feel that jobs in state and collective farm schools are undesirable. Rural teachers are compelled to do agricultural work during vacation, and if they refuse, the school director cuts their pay by reducing their teaching load (20 December 1962). Housing, too, is frequently inadequate and life is drab. Consequently, teachers make every effort to obtain posts in

[4] F. F. Korolev, *Sovetskaya Pedagogika*, February 1962.

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towns and cities, where there may be a teacher surplus; or they take better paid jobs in other occupations. Obviously, therefore, the supply and allocation of teaching staffs by regions, which is planned centrally by the republic ministries of education, breaks down.

The quality of staff and instruction in the pedagogical institutes, both in the undergraduate division leading to the diploma, and in the graduate division leading to the *Kandidat* degree, is poorer than in other institutions of higher education. Furthermore, it is said to be declining year by year. Very few instructors in these institutions hold a Doctor of Science degree; salaries are lower than in other institutes; laboratory facilities are in many places non-existent; and there is little money for research and publication. The teaching load, which is too great to leave any energy for research, is calculated not by hours per week, but by the number of students taught. Those instructors who have small enrolments, as is likely in certain subjects, must carry an increased load in terms of hours. It is not surprising, then, that the ablest instructors wander off and seek positions in non-pedagogical institutes. Students study from lecture notes and textbooks, original works and primary sources are rarely read. Independent thinking is not encouraged, and this shows up especially in the low quality and repetitiousness of the theses submitted for the *Kandidat* degree. Two senior lecturers at the Kazan Pedagogical Institute reported that forty-nine theses had been written there on K. D. Ushinsky, a nineteenth-century Russian educationalist who has received official Soviet approval; thirty-two on A. S. Makarenko; and twenty-six on M. I. Kalinin (11 May 1961). Very few pedagogical institutes publish their theses, and to judge from this example it is no loss to scholarship, since they can be hardly more than paraphrases of a few approved authors. Finally, the pedagogical institutes lag behind in training vocational instructors and supervisors, a large number of whom are required if the Khrushchev reform is to work.

THIS brings us back once more to the unresolved problems and persistent abuses of the school work-training programmes that were only summarily stated at the beginning. Throughout the history of Soviet education, administrators have worked under conditions that made it difficult or even impossible to introduce a genuine polytechnical programme as distinct from a monotechnical, or vocational, one. Under the new reform the term polytechnical still enjoys lip-service, but in reality it is used to confer educational legitimacy on a variety of practices that cause distress to many teachers and administrators. Yet their protests, veiled and indirect, avail them nothing. The situation is worst in rural schools, where is it openly acknowledged that students aged fifteen and over often serve as a source of unpaid labour. A state farm in the Astrakhan region was acclaimed on television and radio as *mayak* (a lighthouse) for its exemplary combination of work training and schooling, but on

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closer inspection it was found to be interested only in boosting its production of ducks and vegetables with the help of student labour. A visiting official from the regional department of education wondered whether these undeniable economic achievements were not too dearly bought. Could educational progress really be measured in terms of thousands of units of this or that produce? After their stints of hard and often dull labour, not a single graduate of the school wished to continue in agricultural work, and all the students with whom the official talked showed indifference or aversion to the work required of them (5 July 1962). A young swineherd on a collective farm complained that only five out of his class of forty-three stayed on the farm; and he himself is disappointed because his work makes no use of his knowledge of physics and chemistry. Or, again, the work training of girls in an eleven-year school in the Krasnoyarsk region consists in the care of cattle and poultry. The pupils simply replace adult farm labour without being paid for it or even receiving proper work clothing (22 January 1963).

In the schools of many industrial centres the work-training programme is adapted less to students' interests, or even to the actual economic needs of the area, than to the training facilities that happen to be available. 'We do not choose our vocation, it chooses us', one student put it. With their interests thus ignored, it is not surprising that the majority of high-school graduates do not intend to take up the vocations for which they were trained (28 April 1962). The *sovnarkhozy* have been repeatedly criticised for neglecting to coordinate vocational education with the recruitment of qualified labour in their areas. No single agency seems to be responsible for planning manpower demand and supply sufficiently far ahead. Other complaints lodged against the regional economic councils concern their failure to provide training shops in factories in anywhere near the number required by the number of eleven-year-school graduates entering the work force. The councils are also charged with neglecting to supply school workshops with adequate equipment. School directors are jokingly referred to as forwarding agents for antiquated machinery in transit from factory to junkyard (22 May 1962).

WITH all their defects, the eleven-year schools, especially in towns and cities, are still superior to the evening and alternating-shift schools. Though they are officially classified as equivalent in curriculum and academic standards, the evening and shift schools are actually inferior. Drop-out rates are startling; often only a quarter of those enrolled at the beginning of the school year remain after the first few months. Some directors falsely report low initial enrolment in order to camouflage the magnitude of the drop-out (24 June 1961). Factory managers sometimes make school attendance impossible by sending young workers on assignments that force them to be absent for prolonged periods. In rural areas farm managers may fail to provide the necessary transportation, or simply refuse to release young people from work (28 March 1961).

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Local Party and trade union organisations are repeatedly but vainly upbraided in the press for negligence in defending young workers' rights to further education. Instruction is criticised for being dry and boring; there is a scarcity of new textbooks that take into account the considerable age differentials and vocational interests of students. Besides, it is no secret that students who fail in day schools, or who are 'difficult', are transferred to evening schools. Those who succeed in graduating usually do so with diplomas that are replete with 3's, or barely passing grades. The chances of these students being admitted to higher educational institutions are therefore small.

The conclusions to be drawn from this review are not encouraging. By hardly any standard can the Khrushchev educational reform, which should more modestly be called a reorganisation, be termed a success, and its faults are unlikely to be corrected by the time it is terminated. Some changes for the better have occurred, as in the boarding schools and the so-called extended day schools. These provide better supervision of homework and discipline than exist at home, but they antedate the 1958 reform, and by the size of their enrolment are of marginal importance. Of any liberalisation of Soviet education there is little evidence. The denunciation of Stalinism in terms of educational formalism, dogmatism, and regimentation has become a ritual, but remains ineffective. Yet destalinisation has certainly had a psychological effect on the young, whose scepticism and cynicism occasionally come to light in the alarm expressed by their teachers. 'It would be a great mistake to assume', a Moscow teacher wrote, 'that fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds could pass through the events of the last years wholly without thinking, satisfied with such explanations as they heard in their history lessons' (24 May 1961). The reorganisation is unpopular with parents and young people because it drastically diminishes the chances for higher education. The teaching profession does not like it because it depresses the level of academic achievement. Factory managers resent or ignore it because in various ways it upsets the routine of their enterprises. Farm managers, however, may profit from it in a manner that has been described. Generally speaking, work-training programmes are introduced in eleven-year schools to comply with the law, whether or not such programmes meet the interests and aptitudes of the students or the economic and technical needs of the area. The result is waste of human effort and energy by both educational and economic standards. The education of gifted children and the possibility of some differentiation in the secondary-school curriculum, publicly debated before the reorganisation, remain undecided. Only in Novosibirsk, by the initiative of the Siberian branch of the Academy of Sciences, and in Tiflis in connection with the university, have special schools for physics and mathematics, covering grades nine through eleven, been established. One achievement of the reorganisation is the release of manpower to the Soviet economy, which will find itself undermanned until the late 1960s owing to the sharply reduced birth rate of the war and post-war periods.

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MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

Peter Juviler

IT was Shurik B's first day at school. Talking about their families with their teacher and each other, children asked Shurik, 'And what is your father?' Flushing with shame, Shurik finally answered, 'I have no father', wondering what they would think of his 'proud, good, loving mother'. This was an illustration of the impact of legalised illegitimacy given by Elena Serebrovskaya in her article, 'Life is making a Revision', which began the debate on family law reform after Stalin, the first of many bitter attacks on the edict of 8 July 1944 concerning marriage, the family, and divorce. Jurists entered the arena to protest against the legal inequality of extramarital children and to attack divorce procedures, citing a case where red tape had delayed a divorce for five years. By the time the divorce came through, Mr A had three children in a new family, Mrs A had two.[1] If in 1960 V. Kaverin could ask impatiently in *Literaturnaya gazeta* (2 April) why 'all these complaints' changed nothing, it might have been because people agreed neither on what should be changed in family law, nor even whether there should be any change at all. Vadim Belyaev, representing an opinion opposed to the 'overwhelming majority' of letter writers to that paper, asserted (14 May), that the present laws were 'in complete harmony with life', and did not require amendment.

The status quo was criticised not only by *Literaturnaya gazeta* and the majority of its contributors in the debate, but above all by such jurists as Alexandra Pergament, of the All-Union Institute of Juridical Sciences (undoubtedly the most eloquent and persistent advocate of reform among the lawyers). On the other hand, Dr Grigori Sverdlov, author of the official law school textbook on Soviet family law, and dean of writers in the field, reflected in his prolific writings the official line on family law from his position in the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences. Most reformers go beyond the changes he suggests.

The controversial provisions on divorce and illegitimacy in the edict of 8 July 1944 were the fruit of official concern that the dislocation

1 Elena Serebrovskaya, 'Zhizn vnosit popravku', *Literaturnaya gazeta* (henceforth: *Lit. gaz.*), 16 January 1954; B. S. Antimonov and A. I. Pergament, 'Nuzhny li izmeneniya v poryadke rastorzheniya braka?' *Sotsialisticheskaya zakonnost* (henceforth: *Sots. zak.*), 1954, No. 9. E. Kovaleva, 'Uluchshit zakonodatelstvo o brake, seme, i opeke', *Sots. zak.*, 1956, No. 12, p. 38, notes that lawyers formerly would not criticise publicly the laws and court decisions that they criticised privately; N. Orlova, 'K razrabotke zakonodatelstva o brake i seme', *Sovetskaya yustitsiya* (henceforth: *Sov. Yust.*), 1962, No. 7, makes it clear that the two same major issues, illegitimacy and divorce, raised in 1954, persisted as codification neared in 1962. There is no clear indication of when new family codes will be introduced; they are now being drafted in the relevant commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which in December 1962 'approved in the main' a first draft of 'fundamental principles'. There may be further public discussion of the texts. When these principles have been confirmed by the Supreme Soviet, the Union republics will then have to adopt codes based on them (*Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR*, 1962, 51, p. 1157).

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caused by war threatened family stability. Since the mid-thirties Stalinist doctrine had restored to the family an essential role in raising children. 'Lifelong' marriages were, ideally, to have the monopoly of procreation. The edict named three ways of promoting this attitude. One was popular: higher family allowances from the state and more nurseries and kindergartens. Two forms of legal leverage proved unpopular, especially when added to the 1936 ban on all but therapeutic abortions which drove women to 'underground abortion mills'. First, the edict nullified unregistered (common law) marriages which had been recognised since 1926. 'Only registered marriage produces the rights and duties of parents.' But so completely was unregistered marriage nullified that paternity could neither be acknowledged, nor even claimed, even when the woman was innocent. Under a strict interpretation of the edict, the victim of a rape still had no rights against the father of the child so conceived. Mothers could not sue for support from fathers of children born after the decree came into force, unless and until the fathers were registered as their husbands in official marriage. Clearly the onus of guilt and the material burdens, tempered by state grants for extramarital children, fell on the woman. In law the man went scot-free. The second legal blow was struck by tougher divorce provisions, aimed at preserving the family wherever possible; many crusaders for reform now blame some of the massive illegitimacy in the USSR on 'divorce red tape'.

However that may be, the 1944 edict marked the completion of the second major family reform since 1917, discarding many of the principles embodied in the first reforms, such as 'freedom of marriage and divorce' (not meaning 'free love'), and the permissive, if not encouraging attitude to abortion, and restoring in large measure the 'double standard' for men and women. It also added to the approved functions of the family (emotional and material sustenance) an educational function.

'IN the name of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic . . . the Civil Division of the Moscow City Court . . . having heard the divorce case of Romanenko v. Romanenko . . .'[2] Behind the judge reading the decision and the two solemn lay judges flanking him, large, dusty windows let in eddies of the raw March wind, keeping in their overcoats the small courtroom audience of old people with nothing else to do, and the foreign observer. '. . . finds that the marriage registered between them in 1945 be dissolved upon registration at Zags (civil registry office). Citizeness Romanenko will keep her married name. Citizen Romanenko will pay 500 (old) rubles. Citizeness Romanenko, nothing.'

The Romanenkos are no more or less typical than any of the fifty million families in the USSR. What is a 'typical' Soviet family in a land so vast that, in the south, the authorities are still combating bride-purchase, polygamy, family barriers to schooling in areas with Moslem

[2] Case No. 2971, Moscow City Court, 13 March 1959. The name given here is fictitious.

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traditions, while in the Baltic republics the Young Communist League experiments with secular, red-draped baptisms, confirmations, marriages, and burials, to compete with Christian rites, and, throughout Russia, collective farm families inherit and divide their household properties under regulations deriving from old customary law, and only now slowly dying out?

Nor is the 45-minute Romanenko hearing entirely 'typical'. The usual divorce case is so deceptively simple, at least in Moscow courts, that an uninformed spectator might wonder why all the fuss about divorce laws. Divorces last about ten minutes, including retirement to write the verdict and delivery of the verdict. They rarely involve witnesses, disputes over property or alimony or custody of children, and only in exceptional cases, attorneys. Most couples are separated some time before divorce, and 'support' (alimony) is as a rule already being paid. But one experienced courtroom sitter gasped at a five-minute case, 'Tak bystro!' (so quickly!).[3]

Divorces are harder for the parties than they are for the foreign onlooker, though not so difficult as under the Tsars. When Mrs R was born in 1914, Imperial laws supported a variegated system in which each recognised faith enforced its own rules of marriage and divorce. If Mrs R's family belonged to the Orthodox majority, divorce was a costly and lengthy affair in two stages, one of attempted reconciliation by the priest, and trial in church court. Adultery was the only ground for divorce in normal cases, and then only after liberal handouts to lawyers, false witnesses, court bureaucrats. In a classic case, divorce was denied a soldier who returned home to find his wife carrying the 'yellow ticket' (the state licence of prostitutes) and living in a house of ill-fame. The church court refused him a divorce because of the legal requirement that there be two eye-witnesses. 'Only witnesses who themselves "saw everything" were (from the court's viewpoint) sufficient proof of adultery.'[4]

Soviet divorces have become harder now, though, than they were when Mr R was born in 1920. Zags handled uncontested cases; the courts rushed through contested ones (with no grounds needed). Divorces have become harder to get than they were after 1926, when all cases were taken out of the courts, and after fees for registering divorce were raised in 1936 from 30 kopeks to 5, 15, 30 new rubles for each successive divorce.

[3] Court Room No. 3, 1 April 1959, listed 15 cases to begin between 10 a.m. and 12.30 p.m. Ten minutes was the average time for 24 of the 25 cases I heard in the Moscow City and Provincial courts. A complex contested divorce action, ending in refusal, with lawyers and witnesses, lasted all afternoon. Usually there were no witnesses, lawyers, or disputes over property, children and maintenance, these questions having usually, but not always, been settled in or out of court before the divorce action.

[4] V. P. Trelin, *O rastorzhenii braka v Dukhovnykh Konsistoriyakh* (Moscow, 1916); A. I. Zagorovsky, *Kurs semeinogo prava* (Odessa, 1909). The soldier's story was related by G. F. Shershenevich, *Uchebnik russkago grazhdanskogo prava*, 10th ed., vol. 2 (Moscow, 1912), p. 705.

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Again, as before the Revolution, there are two main stages: reconciliation (now not by the priest but in a people's court), and final hearing (now not in a church court but in a city or regional court, the court above the people's or lowest court). If Mr R's petition went through the prescribed legal procedures, with delays which seemed average for the Moscow City Court at that time, the story of his divorce was as follows. First, he paid a fee of 10 (new) rubles to hand in his petition to the people's court. Second, he and his wife were called in for an interview with the judge. Third, after a wait of five and a half months, notice of the divorce hearing was published in one of those little boxes so familiar in local papers (in Moscow, *Vechernaya moskva*, or *Moskovskaya pravda*). The publication fee, 40 (new) rubles in Moscow, was payable at the time of the petition. The fourth stage was a hearing in the people's court before a full panel of judge and two lay judges, to ascertain the motives for divorce (the proceedings usually quite free of smut and sensationalism), and to try for a reconciliation. The Rs were not reconciled. Couples rarely are, according to overwhelming testimony. A people's court judge said, for example: 'In my eight years as a judge, I have had only two cases of reconciliation. Of these, only one worked. The other couple came back again in four months.'[5] Fifth, R petitioned the next level, Moscow City Court. Sixth, the Rs had their final hearing and the decision, cited above, was given. The divorce would have taken six and a half to eight months, if typical of the cases I read. (Appeal from the decision would have meant yet another stage, in the RSFSR Supreme Court.)

Seventh, divorce must be registered at Zags, the civil registry office, to enter into effect. When the court awards a divorce, it assigns shares of the 50–200 ruble divorce registration fee (meant to be a deterrent) to the plaintiff and the defendant. In the 34 cases heard and read, the total registration fee was most often 50 rubles, apparently because the cases involved people in the lower income brackets, up to about 80 rubles. It was never over 70 rubles in these cases. The total minimum cost for divorce in Moscow, then, is 100 rubles, not counting possible lawyers' fees. If publication is in a provincial paper and costs less, say 10 rubles, then the minimum cost is 70 rubles.

THE Romanenko case illustrates obstacles of cost and of grounds for divorce. After ascertaining that Mrs R still opposed the divorce, that there had been no reconciliation, that the two witnesses were present, the judge cross-examined Mr R [R, party member, 39 years old, sturdy and jovial, former militiaman on disability pension, met Mrs R in 1942, lived with her in unregistered (then legally recognised) marriage until after the 1944 decree, registered marriage in 1945. He left her in 1949].

[5] Three other judges interviewed confirmed her findings. To save space, names of judges and dates of interviews are not listed here. The highest percentage of reconciliations I read of was 4 per cent in the Kazakh republic for 1957. Cf. M. G. Masevich in *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (henceforth: *SGP*), 1958, No. 11, p. 59.

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Judge: Why did you separate?
R: My parents came to live with us, plus my son by my first [also unregistered] marriage. There were rows between her and my mother. 1946–47, difficult years. Then my father died, and things became easier. But soon rows began again, I came home drunk, we parted. We tried to patch it up. Then there was another woman.
Judge: Why did you not divorce then, why did you wait ten years?
R: I could not afford it. I visited her occasionally. She complained to the party.
Judge: Your behaviour *was* arbitrary, was it not?
R: The party said we must get a divorce. Since 1957 I have not seen her except in the people's court.
[So far, two facts place divorce in doubt, her objection and his relations with her after they had ostensibly parted.]
Judge: Why divorce if you met? Perhaps you can be reconciled. Your behaviour is incomprehensible. It has no basis, no rationality . . . there must be reasons for a divorce.
R: I explained them.
Judge: But reasons did not prevent meetings. There is a contradiction between your words and your actions.
Lay judge [in second question of the morning, first in this case]: Explain why, if you wanted a divorce, you still met her?
R: We were trying to reach an accord, without results.
Judge (to Mrs R): Any questions?
Mrs R: When you came to speak with me, why then did you stay the night? You made yourself at home, put tea on in the kitchen. . . .
[Now Mrs R is examined by the court. Born 1914, she lives in dormitory of factory where she earns 80 rubles a month as technical inspector. She contests divorce. Her husband died in war, then she met R.]
Mrs R: He told me he had one child. Then it appeared he had two. After registering our marriage in 1945 we went to the Ukraine, met his unregistered former wife. . . . I took his son, former wife kept his daughter. I always treated his and mine alike. First it was good. Then his mother appeared. He found a salesgirl in a *gastronom*. She bought him oranges and other hard-to-get items. I, of course, could bring him nothing. I went to his party organisation to get them to restore our family life.
Judge: For a divorce?
Mrs R: Not for a divorce, but to get him back to live with me. I said that if he does not want to live with me, then he should divorce me.
Judge: So you concluded also that such a situation must not go on. Since 1949 how often did you meet?
Mrs R: Periodically. The woman with whom he lives—she talked him out of returning. He deceived me all the time when he said he would come back (weeping). Witnesses will confirm that he came back to stay.
R: I do not deny it.
Judge: If you conclude that life together in the future is really impossible, then there is no need for witnesses. . . .

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[Upon further questioning, it appeared that she too wanted the divorce. She had contested for fear of paying a share of divorce fees. She tearfully asked to be spared any fees.]
Judge: Don't worry, he'll pay it all!

Fees seem frequent deterrents to divorce. Here, R paid all 50 rubles minimum, as the 'guilty' (living with someone else) spouses usually do in contested cases. If R's wife had consented to divorce from the start, and if the court had followed the practice in the 34 cases I heard or read, the fees might have been split—he: 35 rubles, she: 15 rubles, or he: 40 rubles, she: 10 rubles. In uncontested cases where there is no outside liaison, just 'incompatibility', registration fees were usually split evenly. Practice varies somewhat from court to court.[6]

Mr R finally surmounted financial obstacles and red tape, but he still almost did not get his divorce, and most probably would not have done, had there been several young children, because of the *grounds* on which courts are allowed to dissolve marriages.

There are no specific grounds; the vague wording of the decree of 16 September 1949 adds up to the requirement that divorces must not be granted for light or transient reasons. 'The court may dissolve a marriage only when it is convinced that the suit for divorce is prompted by seriously considered and well founded reasons, and that further preservation of the family would conflict with the principles of communist morality and would not create normal conditions for living together and raising children.' In the Romanenko case the court concluded that on the facts presented 'the family has really broken up and cannot be restored . . . the parties have not been living together since 1957, have no children from their marriage, the plaintiff is living with another woman, and both are agreed on divorce'.

The Romanenko case turned during the hearing from a contested into an uncontested divorce. As a rule, uncontested divorce suits in childless marriages are granted without difficulty. Cases uncontested from the start, with or without children, made up 87 per cent of the cases I heard in the Moscow provincial and city courts, and this appears to be an average figure. Sometimes even uncontested divorces have been refused, where there are children. In contested cases courts discount objections based on non-personal reasons such as: 'I won't give him a divorce until he leaves the apartment' or Mrs R's objection for fear of paying part of the fees.

In short, divorces are not automatic; they are drawn out and costly (though not compared with those in some Western countries), but they are not as difficult as Orthodox divorce under the Tsars. No comprehensive long-term statistics are published which reveal national or

[6] Cases heard in Moscow Province Court, 6 January 1959, Moscow City Court, 13 and 19 March 1959. Interviews with three judges. V. S. Makarova, 'Ukaz prezidiuma Verkhvnogo Soveta SSSR 8 iyulya 1944 g. v sudebnoi praktiki', thesis for degree of candidate of juridical sciences, Institute of Law, USSR Academy of Sciences (Moscow, 1954), pp. 180–181.

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republic averages for the time taken to get a divorce, for the proportion of suits refused, for allocation of registration fees between the two parties to a case in uncontested suits. We have to guess from scattered and not always reliable data.

The state, it seems, has partially compensated for the harshness of the 1944 edict by allowing the courts to refuse fewer divorces, perhaps only two or three per cent now in such large cities as Moscow. There are fewer refusals not because more people with weak cases realise the futility of coming to court. In fact, the number of cases is rising.

The reported national annual divorce rate doubled in five years, from 0·6 per 1,000 inhabitants in 1955 to 1·2 per 1,000 in 1959; it levelled off at 1·3 in 1960 and 1961. (This compares with a slight drop in the United States rate from 2·4 in 1956 to 2·2 in 1959.)[7] Urbanisation probably helps to push the rate up. In Moscow, for example, where the city court was handling 320 cases a week (in April-May 1959, including postponed ones, at most 4 per cent), the divorce rate in 1959 far exceeded that in the villages, or in Kazakhstan (only 0·18 in 1957—Masevich, op. cit. p. 57). The Moscow rate was about two and a half times the national rate.

THE opinion of the judge quoted earlier tallied with what can be gathered from the scanty published results of the poll on 'The Young Family' conducted by the Komsomol's Institute of Public Opinion. The judge told me: 'People often don't know each other well before they get married. They see each other at their best in good clothes. After marriage, they say—I did not expect this, did not think you were like this'. Seven of the twelve letters in *Komsomolskaya pravda* which had something to say on the causes of the breakup of young families cited excessive haste in marriage, usually associated with youthful infatuation, ignorance of sexual matters, unwillingness to undertake the hard duties of marriage, superficial understanding of each other. Parental interference in the young couple's life was also frequently cited. Underlying many of these cases, of course, is the perennial housing problem.[8]

There are youngsters who marry simply to get a permit to live in Moscow; others who marry 'for convenience'; there are the women,

[7] For divorce rates see *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1960 godu* (Moscow 1961), p. 204, and the same annual for the following year, p. 165. L. Petrova and S. Gilevskaya (eds.), *Equality of Women in the USSR* (Moscow, 1957), p. 221; *Forty Years of Soviet Power in Facts and Figures* (Moscow, 1958), p. 308. The only (and revealing) comparative figures on changing practice were cited by E. Nazarenko and V. Ostapenko for the Kiev Oblast Court, where refusals dropped from 11·3 per cent of all cases in 1947 to 7·6 per cent in 1953 and 2·2 per cent in 1959. *Radyanske pravo*, 1960, No. 3, pp. 60–66. The total number of cases rose. Refusals in the Moscow City Court declined from a peak of 10 per cent some time before 1956 to 4 per cent in 1956. V. M. Ostroukhova, in *Sots. zak.* 1957, No. 12, p. 97.

[8] *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 17 and 24 December 1961, 6 January 1962; and interviews with three judges, including a vice-chairman of the Moscow City Court, who said many cases are connected with the housing shortage that compels young people to live with their parents.

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now in their late thirties and early forties, the men of whose generation were decimated by war. As one divorced woman in her thirties explained to me, there are men who are strongly tempted by their seller's market to leave their wives at the slightest setback, knowing it will be easy to find others. The twenty million surplus of women over men revealed by the 1959 census as one of the tragic consequences of war looked even worse for people of marriageable age. In 1959, there were 609 women for every 391 men in the 35 to 40 age group (20 to 24 years old in 1944), and 616 women for every 384 men in the 40 to 54 age group (25 to 39 in 1944). In 1961, the disparity was still marked in the 35 to 39 group, with 410 men to every 510 women. This imbalance, which contributes to a higher divorce rate, is passing. Housing, shortage of which is another contributory factor, is improving. And the divorce rate has levelled off in recent years.

In the light of existing social and emotional pressures for divorce, it is easy to accept the verdict of Soviet jurists that the edict of 8 July 1944 'does not strengthen relations in "registered" families, works only in "exceptional cases" to stem the tide of illegitimate relations'.[9] 'Only in a few cases has the refusal of divorce brought husbands and wives together. Usually such husbands and wives apply again to the court later or establish new families, *but this time not sanctioned by law*.' N. Orlova, in an unsubstantiated opinion, calls divorce red tape 'the chief cause, now, of factual, that is unregistered marriages'.[10]

However, it is worth repeating that it is not the *principle* of state interference in marriage through the courts, nor the active role of the court in trying to reconcile couples, that is under attack. Rather, it is at the excesses of the edict that criticism is aimed.

THREE hundred thousand divorces pass through the courts yearly. Many thousands of others pass around them. The masses have been evading the law; it took the writers, journalists, and lawyers to articulate their problems. Without their criticism, divorce reform might never have been considered at this time. The lawyers have been almost unanimous in opposing the restoration of unregistered marriage, which laymen have occasionally suggested. Some lawyers favour Zags, not courts, for divorces by mutual consent, where there are no children, since the courts do not refuse in such cases, and there are no reconciliations. Otherwise they are moderate, fearing the erosion of marriage, which Pergament as well as Sverdlov regard as a 'lifelong union'. Jurists are virtually unanimous in proposing that divorce proceedings be concentrated in the people's courts, because of travel difficulties connected with appearances in provincial courts, and because it makes no sense to have one court establish the grounds for divorce while another court examines

[9] N. V. Rabinovich, in *Sorok let Sovetskogo prava: 1917–1957*, Vol. II (Leningrad, 1957), pp. 243, 245.

[10] N. H. Tikhonov, vice-chairman of the Kiev Oblast Court, cited by Kiselev, op. cit.; N. Orlova, loc. cit., p. 7.

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them. Some people want one stage, with no reconciliation. Reconciliation is just a 'formality'. Others still prefer two stages, because the 'need for a second petition makes them give more serious thought to the matter'. Publication of divorce notices is widely condemned. 'Let us publish engagement notices instead.' [11]

G. M. Sverdlov has been among the more cautious advocates of reform, arguing that the elimination of red tape might make divorce procedure too hasty. He thinks that divorce by mutual consent might be handled in one stage, but wishes to give greater emphasis to 'guilt', which would in fact bring Soviet law closer to the punitive aspect of 'bourgeois' divorce law. He wants Soviet law to follow the example of Czech, Polish, and Bulgarian laws, and deny contested divorce to an adulterer who cites as grounds his own infidelity ('I already have another family'). The amount of support and division of property should depend on guilt, etc.[12]

Three respondents in the Komsomol poll on the family urged that divorces be tried in 'social' courts, advocated as logical complements of the comradely courts, people's militia, etc., which supposedly mark the transition to 'communist popular self-government'. The suggestion has not been well received by the jurists.

Clearly, no return to the divorce practice of the twenties is contemplated. But such steps as lowering fees, transferring all divorce cases to the people's courts, reducing delay, and eliminating the publication procedure, would be a more reasonable compromise between excessive haste and red tape, and would result in fewer evasions.

AT the heart of the criticism, and in the hearts of the critics, and the cause of more mass evasion and protest than divorce barriers, is the moral and material plight of the illegitimate children and their mothers.

'Old ideas about illegitimate children still survive in the minds of some people.' Pergament thinks that here Sverdlov understates the case.[13] She might be right. B has a daughter by K, whose wife refused him a divorce. B's parents made life so wretched for her that she moved to her factory dormitory. K proved an attentive father who contributed to his daughter's support. The mother's position was darkened further, no doubt (though we are not told this), by her child's birth certificate. Soviet birth certificates have a place for the father's name. Where the father is not in registered marriage to the mother, the 8 July 1944 edict forbids entry of his name, the space is crossed out with the notorious *procherk*.

There is a way out. It is for the father to adopt his own natural child so as to give it his name and pass on his inheritance and pension rights after his death. But adoption is no complete solution, wrote N. V.

11 Interviews with five judges. See also Ostroukhova, op. cit., p. 91; *Sots. zak.*, 1958, No. 7, p. 37. Antimonov and Pergament, op. cit., pp. 24–25.

12 G. M. Sverdlov, in *SGP*, 1958, No. 12.

13 G. M. Sverdlov, *Okhrana interesov detei v sovetskom semeinom i grazhdanskom prave* (Moscow, 1955), p. 46; Pergament's review in *SGP*, 1956, No. 5.

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Rabinovich (op cit., p. 294). 'Unsophisticated people find it absurd or incomprehensible to adopt one's own child.' Here is a harassed father at the Odessa administration of the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice. Officials tell him that to give his son his name he must adopt the child. There is no other way. 'But comrades, look, it's my little son—my son. Here I am before you—his father. How then can I adopt my own son?' [14] But most illegitimate children (like Shurik B) have nobody who wishes to adopt them, let alone their natural fathers whom they may never have seen. In cases like that of B, above, 'a wife who refuses a divorce will be generally even more opposed to an adoption'. Pergament indicated that fathers were 'the largest category' of adopters and that there would be more adoptions if the registered wives consented. K's wife did not. In May 1956, B had a son, her second child by K. 'In poor health, persecuted by the sneers of philistines, and her parents' reproaches, she threw her little son into the river and tried to drown herself.' She was sentenced to prison for the murder of her child. K got his divorce and permission to register his marriage with the imprisoned B.[15]

The familiar 'double standard' often spares the 'fugitive' father, whose workmates 'smile understandingly and crack jokes'. Soviet life is replete with examples of attempts by the official apparatus to counter the paternal irresponsibility encouraged by double standards and the absence of legal weapons with which women can defend themselves. I listened to a divorce case in the Moscow city court between an Army captain studying at a military academy and his wife (she successfully contested the divorce—they had two children) who had written to his academy to complain of his leaving her. Students are expelled just short of graduation for leaving their unmarried spouses. Pergament writes of 'courts of honour' in Party and Komsomol organisations, which condemn fathers who leave their extramarital children without support. She cites a letter from the Party commission of the political administration of the North Caucasus military district, 22 December 1955: for failing to support his illegitimate child, 'Colonel K was severely disciplined by the *okrug* party commission and recommended for dismissal from the ranks of the Soviet Army'. Official interventions, however, probably touch only a small proportion of all cases, and do not remove the sense of public shame which weighs so heavily on some people.

Unmarried mothers share the generous state medical, legal, and financial aid to all mothers. But the monthly grants of five rubles for one illegitimate child, seven and a half rubles for two, and ten for three or more, are poor substitutes for the minimum 7·5 to 15 rubles (but usually much more), that they could claim if they had the same rights to support as legally married women.[16]

[14] E. Serebrovskaya, 'Eshchë raz o metrikakh', *Lit. gaz.*, 7 June 1956.

[15] A. I. Pergament, *Pravovoe polozhenie vnebrachnykh detei dolzhno byt izmeneno*, *SPG*, 1956, 9, p. 70.

[16] Wives in registered wedlock may receive support for their children from their husbands, whether still living with them, separated, or going through divorce procedures, if they

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The courts can, and do, evade the edict. The USSR Supreme Court published for all courts its approval and endorsement of the decision of an Uzbek people's court awarding maintenance to an unmarried mother. How could it justify this? The mother married the man in 1928, divorced him in 1929, but was reconciled with him and lived with him in unregistered marriage. They had a child in 1947. In 1950 he left her. According to the edict of 8 July 1944, she could have claimed maintenance only for a child born out of wedlock before the decree, or if he had later married her. But the Supreme Court chose to regard their marriage, because it had once been registered, as still registered. Again, we consult Pergament (p. 69):

> There are many such court decisions. . . . Thus courts tend to recognise the rights of illegitimate children against their fathers whenever there is some way to evade the edict of 8 July 1944, however shaky and far-fetched their grounds may be. It is obvious that this never entirely solves the problem. If Soviet legal consciousness demands that the illegitimate child have full rights in relation to his parents, this should be directly inscribed in the law.

NO account of evasions of the edict should omit the famous Article 42/3 of the 'Family Code'. This provides that 'persons who have undertaken permanent support and upbringing of children must, upon refusal of such care, pay maintenance to minors or needy children unable to work: (a) if their parents are dead, and (b) if their parents lack the means to support the children'. Article 42/3 is serving quite a different purpose from the one intended. When first adopted in 1928, this was meant to protect waifs and strays, or children of legal marriages. Suits against fathers for support under this provision had no meaning, since suits for paternity and unregistered marriages were recognised. Some ingenious but unidentified soul turned to Article 42/3 after the 1944 decree appeared, so that women could try through this route to get maintenance from men who had loved them and left them, but could hide behind the edict's ban on suits for paternity. They were now to be sued not as fathers, but as persons who had taken the mother's children under their wing and then abandoned them. The official journal of the Procuracy, *Sotsialisticheskaya zakonnost* (Socialist legality), opposed such suits for support; so did many lawyers and judges; so, fitfully, did the USSR Supreme Court. Estonia, and probably some other republics, imposed a general but not fully effective ban on them. Pergament and others continued to insist that the use of 42/3 did not run counter to the edict, which banned suits against fathers as fathers, but was silent on such cases.

are caring for the children. They receive one-quarter of his salary for one child, one-third for two children, and one-half for three or more. Minimum wages and pensions are now 30 rubles. Upon divorce or separation, only needy spouses unable to work may claim support for themselves. They receive such support from their partner or former partner only for up to one year in all republics save in Georgia, Tadzhikistan, and Uzbekistan (three years), and Azerbaidzhan and the Ukraine (unlimited time). A. I. Pergament and A. I. Stavtseva, *Sovetskoe zakonodatelstvo o pravakh zhenshchin* (Moscow, 1962); I. S. Gurevich in *SPG*, 1956, 9.

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At last on 16 September 1960, the Supreme Court gave a favourable judgment.[17]

The device of suing unwed fathers through 42/3 has been applied especially liberally since then to fathers who lived with mother and child but for a short time; but Soviet statistics do not reveal how many mothers are actually protected under this provision. We can only note that proponents of reform feel that it is no basic remedy and does not correct the edict of 8 July 1944. Opponents of reform say that with 42/3 in effect everywhere, no revisions are needed.

In 1961 a Soviet legal specialist gave a figure of 11 million for the number of illegitimate children in the USSR. Impossible? High, perhaps, but of the right order of magnitude. There were 77,571,000 people under nineteen in 1959. Teacher N. Dolinina in School No. 189, Leningrad, said that on the average one-fifth of her students over the ten-year period she had taught had dashes in the space for father's name on their birth certificates.[18] One-fifth is hardly likely to be the national average, but this figure, combined with the figure for the number of children, gives some idea of the situation.

More concretely, the number of unmarried mothers reported as receiving state grants for children jumped from 281,700 in 1945, to 1,952,000 in 1950, and to a peak of 3,312,000 in 1957, falling to 2,445,000 in 1961. This meant that nearly four million children in 1957 and three million in 1961 were receiving grants as bastards.[19] And these figures greatly *underestimate* the actual number of extramarital children. Grants are paid only up to the age of twelve. Add the children over twelve, at least those born after the decree, or, if before, of unregistered fathers, children getting the evasive maintenance payments under 42/3, children adopted, children living with their natural fathers who do not adopt them. (This last barrier to grants is the crowning paradox of the decree; papa is not papa for the registry office, but he is for the local social security office when he lives with mama, who then does not get the state grant for single mothers.) Add also the children whose mothers put them in state homes, again losing the grant, or whose mothers simply do not apply for the grants out of shame or apathy. If the figure of eleven million is high, an informed guess indicates up to eight million illegitimate Soviet children (up to age 18) in 1957.[20]

Unregistered marriages are encouraged both by the possibility of separation and by the prevailing morality. One may separate and sue one's undivorced husband or wife for custody of the children, for their support, for division of communal property, and enter into a new relationship with one's share of the wreckage of the still registered

[17] Cf. *Sots. zak.*, 1960, No. 12, pp. 31–32.
[18] *Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR v 1959 godu* (Moscow, 1960), p. 11; N. Dolina, *Lit. gaz.*, 28 May 1960.
[19] *Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR v 1958 godu* (Moscow, 1959), p. 894; ibid. 1959, p. 794; *SSSR v. tsifrakh v 1961 godu*, p. 377.
[20] *Sov. yust.*, 1961, No. 20, pp. 12–13; *Sots. zak.*, 1962, No. 9, p. 86. Satisfied that reforms stop at using 42/3 were K. Plutus and Kh. Austa, ibid. pp. 40–41.

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marriage. As for moral attitudes, whether of student friends, or judges, or leading writers on the principles of the Soviet family like A. Kharchev, they all draw a line between genuine extra-marital love, which is tolerable, and frivolous sexual conduct, which they condemn. Students do not bother to justify extra-marital ties, but Kharchev and their elders cite wartime separations and upheavals, and the imbalance of the sexes as the main justifications (cf. *Kommunist*, 1960, No. 7, p. 63).

One partial revision of Stalin's family reforms has been not only introduced but confirmed. Women may now have abortions. The ban imposed in 1936 on abortions for other than health reasons was repealed by the decree of 23 November 1955, 'to prevent harmful and dangerous consequences to women of abortions performed outside hospitals, often by entirely untrained ignorant people'.[21] To combat abortions, there is a campaign to inform men and women of the possible harm even of abortions performed legally in hospitals. Information on birth control is given through lectures and throughout the network of women and child care centres. And although abortions and contraceptives seem to have set an upper limit to families they have not yet halted the flood of extramarital children.

UNDERLYING the debates about what should happen to illegitimacy under the impending reforms there lies a fundamental divergence in moral attitudes. The view expressed in the edict of 8 July 1944 amounts to a justification for men to escape, and for the Shurik Bs and their mothers to carry the full burden of the moral or material consequences of extramarital relations. The case of Larisa P illustrates this. She fell in love with Yuli S who moved in with her because it was more convenient to finish his diploma thesis at her place than in the dormitory of his institute. She did not find out that he had a wife and child until she became pregnant. And then he left. The opponents of reform (who appear to be on the losing side) would stress that Larisa was 'sensual', 'frivolous', 'dissolute and morally slovenly'. Such people must not be indulged. It is of course a pity about the child, but the woman must be punished. Advocates of reform stress the principle of equal rights for women and children (*Lit. Gaz.* 14 May 1956).

This divergence appears too on financial questions. Opponents of restoring suits to establish paternity point out that before 1944 a woman might be able to claim and get support from a man who was not the father of her child. The burden of proof that he was not the father rested on the man. Courts were determined to find somebody to play and pay the role of father. The USSR Supreme Court considered that 'It is more dangerous to leave the child without support than it is to award support from the wrong person',[22] and this is cited as a warning against any restoration of the right to establish paternity, implying that the possible injustice to men is more important than the equality of women and illegitimate children.

[21] Ya. A. Dultsin, *O vrede aborta* (Leningrad, 1960), p. 10. [22] Masevich, loc. cit., p. 57.

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G. M. Sverdlov is inclined to share these views of the opponents of change. 'How are we to alter the denial of any legal consequences of paternity, without jeopardising our struggle for a strong family?' His answer: increased grants to unwed mothers, plus a standard birth certificate form for all children, plus a father's right, which he does not now have, to acknowledge paternity and assume responsibility for the child; these measures would eliminate the need for suits for paternity 'which had negative as well as positive sides'. If his view prevailed, the men concerned would be even better off than they were before, since they could dodge or assume rights of fatherhood as they pleased.[23]

The proponents of reform would argue that Larisa might be at fault, but should not bear a heavier burden than Yuli. Above all, her child should not be made to suffer. The discrimination against women is described as repulsive and crude, legitimising privileges for men and degrading and humiliating to women.[24] These are the words used by Lenin to describe the Tsarist laws, and are used by the reformers as a discreet cover for their attack on Soviet laws.

* * *

This account has been concerned with the practical problem facing the Soviet regime of how to reconcile 'strengthening the Soviet family' with 'guaranteeing full equality of rights for women and illegitimate children'. If the reforms summarised here were adopted, they would indicate that a professional group, backed by large sections of public opinion, had been able to influence the leadership of the Communist party, and would embody a return to the spirit of family law before the Stalinist reforms in stressing again the importance of the emancipation of women and of the elimination of the concept of illegitimacy, but falling short of the extreme 'freedom of marriage and divorce' under the original 1926 code.

There is no space in which to speculate at length on the future of the Soviet family. Judging from Mr Khrushchev's remarks, the more the family changes, the more it will remain the same, allowing for some further shrinkage, but no withering. Reporting on the new programme of the CPSU, he said (*Pravda*, 20 October 1961):

> Those who affirm that the family will lose its importance and that with time it will entirely disappear are incorrect. In actuality, the family will be stronger under communism, family relations will be cleansed finally of material considerations and will achieve a high level of purity and stability.

Here then is the second modern Soviet dilemma of the family: how to reconcile 'strengthening the Soviet family' for the sake of its children, with collectivism and social controls for the sake of unity around the common task of 'building communism'. Marriage reforms leave this problem unsolved.

[23] G. M. Sverdlov, in *Voprosy kodifikatsii* (Moscow, 1957), p. 107.
[24] Pergament, 'Pravovoe polozhenie . . .', p. 71; Rabinovich, op. cit., p. 295.

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OPINION POLLS

Emilia Wilder

THE Communist Party's claim to an a priori knowledge of society was one of the causes of the economic and administrative failures throughout the communist-ruled area in the era of Stalin. Recognition of this after his death called for changes which, in turn, had to be based on a more critical analysis of communist practice. For this, sociological research appeared indispensable.

Initially, the revival of empirical sociological research, which set in in Poland with the early ' thaw ', provoked a cry of indignation throughout the rest of the bloc. It was condemned as a betrayal of Marxism, a symptom of ' revisionism '.[1] In recent years, however, Soviet sociologists have come round to acknowledging the value and applicability of, at least, the ' techniques of bourgeois sociology '.[2] At the same time, the general trend towards stricter controls observable in Poland since the fall of 1959 (coinciding with the East-West confrontation of sociologists at the fourth World Congress in Milan and Stresa) did not leave sociological research unaffected. Apart from attacks on the Polish ' poll mania ', and on Western, especially American, sociology by communist authors, administrative measures were expected to dampen the zeal of westernised Polish research.[3] These included the removal of some leading non-party sociologists from their posts at the Polish Academy of Science, the prohibition on holding teaching jobs and working on outside projects simultaneously, the refusal of travel visas to the West, and threats of tightening the purse for polling projects.

The relative severity at this stage towards free-wheeling Polish sociology, and the simultaneous (and equally relative) liberalising trend in Soviet science, suggested that now was the time for the sociologists from the erstwhile opposing camps to meet. Their first official meeting took place at the first Conference on Sociology of the communist-ruled countries, held at Prague in September 1961 under the sponsorship of the editorial board of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, with the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria participating. In a total reversal of its former role as a target of fraternal attacks, Polish sociology, represented by the Professor of Philosophy, Adam Schaff, appeared as acknowledged mentor at this forum. Later in the year, Polish and Soviet

1 Cf. *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 4, 1957, pp. 227–98, and No. 7, 1958, pp. 3–19; *Nove Vreme* (theoretical organ of the Bulgarian Communist party), December 1957.

2 E. Arab-Ogly, in *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, December 1959, p. 77, and G. W. Osipov in interview with *Zycie Warszawy*, 10 July 1962.

3 See, e.g., J. Putrament, *Przeglad Kulturalny*, 20 August 1959, and A. Schaff, *Polityka*, 21 April, 7 July, 14 July 1962, on poll mania; J. J. Wiatr, *Szkice o materializmie historycznym i socjologii* (Warsaw, 1962), and Z. Bauman, *Z zagadnien wspolczesnej socjologii, amerykanskiej* (Warsaw, 1962), on Western sociology; *Kultura* (Paris), No. 1–2, 1960, and *Polish Affairs* (London), March 1960, on Chalasinski; *Przeglad Socjologiczny*, vol. XVI/1, 1962, on Professor and Mrs. Ossowski.

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sociologists, meeting in Moscow, acquainted each other with their respective research projects. At both these gatherings, the verbal emphasis on 'coordination' was marked. Practical decisions, however, seem to have been made at the Moscow conference only: two themes were selected for parallel research in Poland and the USSR, with the aim of coordination and eventual confrontation. One research theme concerned 'changes in the occupational structure of the working class under the influence of continuing socialist industrialisation', and the other 'the development of engineering cadres'. But just as the Polish anti-polling campaign was not to go beyond the requirement 'Not by Polls Alone', so Soviet sociological research still has quite a distance to go from its (more sensational than expert) first polling steps in order to approach what has already been achieved by the Poles. The meeting ground, however, for communist empirical research seems now to be pretty well delineated by this formula: First, study all the documentation and statistics of the given unit (factory, school, etc.), as well as documentation assembled by the relevant 'social organisation' (trade union, party, youth league, etc.). Polls, observation, interviews are important, but the best result is obtained by a combination of all these methods.

IN any attempt to indicate what is now being done in the way of empirical sociological research in the bloc, priority must be given to Poland, not only because of the prompt and vigorous revival of sociological research there, but also because of that country's unique tradition in the field.

The first chair of sociology in Poland was established over forty years ago, and the Polish Institute of Sociology some thirty years ago. The Institute had its own publication, *Przeglad Socjologiczny*. Other institutes (the Rural Culture Institute, the Pulawy Institute, the Silesian Institute, the Institute of Social Affairs, the Institute of Social Economy) devoted themselves wholly or partly to sociological studies before the second world war. The Institute of Social Economy initiated and collected materials for sociological research in the form of so-called personal documents, supplied by peasants and workers, employed and unemployed, as well as by Polish emigrants—possibly the largest collection of this kind in existence. Even under the Nazi occupation, clandestine sociological studies continued at the universities of Warsaw and Poznan, and went on even after the loss of one of the research teams at the hands of the Gestapo. The data collected by two of the institutes during the war were destroyed in the Warsaw uprising. Immediately after the war, in June 1945, the Sociological Institute was re-established and began to conduct surveys in the Opole region of Silesia: other research teams conducted enquiries into a variety of subjects but were unable to complete them during the era of Stalinist repression. Some of these studies were published after October 1956. One team, which started collecting survey

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material on the socio-economic structure of the village in 1947, has continued the work at five-year intervals to obtain a true picture of rural change in post-war Poland.

With this background, and in the special circumstances of the Polish 'thaw', it was hardly surprising to find Polish sociological research stirring again as early as 1955, when the Centre of Sociological Research (Warsaw branch) was set up at the Polish Academy of Science. A branch in Lodz was organised in 1956–57. Some measure of the new status of sociological enquiry was the use by the Polish judicial authorities of the expertise of three noted sociologists at the Poznan riot trials in 1956. In the first post-October years, the daily press and a number of periodicals shared in the general exuberance over the freedom to search for and tell the 'truth' by polling their readers on a variety of previously untouchable issues. The evidence thus obtained, though obviously not up to professional standards of validity, created a sensation among the public. Since the results did little credit to Marxist rule, and were at the same time amateurish, these journalistic activities were bound to become a target of criticism.

In 1957, the Polish Sociological Association was established, and the Polish Radio set up a Public Opinion Research Centre. Dubbed the 'Polish Gallup Institute', this workshop runs its projects with the aid of volunteer interviewers, since it lacks sufficient funds. But from 1958 through 1960 it has completed some forty projects—one-third financed by the Polish Radio, the rest by various governmental and social institutions. The main preoccupation of the Centre is with themes such as work and choice of profession; attitudes and aspirations of youth; economic and cultural needs of the rural population; factors moulding public opinion; migration problems; and leisure time, cultural entertainment and types of recreation. In 1962 the Centre started, on an experimental basis, research on the consumer market; it is also carrying out opinion polls on the performance of certain service establishments. Among its clients is the communist party itself, which has lately been contemplating a systematic investigation by means of quick polls of the fluctuation of public opinion in Poland on a variety of questions, for use by the various departments of the party's central committee.

A survey of more than 400 Polish research units and institutes, carried out in April 1960, showed 136 of them engaged in enquiries relating to culture, social change, and socio-economic phenomena. Academic centres carry the major share of the load. More than 10 per cent of the surveys are undertaken directly by the central government. Even the party institute known as 'The Philosophy and Sociology Department at the Higher School of Social Sciences', which previously monopolised the field in the spirit of Marxism, now engages in empirical research without claiming superior a priori knowledge of society. The projects listed in the survey covered more than 600 research themes in the areas of cultural activities (189); education and social consciousness (141); social change

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(218); and socio-economic phenomena (92).[4] These figures alone indicate the wide scope of Polish research activity.

The most important—because of its repercussions—appears to have been a poll on the religious, political, moral, and social attitudes of a group of some 730 Warsaw undergraduates taken by a research team of the Warsaw University Sociology department in 1958. It might have been inspired by the results of a survey conducted among its readers in 1957 by the communist youth paper *Sztandar Mlodych*. The *Sztandar Mlodych* survey had shown, among other things, the deep impact of the October events upon the younger generation; their preference for 'national communism'; their pro-Western literary tastes; and better living conditions as the central goal of their personal aspirations. A check by valid research methods of what goes on in the minds of the future builders of communism seemed therefore to suggest itself as an obvious proposition. The Warsaw University poll was followed a year later by a country-wide survey, carried out by the Public Opinion Research Centre at the Warsaw Radio on the basis of a representative sample of Polish youth ranging in age from 15 to 24 years. But though its results were in many respects even more disappointing, from the official point of view, than the Warsaw student poll, it is the student survey that has continued to rankle in the minds of officialdom.[5]

WHAT then did the anonymous responses to the painstakingly prepared questionnaire disclose that so upset the leaders and surprised the outsiders? They showed 69 per cent of the respondents professing religious beliefs, and more than 70 per cent of the students from working-class families put themselves down as religious believers. Although 'some form of socialism' seemed desirable to 70 per cent, only 13 per cent of the students called themselves Marxists, clearly indicating their disapproval of the official definition of 'socialism'. And while 610 (out of 725) respondents had been members of the communist youth union (which disintegrated in 1956), only 8 per cent said that they had joined out of some conviction.[6] A follow-up in 1961 could have provided some measure of comfort to the communist hierarchy—although there is little evidence that it did. In the intervening years the party and government had introduced a number of measures designed to change the attitudes of youth. To mention a few: schools were ordered to ban religious instruction on their premises; Marxist theory was reintroduced as a subject of instruction at the academic schools; the training of Marxist teaching cadres was expanded in order to replace non-Marxist professors, who were being gradually removed from positions in which they had

[4] *Kultura i Spoleczenstwo*, July–September 1960.

[5] Cf. A. Schaff in *Polityka*, 21 April 1962, J. J. Wiatr, ibid. 5 May 1962, and speech by W. Jarosinski at the 11th central committee plenum, *Trybuna Ludu*, 19 December 1962.

[6] See *Nowa Kultura*, 17 July, 10 August, 28 September 1958; also *Polish Perspectives*, Nos. 3–4 and 7–8, 1958; *American Sociological Review*, February 1960; *L'Esprit* (Paris), November 1958.

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been able to influence the students' outlook; party organisations at the institutions of higher learning were told to draw more students into the party; atheist propaganda adopted a more 'scientific' approach, and the entire indoctrination effort was mobilised under Professor Adam Schaff to make Marxism more palatable. But all this could hardly have had any effect on the minds of the students by 1961—except perhaps in their getting ready to accommodate themselves to future inevitabilities. Thus the follow-up survey, restricted to technology students, found a decrease (10 per cent) in the number of religious believers, and an increase (6 per cent) of agnostics and atheists. There was also a somewhat greater acceptance (by 5 per cent) not only of socialism, but of a model of socialism with a more comprehensive nationalisation of the economy. Seven per cent more students than in the 1958 sample found the state justified in restricting civil liberties in the name of socially important goals.[7] These investigations are to continue, and the regime intends to use them as a guide for its policies.

A study promising greater opportunities for the party to shape the consciousness of the future citizens of Poland was conducted in the spring of 1958 among children 12 to 13 years of age. This survey was based on a representative sample of 2,045 sixth-graders. Their 'moral views' were probed by means of a questionnaire to which they responded anonymously. The findings were intended to disclose, in particular, the proportions among the youngsters of two types of attitudes: an 'altruistic' one—measured by the frequency of condemnation of actions injurious to others; and a 'ritualistic' attitude—marked by condemnation of transgressions of Catholic religious precepts. The poll showed a marked prevalence of the 'ritualistic' type.[8] There were also several studies of the vocational aspirations of youth; a survey of ethnic images and attitudes among school children in Opole (Silesia); of the Negro image among children of various ages in the Lodz schools; of juvenile delinquency, etc.

Other attitude and opinion surveys covered such subjects as the prestige of various types of occupation in Poland today. These—especially the survey reported in the May 1961 issue of the *American Journal of Sociology*—provided the interesting information that while the professional classes still enjoy the highest status in Poland, the formerly less respected skilled worker has moved up to the second step on the prestige ladder. Groups representing the various strata of adult society were probed in studies of 'the psychological aspects of social stratification'; a mail questionnaire elicited responses from scientific workers on their social and political views; and chemical engineers were asked their opinions about their first job.

Attitudes towards culture, use of leisure time, reactions to mass communication and entertainment media have been under constant scrutiny. (Radio listening and press and book readership, as well as

[7] *Przeglad Kulturalny*, No. 46, 1961.
[8] *Nowa Szkola*, No. 3, 1959, No. 4, 1960; *Studia Socjologiczne*, No. 1, 1961.

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attendance at the cinema, theatre, etc., had been watched even before the thaw, to provide a rather mechanical measure of the effects of official propaganda.) The Lodz Sociological Centre has been specifically concerned with mass culture in Poland: the themes of the various related projects include reactions to films; cultural life of the residents of Lodz; impact of small groups, institutions, and mass communication media on the attitudes of young people towards the national and foreign cultures; the student's use of leisure time.

Within the broad framework of the study of changes in the Polish working class, investigations have been carried out into the attitude of workers towards the Workers Councils and other social organisations; into the process of adaptation of young peasants to industry, and so forth. The sociology faculty of the Catholic University of Lublin, of the State Military Academy, and the Social Research department of the Party Higher School of Social Sciences, concentrate respectively on religious, military, and Party sociological problems; labour, living standards, rural life, life in the Western Territories, are studied by special institutes.

As can be seen from this (far from exhaustive) enumeration, sociological research activity in Poland continues to be both extensive and intensive. The latter quality may be gathered from the character of Polish writing in the specialised journals and in books, no less than from the papers presented by Polish sociologists at international meetings.[9] Publications on sociological subjects issued during the years 1959 and 1960 alone totalled 31 books and 467 articles.[10]

DEVELOPMENTS in Soviet sociology have been hopefully watched in the West but the results so far have been disappointing. Far from being treated as an independent branch of enquiry, sociological research in the USSR is still largely conducted by various other disciplines, under the ideological guidance of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences. Articles on sociological subjects, even if they deal with 'concrete' research, usually appear in *Voprosy Filosofii*; there is no special sociological journal. According to Polish reports, it is the long-range approach which characterises the present Soviet effort. Structural changes in society as a whole, and personality changes under the impact of technical progress, occupy the attention of Soviet sociologists. Another characteristic is the relevance of their research to economic problems and the stress on the practical applicability of its findings. Therefore the practical goals of their projects are always stressed, and the projects themselves are carried out in collaboration with the planning authorities, the Economic Councils, etc. Soviet experimental planning, such as, for example, the introduction of greater autonomy for the kolkhozes, or planning new housing settlements near Moscow, increasingly relies on

9 See L. Labedz, *Survey*, January–March 1960, and Z. Jordan, *Kultura* (Paris), November 1962.

10 For details see *Przeglad Socjologiczny*, vol. XIV/2 and XV/2, 'Bibliografia'.

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help from empirical sociology. There is said to be wider use of statistical methods in this research, but it is claimed that the practice of combining a variety of methods (historical analysis, personal documents, participant observation, and various survey techniques including polls) predominates.

The first occasion on which the tendency towards developing concrete sociological field research received quasi-official sanction was the meeting of the Soviet Sociological Association in February 1961. For all practical purposes, this was its first plenary meeting. As the Chairman of the Association, Professor Frantsev, explained, 'doubts arising from the fear that these studies are a concession to positivism and empiricism are gradually being overcome'. Following the 21st CPSU congress, a turn towards such research became noticeable among Soviet economists and philosophers: 'The propaganda of the idea of scientific communism, based on the results of concrete sociological research into specific areas of life of the socialist countries, above all the USSR, has special importance'. In addition to stressing the superiority of Marxist sociological research, resulting from its multi-technique approach, Frantsev pointed out that, unlike bourgeois sociology, Soviet research enjoys the active assistance, even a kind of co-authorship, of the respondents. He also noted the existence of a mass of material collected by bourgeois sociologists, which should be studied by the Soviet experts, 'so that they could draw the correct conclusions about the position of working people under capitalism'.

Towards the end of 1959 a few of the younger Soviet sociologists in the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences formed a research team. Soon other groups were set up; their work was at first coordinated by the Sociological Association, but later in the year a separate sociological research department was established within the Institute of Philosophy, working on problems such as (a) research methods and techniques, (b) social problems of labour, (c) rural population problems, (d) urban living, (e) social psychology, (f) mathematical methods in sociology. Books were being prepared on *Methods and Techniques of Sociological Research*, *Social Psychology*, and *Statistical Methods*. The department also received the results of research conducted by other centres. It analyses and generalises the findings. Among the investigations conducted so far the following projects are repeatedly cited as examples of advanced specialised Soviet sociological research:

1. Long-range research on changes in the occupational structure of the working class under the impact of automation, carried out by the Department of Dialectical and Historical Materialism at the University of the Urals in Sverdlovsk.

2. Preparation of two volumes on *Technical Progress and the Working Class*, based on research results from five large industrial enterprises, and presenting an analysis of individual and social change connected with technical problems, by the Gorky University Research Laboratory.

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3. Various research projects connected with labour sociology (i.e., empirical research into the laws governing the transformation of work into a primary human need in preparation for a book on 'The Struggle for the Communist Character of Human Work').

4. Investigation into juvenile delinquency by Kiev University.

5. Research into mathematical methods in sociology at Novosibirsk.

6. As a continuation of the monograph by the Rumanian sociologist R. Gusti on a Moldavian village in the thirties, a new monograph is now being prepared by a team in Moldavia.

All in all, the Soviets claim to have now 500 research centres working on large-scale projects. They do admit that this enthusiasm has its drawbacks, since some of the research does not reach rigorous scientific standards, some projects duplicate each other, and so on. But, as they see it, these are just 'growing pains'.

The establishment in 1960 of the Public Opinion Institute attached to the communist youth paper *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, and the subsequent publication of some results of the first polls could hardly be regarded as harbingers of a new era in Soviet sociology. The first of the polls, published in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* on 19 May 1960, addressed three questions to a representative sample of one thousand persons in ten localities along the 30th parallel running through four of the 15 Soviet republics. Only the first question was a closed one; the two others were open-ended. The closed-type question asked whether, in the opinion of the respondent, 'mankind can successfully prevent war'. The follow-up questions were: 'On what do you base your conclusion?' 'What must be done first of all to strengthen peace?' It goes without saying that the results obtained—96·8 per cent of the respondents expressing belief in a peaceful future, with 10 per cent basing their belief on Soviet military power under Khrushchev's leadership, and 50 per cent on the world-wide peace movement of the working people—were pleasing enough to merit publication. And the fact that almost all the respondents had suggestions on how to prevent war filled the initiators of the poll with great pride. The Institute did not fail to stress the great similarity between these suggestions and party policies, implying that the party knows what the people want.

The second poll, published in the same paper on 7 October 1960, asked the people's views about their present living standards as compared to those in the recent past. Some 1,600 questionnaires were distributed for this purpose among passengers of 65 trains leaving Moscow daily for all parts of the USSR and abroad. Of the 1,399 responses obtained, 476 came from industrial workers, 467 from white-collar workers, 186 from engineers, 105 from the military, 47 from unemployed (mainly housewives), 43 from pensioners, and 32 from collective farmers. *Komsomolskaya Pravda* recognised the over-emphasis on the 'elite' in such a sample, but it also contended that it reached into all corners of the USSR, thus representing the greatest variety of views. Here again the

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first question elicited an overwhelming majority of answers expressing the opinion that living standards have indeed improved. The second question, asking for an explanation of these opinions, apparently did not yield any statistically meaningful data. The third question listed seven problems and asked those questioned to underline the one which was foremost in their mind. And the fourth again asked for suggestions for the rapid solution of these problems.

The most widely discussed was the third of the polls, published in the same paper on 1 January 1961. Readers ranging in age from 15 to 28 were asked to reveal their thoughts about their own generation ('What do you think about your generation?'). Twelve questions were listed in the questionnaire printed in the paper. At the end respondents were asked to supply personal data in reply to these questions: 'How old are you? Your education? What activity are you engaged in? When did you start working independently? Your domicile? Sex?'; and then, 'If desired put down name'. It is obvious that a subscriber to *Komsomolskaya Pravda* supplying all these details and, 'if desired', putting down his name, ceased to be an anonymous respondent. This may be one of the reasons for the number of declamatory statements obtained and for the wide publicity given to this evidence of the 'true communist and patriotic spirit of Soviet youth' in the communist press throughout the bloc.[11]

The fourth questionnaire, published by *Komsomolskaya Pravda* on 21 December 1961, dealt with the high divorce rate in the Soviet Union. Instead of showing progress in the use of questionnaire techniques by avoiding any attempt to influence the answers, the introductory statement to this questionnaire read: 'The moral code of the builder of communism, as formulated in the programme of the CPSU, must become the highest law of life for every young person'. Most of the questions in this poll were general and impersonal, with only one asking specifically about the respondent's own family. One of the questions included a vague allusion to the 'carry-overs from the past, from which young families should free themselves'.

How little there is in the officially announced general Soviet intention to apply Western research techniques, even in so-called 'concrete specific problems', can also be gathered from an article on 'Methods of Sociological Study of Specific Phenomena' which appeared in *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 3, 1961. 'The Marxist', it declares, 'does not deny the need for and the significance of public opinion studies, proof of which can be seen in the polls conducted by *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. . . . But for the Marxist public opinion represents only a more or less accurate, but sometimes distorted, reflection of the real conditions of their life'. The bourgeois sociologist, on the other hand, 'offers people's opinions as an indication of their real social position'.

All in all, the picture is a mixed one of real progress and no less real backwardness in Soviet empirical sociology. The little polling that

[11] Cf. 'A Glimpse into the Future', *World Marxist Review*, October 1962.

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has been publicised appears to have aimed at proving that Soviet youth is developing as expected towards the ideal of communist man in a classless society.

THINGS are simpler in the rest of the bloc area, to judge from the scarce evidence available in the West. Sociologists in these countries (who might more appropriately be called ' socio-philosophers ') had been among the most virulent assailants of empiricism in sociology until the recent half-turn in the Soviet attitude.

Pre-communist sociological research is usually passed over in silence in these countries, although they otherwise display enormous national pride in their intellectual achievements.[12] Thus, from the recent laments in Czech periodicals over the vacuum which the cult-of-personality period had created in sociological research, one could never guess that between 1929 and 1948 (with a pause during the German occupation) there existed an active Czechoslovak Sociological Society, and that, in addition to its organ, *Sociologicke Revue*, there appeared two other sociological periodicals: *Sociologie a Socjalni Problemy* in Prague, and *Sociologicky Sbornik* in Bratislava. What the Czechoslovak sociologists have been doing in recent years (apart from studies of living standards, reactions to the propaganda media, and studies of consumer attitudes, typical of all these countries), is some research on attitudes in the socialist work brigades, as well as an investigation of ' religious survivals in people's consciousness ' in the region of Kyjovo, and lately also of Ostrava. This subject, by the way, is also being pursued in the other bloc countries, if not as a sociological project (Bulgaria, Rumania, the USSR), then, at least, by using teachers for polling pupils on their world views (Hungary). Here are some examples of this bloc-wide practice: A small poll of eighth-graders at a Prague school disclosed that out of a total of 85 respondents 46 showed an unreservedly atheistic attitude, while only 22 believed in God.[13] Another poll among the sixth-to-ninth-grade students in Kolin revealed that 65·7 per cent (of an unspecified total) answered ' correctly ' the question about ' the world's beginning ', 65·3 per cent did not believe in the end of the world, 98·4 per cent answered ' correctly ' the question about the origin of man. The hypothesis that the world is directed by a mysterious being was rejected by 84·4 per cent; a ' natural end to human life ' with no existence after death was ' grasped correctly ' by 98 per cent of the students. Such primitive ' projects ' corroborate the opinion of the head of the Historical Materialism Department of the Institute of Philosophy, Czechoslovak Academy of Science, who said in an interview printed in *Kulturni Tvorba* (No. 4/1, 1963): ' To tell the truth, in sociological research we are behind

[12] An exception are those inter-war sociologists who, like L. Krzywicki in Poland or R. Gusti in Rumania, used the previously mentioned complex methods of enquiry which Soviet sociology recommends for adoption in ' Marxist research ', or wrote monographs to which current research can relate its findings.

[13] *Dejepis a Zemepis ve Skole*, February 1961.

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the USSR and some of the People's Democracies (Poland, Bulgaria, and others)'.

The Rumanians have also followed promptly the Soviet hint that Marxist research may profit from the Western empirical approach. They founded a National Sociological Committee in 1959, affiliating it, as is customary, to the International Sociological Association, and taking part in its congresses. Possibly in preparation for the fifth world congress of Sociology in Washington in September 1962, the Committee issued a rather impressive-looking first volume of *The Rumanian Journal of Sociology* in English. Typical of the Rumanian sociologists' approach to the new requirements appears to be a report, in that volume, by M. Cernea on the study of the 'Transformation of the peasant's consciousness and the economic relations in the countryside'. Replete with statistics, the text can be summed up in the following finding: The peasant in Rumania, a country with socialised agriculture, has proved that his consciousness underwent a transformation when he joined the agricultural collective, because this empirical knowledge of the new reality is reflected in it [that is, in his consciousness]. But since phenomena of consciousness are not directly measurable by arithmetical methods, 'objective criteria' are used in this research, such as 'the dynamic of the development marked by various forms of cooperation in production'. Recently, the Rumanians also conducted a poll among Bucharest workers on their 'purpose in life', details of which were published in *The New Times* (No. 6, 1963).

Of all the bloc countries, one would have expected Hungary to try to emulate the Polish example of free sociological research with zeal, to fit the present pattern of the regime's quest for a more liberal image of Hungary. But there seems to have been no serious attempt yet at empirical attitude and opinion research. A. Szalai, writing in *Elet es Irodalom* (No. 17, 1961) in praise of the achievements of bourgeois sociology as contrasted with the lack of any progress in Hungarian research, drew a vehement protest in the Party organ, *Nepszabadsag* (29 April 1961). It was more than a year before a compromise proposal concerning the legitimacy of public opinion studies within the framework of Marxist-Leninist sociology was made public.[14] Investigation of public opinion was recognised as an important task, to which Hungarian sociologists must turn their attention. Empirical studies of public opinion, however, can be useful only if they are based on the macro-sociological point of view. So far, nothing seems to have been produced by Hungarian research on this basis. Press reports indicate that, as in other countries, teachers in various schools try to find out what their pupils believe in and aspire to in the future. In several Budapest schools students were questioned about their leisure-time activities. The communist youth organisation polled the leaders among the young workers

[14] Kalman Kulcsar, *Magyar Filozofiai Szemle*, No. 3, 1962, and *Allam es Igazgatas*, November 1962

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in a Gyor factory on this single question: 'Why do you like our people's democratic system?' Knowledge of the world outlook of students, obtained through 'continuous observation', has become a requirement for teachers under the new Hungarian education plan. And if neither this nor the preceding examples have any similarity with the notion of public opinion research as practised in the West, the periodic talks with large groups of workers, such as last year's conversations of some 5,000 'activists' with 120,000 Budapest workers, certainly do not correspond to the official label of a 'public opinion poll', given them by the press.[15]

The Hungarian investigations illustrate the kind of research now prevalent in other East European countries, and is representative of present-day empirical sociological research in the Soviet bloc as a whole. Available published information seems to indicate that, except for Poland, nothing has so far been provided by these countries that could be considered a contribution to the factual knowledge of their societies.

[15] See 'Public opinion poll among workers', *Nepszava*, 29 July 1962.

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AMERICA AND EUROPE

Louis Hartz — American Historiography and Comparative Analysis: Further Reflections

LAWS

Brian Tierney — "The Prince Is Not Bound by the Laws." Accursius and the Origins of the Modern State

Asaf A. A. Fyzee — Muhammadan Law In India

SOCIAL MOBILITY

Robert J. Smith — Aspects of Mobility in Pre-Industrial Japanese Cities

IMMIGRANTS AND ASSOCIATIONS

W. T. Morrill — The Ibo in Twentieth Century Calabar

DEBATE

Robert F. Gray — Political Parties in New African Nations

L. P. Mair — Comment on the above

UTOPIAS

Ernest Tuveson — The Power of Believing (Review Article)

(Any article that is not in itself comparative will be followed by another setting its subject in comparative perspective.)

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THE DIALECTICS OF POLYCENTRISM

Melvin Croan

> *What communists need is not division into 'majority' and 'minority' but unity, more unity, and still more unity.* *Pravda*, 7 January 1963
>
> *. . . the strategy and tactics of the international communist movement would have to be completely changed and the revolutionary line of Marxism-Leninism would have to be replaced by the capitulationist line of revisionism. Were this to happen, what possible common basis would there be for unity among the Communist and Workers parties of all countries? Is it not a deliberate attempt to create a split in the international communist movement?*
>
> *Jen-min jih-pao*, 27 January 1963
>
> *Such a debate acquires a momentum of its own. Positions harden. Differences proliferate. A solution becomes more difficult.*
>
> *Daily Worker* (London), 14 January 1963

LONG accustomed to a paucity of first-hand information—with much of what was available of questionable reliability—students of international communism have suddenly been deluged by a flood of documentation, not only on the immediate issues of the Sino-Soviet polemic but also, as befits a movement with a highly developed historical consciousness and a flair for historical recrimination, on the particulars of the development of that polemic. While they strive to absorb and digest the latest materials, their analytical talents are in urgent demand. 'The nature of the present epoch' in international communism, if one may so express it, has become a matter of general interest to the public at large, fascinated by the break-up of the communist international monolith, as well as of practical importance to chancelleries, concerned with the policy implications of recent developments. Does the Sino-Soviet polemic entail a mere 'dispute'? Is it, perhaps, better described as a 'conflict'? Or does it actually amount to the long awaited 'split'? And how to characterise present-day international communism more generally? Is it 'polycentric' or has it become 'bipolar'? How, indeed, to gain perspective on the daily news dispatches with their alternating emphasis upon 'diversity' and 'unity', 'rift' and 'rapprochement'?

If sweeping conclusions based on the news of the day are obviously inadequate, hairsplitting semantic exercises to determine elusive definitional characteristics are no more rewarding. Both approaches run the

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risk of missing a prior point: the failure of the international communist movement, in its post-Stalinist phase, to fashion institutions and to formulate procedures to take the place of the defunct monopoly of personal power exercised by the late Soviet dictator. That this pursuit of parliamentarism has so far proved abortive should be unmistakably clear. What is less apparent, although scarcely less significant, is the fact that the search itself has contributed not to the amelioration but precisely to the exacerbation of relations between Moscow and Peking. This has been the case because of the congenital inability of both protagonists to separate procedural matters from the substantive issues which divide them. While it is true that this failing is not unique to the communists, the situation is made much more serious in their case because of the inability of both the Soviets and the Chinese to disengage themselves on either count from their absolutist ideological pretensions. Refusal to sacrifice first principles, together with a reluctance to compromise special interests, not only dooms in advance the quest for parliamentary forms and procedures, but also turns the search itself into yet an additional source of friction. Successive 'cooling off' periods in Sino-Soviet relations, in 1960–61 in the wake of the Moscow meeting of the eighty-one parties (November 1960), and in the spring and summer of 1962, after the twenty-second Soviet Party congress (October 1961) had led to the Soviet break with Albania (December 1961), each recorded a more rapid rise in the overall temperature of the polemic. The present period in early 1963 promises to bring a similar result, raising a few more degrees the dangerously overheated dispute.

To concentrate exclusively upon the disruptive consequences of the search for parliamentarism for Sino-Soviet relations alone is not, however, to tell the whole story. The precarious balance of relations between Moscow and Peking has also contributed to the spread of polycentrism. Although the word itself is in considerable disrepute in the official communist lexicon, the reality which it does connote now has a two-fold character. *Toutes proportions gardées*, many other communist parties—both in power and out—have in fact been developing their own internal policies and formulating their own tactics, independently of both Moscow and Peking. And now, in addition, a number of these fraternal parties have also emerged as independent actors on the stage of international communism, with contributions of their own to the search for a parliamentary solution, as well as, inevitably, to the Sino-Soviet polemics. Given these extraordinarily complex and highly dynamic developments, it is small wonder that the present phase of international communism elicits so many divergent outside interpretations, or that prognostication of the future should appear so hazardous. Both these exercises beg a more detailed analysis of the problematics of polycentrism and the quest for an international communist parliamentarism, which is the purpose of the following pages.

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THE shocking novelty of the present situation, and the unprecedented dilemmas it poses, cannot be emphasised too strongly. It is safe to assume that if any single passage of the 1960 Moscow Statement really represented the unanimous agreement of all eighty-one fraternal delegations, then it was certainly the passage containing pointers on the need for communist unity and solidarity. The reasons for the passion for unity there expressed are not very hard to find. International communist unity represents more than merely an abstract postulate of Marxist-Leninist theory; it is also a quite practical requirement for the consolidation of gains already won and, as the Statement itself put it, ' a necessary condition ' (although hardly a sufficient one) for ' victory '. Less abstrusely formulated, unity is an indispensable attribute of a dynamic totalitarian movement.

Unfortunately for international communism, nothing in either Marxist-Leninist theory, or in the practical experience of communist totalitarianism, has prepared it in the slightest to deal with the reality of divisions and disputes. Familiarity with the proper techniques for ' unmasking renegades ' and ' relentless struggle against enemies ' may well militate against compromise; it can hardly be expected to produce the familiar results in the absence of a single authoritative centre, possessing a monopoly, or near-monopoly, of power. Belated recognition on the part of communist theoreticians that an automatic identity of interests among communist regimes is no longer to be expected does not help very much either. Developments in the realm of theory have lagged behind the problems of practice. Theory itself is partisan, to the extent of mirroring divergent positions. Thus the Soviets, for example, have been less ready to give up outdated but once serviceable illusions than the Chinese. In the current Soviet view:

> Disagreements among individual communist parties do not have deep roots in the social system of the socialist countries . . . the differences are above all of a subjective nature.[1]

The Chinese, however, do not dismiss the issue quite so simply. They hold that:

> Common problems being extremely complicated, the conditions in which the parties find themselves widely different, and the objective situation constantly changing, it is unavoidable that various fraternal parties form different opinions, which is not necessarily a bad thing.[2]

[1] ' Let us Strengthen the Unity of the Communist Movement in the name of the Triumph of Peace and Socialism ', *Pravda*, 7 January 1963.

[2] ' Workers of all Countries Unite to oppose our Common Enemy ', *Jen-min Jih-pao*, 15 December 1962. Both the Chinese and the Soviet explanations for the differences lag behind the theories advanced by other communist parties. Thus, Jean Terfve finds the source of divergence in the ' inequality of development in the socialist countries . . . evident on several levels: political, economic, cultural, etc.' See *Drapeau Rouge* (Brussels), 5 January 1962. Terfve's analysis parallels the line of reasoning currently fashionable in the West. Both are open to criticism on grounds of neglecting power political and purely psychological considerations.

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Neither the Soviet nor the Chinese analysis offers any effective guide to the solution of these differences. Indeed, the home-made Chinese dialectic of 'unity-contradiction-unity' only raises the basic question: how to agree on procedures and fashion institutions to resolve the palpable contradictions.

There is no need to dilate upon the reasons for the emergence of this problem only after the death of Stalin. Suffice it only to recall the decisiveness of Stalin's personal role—amply demonstrated in the case of Tito in 1948. Although the Soviet dictator was not privileged merely 'to raise his little finger and see Tito fall', nonetheless he could and did excommunicate the Yugoslav leader and was able to enforce his pontification. Whether China—never subject to the network of Stalinist controls which were operative in the East European satellites and, in a different way, over non-ruling communist parties elsewhere—would have remained subordinate to Moscow, even if Stalin had lived longer than he did, is, of course, a moot question. This would have depended upon Stalin's ability to elicit at least passive Chinese acceptance of his *policies*, for Mao's disagreements with Khrushchev began, not with a Chinese claim to sole or even shared leadership over the communist camp, but rather with complaints that the Soviet position of leadership was being exercised in an incorrect manner, inasmuch as Khrushchev was pursuing what the Chinese, in their not exactly humble view, regarded as the 'wrong' policies. And with that Chinese finding, the issue was unmistakably joined, openly by 1958, although covertly even before.

The broad outlines of major developments in Sino-Soviet relations between 1958 and early 1962 have been adequately reported and intensively analysed in the West. What should be recalled here is that the Moscow meeting of the eighty-one parties in 1960 failed to provide a common platform for unity, not only because the Statement it produced was put together after prolonged acrimonious debate and violent personal polemics, but more importantly because the Statement itself was self-contradictory. Agreement to the formulations of the Statement—a papering over rather than a resolution of the disputes—marked the outer limits to which the major protagonists were prepared to go towards realisation of a common substantive goal—that of unity itself. Yet almost before the ink on the Moscow Statement had fully dried, there arose the inevitable question of how to interpret its provisions and by what means to enforce them. That troublesome issue was made immediately topical thanks to Hoxha's defiance of Khrushchev; it was rendered even more vexatious thanks to China's decision to back Albania. Khrushchev's use of the forum of the twenty-second Soviet Party congress to mount a public attack on the Albanians, for which, incidentally, the Chinese have never forgiven him, may be taken as the final collapse of that particular phase of communist parliamentarism. Chou En-lai's premature departure from the Soviet Party congress, on the flimsiest of pretexts, suggests his lack of advance notification of Khrushchev's impending denunciation,

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even as the Chinese delegate's rejection of the tirade as 'not a serious Marxist approach' demonstrates the Chinese unwillingness to accept the Soviet party meeting as in any way binding upon them. Finally, one has only to reread the editorials of the Albanian party daily, *Zeri i Popullit*, during the winter 1961–62, not to mention the speeches of the Albanian leaders at the time, and to recall how warmly their sentiments were applauded and how widely their texts were disseminated by the Chinese, to gauge the extent of the collapse of the unity which had been endorsed by the eighty-one parties only one year before.

But these striking developments, the source of so much current recrimination, should not obscure the fact that the forward momentum of events towards an open rupture between Moscow and Peking was arrested in the spring of 1962. While details are at present scanty, it is likely that this lull was the result of some sort of negotiations. Indeed, after a major editorial blast against Khrushchev on 25 March, *Zeri i Popullit* fell silent—quite unnaturally so, in view of its frenetic pronouncements of the preceding months. That the Chinese continued to publish learned articles on the history of revisionism [3] is compatible with the hypothesis, since these scholarly polemics can be interpreted as a return to earlier forms of esoteric communication. As to who may have taken the initiative, and what decisions, if any, may have been reached on the substance of the Sino-Soviet dispute or the procedures to resolve them, little is at present known beyond the indication that as early as January 1962 the Vietnamese party had proposed another international communist conference and the immediate cessation of radio and press attacks.[4] The Chinese claim that they agreed to these proposals in April 1962,[5] but the Soviets, at the time, showed no interest in them.[6]

THE failure of this second attempt to repair the damaged fabric of communist unity cannot be attributed exclusively or even primarily to the policy cleavages opened up anew between Moscow and Peking as a result of the two international crises, in Cuba and on the Sino-Indian border, in the fall of 1962. Even before that critical juncture Khrushchev had taken certain actions which had the effect of demonstrating that he did not intend to yield an inch on matters of policy. These included not only the MIG deal with India but more especially the continued rapprochement with Yugoslavia, beginning with Gromyko's visit to

[3] E.g. 'On Kautskyism', *Hung-ch'i*, 25 April 1962; 'The Revolutionary Tradition of Political Parties of the Proletariat: On reading Lenin's "What is to be Done?",' ibid., 16 May 1962, and the earlier 'On Bernsteinian Revisionism', ibid., 10 February 1962.

[4] Cf. the statement of the Politburo of the Vietnamese Workers party of 10 February 1963 as published in *Pravda*, 12 February 1963.

[5] See the excerpts from Wu Hsiu-chuan's speech to the 6th SED Congress, *Peking Review*, 25 January 1963, p. 7.

[6] Cf. 'Let us Unite on the Basis of the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement', *Jen-min Jih-pao*, 27 January 1963. For their part, the Soviets mention that in a letter from the CC/CPSU to the CC/CCP of 31 May 1962 they agreed to 'the necessity of convening a meeting'.

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Belgrade in April and culminating in Brezhnev's demonstrative visit there in September, preparatory to Tito's subsequent trip to the Soviet Union.

As could have been expected, Albanian reaction to the improvement in Soviet-Yugoslav relations was furious to the point of hysteria. They greeted the Brezhnev-Tito communiqué (3 October) with a militant call for all true Marxist-Leninists to face up to an open split in international communism and to marshall their forces in order to overthrow Khrushchev.[7] The Chinese did not directly associate themselves with so radical a summons, for they were then, and still remain, anxious to avoid the odium of bringing about the final split. Still, there is no doubt that the Chinese were responsible for what the Soviets like to call the 'outpourings of the Albanian loudmouths'. Although the Albanians had their own reasons for so doing, the Chinese had in fact paid them a few kopeks and taught them to say foul words to their mother, the CPSU, to use Khrushchev's homely analogy.[8] And in this case the Chinese had themselves touched off the new round of polemics. Correctly interpreting the rapprochement between Khrushchev and Tito as a direct challenge to themselves, the Chinese attacked Yugoslavia as having 'ceased to be a socialist country' and violently castigated 'modern revisionism' in all its forms.[9]

Thus, even before the international crises of October-November 1962, Sino-Soviet relations had already taken a distinct turn for the worse. The Cuban crisis and the Sino-Indian conflict served to bring into the open widely divergent Soviet and Chinese positions on a number of substantive issues, no longer as abstract formulations, but now as practical policy matters of the greatest immediate urgency. In the case of Cuba, it was the ultimate question of war and peace in the thermo-nuclear age, the question of the nature of imperialism and the balance of world forces in the present historical epoch. In the case of India, it was the question of non-alignment and neutralism, the national liberation movement and the reliability of the national bourgeoisie in the former colonial countries. Differences between the Chinese and the Soviets which had come to light before were now made specific in particular cases.

The Soviets, of course, based their argument for 'peaceful coexistence' upon the impermissibility of a general world war, given the nature of weapons today, an assessment which they say is shared by 'sober elements' in the imperialist camp. The Chinese, by contrast, insist that imperialism has not changed its 'essential character' (viz., its

[7] See 'A Great Betrayal of Marxism-Leninism', *Zeri i Popullit*, 13 October 1962. The newspaper had earlier prepared its readers for the worst with a two-part editorial, entitled 'Modern Revisionism assists the Fundamental Strategy of American Imperialism', which appeared on 19–20 September.

[8] Cf. Khrushchev's speech on foreign policy to the Supreme Soviet, *Pravda*, 13 December 1962.

[9] 'Let Everyone see how degraded Modern Revisionism has become', *Jen-min Jih-pao*, 17 September 1962. The Yugoslavs had never been spared the attack. See, e.g., the article entitled 'An Analysis of Yugoslav Economic Failures', ibid. 3 August 1962, reprinted in *Peking Review*, 17 August 1962.

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predatory nature); that with or without ' nuclear teeth ' it is still a ' paper tiger ', and that, in any case, the decisive factor in modern warfare remains the power of the popular masses.[10] The Soviets claim that nationalist-neutralist regimes, despite all their internal contradictions, still represent a ' progressive ' factor in world affairs, that they deserve Soviet endorsement, and are worthy of extensive Soviet economic assistance. The Chinese, aggrieved by the diversion of Soviet aid from the underdeveloped communist countries to the neutralist regimes, and the passive role for native communist cadres seemingly dictated by Soviet policy, insist that the progressive role of the national bourgeoisie has already been played out; that neutralist regimes, or many of them at any rate, have already put themselves ' objectively ' in the service of imperialism.[11] Thus the Cuban crisis, in the Chinese view, demonstrated that the Soviets wantonly misconstrued the nature of imperialism, that they were ' scared stiff ' and ' timid as mice ' in dealing with it, that, worse yet, they were willing to commit a ' Munich ' as far as the Castro revolution was concerned. And the Chinese invasion of India, for the Soviets, amounted to a deliberate attempt to undermine the entire Khrushchev policy towards the *tiers monde* in general, and in particular threatened to drive one of the leaders of the neutralist camp, the Nehru Government, into the arms of the West.

THESE events form the immediate background to the present phase of abortive parliamentarism and the spread of polycentrism. Both phenomena, separately and together, can be best examined in the light of the five communist party congresses which took place during the winter 1962–63. Although the congresses in question, the Bulgarian (5–14 November), the Hungarian (20–24 November), the Italian (2–8 December), the Czechoslovak (4–8 December), and the East German (15–21 January) were all due, and in some cases overdue, their timing cannot be considered ' an accident '. Rather their timing and sequence must be regarded as a deliberate Soviet attempt to have them function as international bodies, ratifying Soviet policies and rejecting the Chinese position. This conception of the ' international significance of the fraternal congresses ' was repeatedly advanced by Soviet commentators and was explicitly formulated by Khrushchev himself, who in his speech to the SED congress noted ' the participation of representatives of a majority of the fraternal parties in the work of these congresses ' which, he said, imparted to them ' the character of international communist forums '.[12]

With this purpose in mind, the Soviets dispatched top-level delegations, headed in each instance by leading functionaries, members of the presidium of the central committee of the CPSU or the secretariat, or

[10] The point was strongly reiterated in the major editorial, ' Our Differences with Comrade Togliatti ', *Jen-min Jih-pao*, 31 December 1962.

[11] This point was developed explicitly with reference to India in the Chinese editorial, ' More on Nehru's Philosophy in the light of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question ', *Jen-min Jih-pao*, 27 October 1962.

[12] *Pravda*, 17 January 1963.

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both: Suslov in Sofia, Kuusinen in Budapest, Brezhnev in Prague, Kozlov in Rome, and Khrushchev in Berlin. The Chinese, by contrast, resisting from the outset any notion of the binding international character of the decisions of these congresses, sent only a small, second-level delegation, headed in every instance by Wu Hsiu-chuan, with the exception of the Italian congress (in session simultaniously with the Czech), at which their delegation was led by Wu's deputy, Chao Yi-ming.[13]

Given the divergent Soviet and Chinese conceptions of the proper role and purpose of these fraternal congresses, it is not surprising that the meetings failed entirely to facilitate the search for parliamentary procedures, let alone a resolution of the substantive disputes. On the contrary, they rather served to heighten disagreement on both matters. Each successive congress contributed something of its own to the current discord, either by way of more strenuous Chinese polemics, more vigorous rebuttals to the Chinese, or both. In Sofia, Wu's remarks were reportedly greeted by dead silence. In Budapest, the Chinese party was openly criticised by name; the task, however, falling to an obscure delegate, a mere provincial secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers party. In Prague and Rome, the Chinese were again openly and explicitly attacked by name, this time by the leaders of the host parties. That all pretences were being abandoned was clearly indicated by Giancarlo Pajetta, a deputy secretary of the CPI, who exclaimed, 'When we mean China we have no need to say Albania'.[14] In their concluding speeches both Novotny and Togliatti addressed themselves directly to the Chinese, and excerpts of their critical remarks were published in *Pravda* (10 December 1962). Finally, in Berlin, Wu was subjected to the ultimate indignity, a prolonged period of stamping, booing, and cries of 'pfui'; a display which the Chinese, with reason, have publicly called 'rude and vulgar' and 'all the more serious because it was planned'.[15] Nor were these activities all one-sided, with the Chinese merely passive victims. On the contrary, throughout the Chinese proved themselves zealous lobbyists on their own behalf, and at Berlin they were ready and willing to distribute the text of Wu's speech even to Western newspapermen.

If these five congresses were supposed to bring the Chinese to heel or even only to impress upon them the extent of their isolation, they must be deemed a total failure. What the congresses did succeed in doing was the precise opposite. The meetings not only made public the full extent of the substantive differences between the Soviets and the Chinese, they also exposed and further developed two diametrically opposed conceptions of the proper international organisation and procedure. To

[13] Wu is the chairman of the international liaison committee of the central committee of the Chinese Communist party. Ironically enough, between 1956 and 1957 he also served as China's only ambassador to Belgrade. Chao is deputy head of the international liaison committee of the central committee of the Chinese Communist party.

[14] See *The Times* (London), 6 December 1962. The particular remark is missing from the excerpts of Pajetta's speech published in *L'Unita*, 6 December 1962, which, however, do mention the Chinese by name.

[15] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, 27 January 1963.

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the policy disputes which rent international communism, the congresses thus added, more clearly than ever before, fundamental disagreements on the organisational question.

Consider, for example, the crucial complex of questions concerning leadership, obligation, representation and consultation. Having ostensibly renounced in 1960 their previous pretensions to the 'leading role', the Soviets subsequently have been trying to reclaim the honour, at least to the extent of insisting that major decisions of the Soviet party, as ratified by international communist meetings, must be binding on all parties. On this basis, the Soviets also demand acceptance of their pronouncements and policies on important matters of general concern to the international communist movement.[16] In effect, they demand the right to act as the international executive arm, subject only to subsequent ratification by an international majority, on which the Soviet party can still count. Repeated claims of the leading role of the Soviet party, of its special position in the international movement, and of the weighty burdens it has borne for the common good, were made at each of the five party congresses of 1962. These claims were most pronounced at the East German congress, where speaker after speaker referred to the 'leading Soviet role'. Even Gomulka, who, for understandable reasons of his own, shuns that particular designation, went out of his way to emphasise the role of Soviet power in protecting the entire socialist camp against the designs of its enemies, and suggested that this service alone entitled the Soviet party to special respect.[17]

THESE Soviet aspirations, clearly exaggerated since neither the Soviets alone nor the majority which they command can enforce them, only served to elicit an explicit Chinese rejoinder. The Chinese reaction is the more remarkable because the terms in which it is now being couched betray a lively personal animus as well as deep-seated nationalist sensitivities. Thus, the Peking *People's Daily* wrote (27 January 1963):

> In the international communist movement, the resolution of any one fraternal party, whether right or wrong, and however important the place and role of that party, can be binding on that party alone. . . . It is impermissible to impose the programme, resolutions, lines, or policies of any one party on other fraternal parties, or to require other fraternal parties to obey the irresponsible self-contradictory statements made by the leader of a party who talks one way today and another tomorrow, as if these statements were imperial decrees. . . .

Not surprisingly, the Chinese also reject all attempts to interpret the five congresses as international communist meetings, whose common pro-Soviet line must be obligatory for the whole of international communism.

16 See M. Croan, 'Communist International Relations', in W. Laqueur and L. Labedz, eds., *Polycentrism*, for a more detailed discussion.

17 Text of the Gomulka speech, broadcast by the Warsaw home service, 17 January 1963, 1505 GMT.

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They give three basic reasons for this rejection. First, the congresses all engaged in ' impermissible public attacks ' on fraternal parties. Secondly, the international representation at each of the meetings was faulty—Albania being absent from them all, while *horribile dictu* Yugoslavia was in attendance at Rome and Berlin. Finally, much like Trotsky in the final stage of his opposition, the Chinese complain about the ' undemocratic ' nature of the proceedings. Specifically, they cite the case of the North Korean delegation in Berlin, which desired to speak but was denied the rostrum, ostensibly on account of lack of time. The Chinese have published a letter of protest submitted by the North Korean delegation to the presidium of the East German congress asserting that such high-handed treatment alone deprived the meeting of any claim to being an international forum of fraternal parties.[18]

Nor is this all. Much more seriously, the Chinese now advance claims of their own to leadership of all true Marxist-Leninists (as opposed to renegades and revisionists), and on this basis justify their own fractionalism. In fact, the Chinese have developed what might be called with apologies to Edmund Burke, a doctrine of ' virtual representation '—i.e. the representation of the masses by their betters (the Chinese Communist party), and the right of that representative to act according to the dictates of conscience (to behave as it sees fit within international communism in order to further the real historical interests of the popular masses). According to the Chinese:

> Marxism-Leninism holds that the sole majority which is the most reliable in the world is the people who decide the course of history and who account for more than ninety per cent of the population of the world. Although those who go against the basic interests of more than ninety per cent of the people may raise a hue and cry at a certain place or at a certain meeting, they definitely do not represent the genuine majority. Their ' majority ' is only a fictitious, superficial phenomenon; in essence they are precisely the minority, while the ' minority ' they have attacked is, in essence, precisely the majority.[19]

With such totally divergent views on the nature of international leadership, obligation and representation, is it any wonder that the question of consultation between the two feuding parties has proven so troublesome?

[18] The text of the North Korean letter, together with the proposed North Korean intervention which was pro-Chinese in content, was distributed by Hsin-hua, the New China News Agency, on 22 January 1963.

[19] ' Workers of All Countries Unite to Oppose our Common Enemy ', *Jen-min Jih-pao*, 15 December 1962. Naturally the Chinese do not cite Burke as their source. Rather they claim inspiration from the behaviour of Karl Liebknecht within German Social-Democracy during the first world war as well as, of course, Lenin's own activities in ranging the Russian Bolsheviks against the Mensheviks. Such pretensions, needless to add, outrage the Soviets, who doubtless recognise the cogency of the Chinese historical analogy. In their rebuttal the Soviets have denounced ' the incredibly pretentious aim of proclaiming one party to be Lenin's true heir ', and ask, somewhat weakly, ' has anyone been given the right to put himself in the place of the great Lenin?' See, ' Let us Strengthen the Unity of the Communist Movement in the name of the Triumph of Peace and Socialism ', *Pravda*, 7 January 1963.

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The Chinese claim that they favour such consultations; indeed, before the close of the Czechoslovak congress Wu presented a proposal for the convocation of another world communist meeting, thus making public a position to which the Chinese have apparently adhered since April 1962. The initial response of the Soviet party and its supporters was distinctly unfavourable. As if to put the Chinese in their place, in Rome Luigi Longo suggested future bilateral consultations between the Italians and the Chinese, a proposal which he repeated to Wu in Berlin. And Ulbricht, addressing himself to the question of consultations, castigated the Chinese for having failed to consult other socialist states before violating the principle of peaceful coexistence on the Sino-Indian border.[20] Finally, Khrushchev, speaking to the same East German congress, expressed the fear that another world meeting might have disastrous consequences since, as he put it, 'battle has a logic of its own, and political passions can reach a boiling point' (*Pravda*, 17 January 1963).

More recently, the Soviets, who have been prevented by the logic of their own claims to international legitimacy from rejecting such a world-wide meeting on principle, have seemingly acceded to the Chinese request by stating their willingness to meet 'at any level, at any time'.[21] But appearances are misleading. In fact both the Chinese and the Soviets have posed preconditions for any such meeting which may well prove to be an insurmountable obstacle. These conditions have nothing to do with the prior cessation of public attacks, which both parties agree would be necessary. Rather each side, in effect, demands that the other capitulate on the major substantive issues in advance of the calling of a new conference. This is precisely the meaning of the central focus currently enjoyed by the Yugoslav issue. The Chinese insist that a world-wide meeting can be called only on the basis of the 1960 Moscow Statement on revisionism as the 'main danger', and the exclusion of Yugoslavia. By contrast, the Soviets demand prior Chinese acceptance of the Soviet rehabilitation of Tito and the shifting of emphasis from revisionism to dogmatism and sectarianism as the 'main danger'.[22] Ironically, Tito's craving to play a central role in international communist affairs has been requited to the extent of his serving as the embodiment of substantive, procedural, and ideological issues dividing Khrushchev from Mao, and their inability or unwillingness to distinguish among these issues. Consider what is at stake. For the Soviets to return to the provisions of the Moscow Statement indicting the

20 Ulbricht's report to the congress, as carried by the East Berlin home television service, 15 January 1963, 0750 GMT.

21 See *Pravda*, 10 February 1963, and the letter of the CC/CPSU to the CC/CCP of 21 February 1963.

22 Cf., e.g., *Jen-min Jih-pao*, 27 January 1963, with *Pravda*, 10 February 1963. In their invitation to Khrushchev either to visit China himself, or to send a high-level Soviet delegation, or to receive a similar Chinese delegation in Moscow, the Chinese again stressed that all disputed questions 'ought to be discussed . . . in accordance with the revolutionary prinicples set forth in the Moscow Declaration [1957], and the Moscow Statement [1960]'. Cf. Chinese letter of 9 March 1963, distributed by New China News Agency.

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Yugoslav League of Communists, as demanded by the Chinese, would amount to Khrushchev's writing off as incorrect almost all the essentials of Soviet policy and doctrine with which the Chinese disagree. Similarly, for the Chinese to accept Khrushchev's rapprochement with Tito would entail Chinese recognition of the validity of Soviet interpretations of and innovations upon the Moscow Statement, and thus also an acceptance of the Soviet right to act in behalf of the international communist movement in other respects as well, say, against Albania or, for that matter, China itself.

HOW, then, to evaluate the prospects for another worldwide communist conference? Is such a meeting possible with each side demanding as a precondition the surrender of the other *before* it can even be convoked? And, if not, how will this affect polycentrism?

In considering these questions, it may be instructive to look at the role of other communist parties as possible mediators between Moscow and Peking. This role itself is one manifestation of the rapid spread of polycentrism in the present period of communist international relations. Other manifestations can be found in the congresses of the five European parties, which were markedly different in preparation, execution, and programmatic result. Suffice it to note, without considering the details, that while the Bulgarians went through a long overdue stage of destalinisation, the Hungarians approved a new phase of relaxation, and the Italians adopted a platform of 'structural reform', while the Czechs and East Germans clung to the remnants of their Stalinist order with considerable success. Radio Prague caught the spirit of these developments when on the eve of the Czech party congress it announced (in its foreign service commentary on 30 November) that although the Czechoslovak Communist party would 'learn from the experience of the Bulgarian and Hungarian congresses, the experiences of one country are not automatically transferable to another as in Stalin's time'.

Still, this measure of polycentrism, made possible by the requirements of the larger issues dividing Moscow from Peking, is perhaps less immediately relevant than the independent initiative shown by the Polish, Vietnamese, Indonesian, British, and Norwegian parties, and, to give him his due, Fidel Castro, in presenting themselves as mediators on these larger issues. But what to make of these activities? Beyond the fact that all these self-styled honest brokers believe in international communist unity *per se*, specific motivations differ in each case. Gomulka, for example, in addition to being a primitive enough Marxist-Leninist, is also a clever enough politician to realise that if it comes to a final split, that result (together with the imposition of a central planning agency for the Comecon countries) will almost certainly undermine the vestiges of Poland's internal autonomy. Both the Vietnamese and the Indonesians are motivated by comparable considerations, involving the preservation of an open option between Moscow an Peking of the sort already forfeited

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by the North Korean party which has gone over completely to the Chinese. The British party, on the other hand, seems to have absorbed enough from the political culture in which it functions to appreciate the need for genuine compromise and thus to deplore on procedural as well as substantive grounds the wild and self-generating polemics.[23] The attitude of the Norwegian party is a case all to itself, for it reflects considerations of party in-fighting, and specifically the attempt of the present party chairman, Emil Lövlien, to prevent the return to power of a personal rival, Furubotn. (Expelled from his position as party leader in 1950 as a 'Titoist', Furubotn bases his present hopes upon an international split with the 'dogmatists'.) As for Castro, this is not just a case of personal megalomania. Fidel's exaggerated notion of his personal role in world affairs is, perhaps, less important than his continued need to rely on Soviet help, despite his anger at Khrushchev's high-handed treatment of Cuba and his sympathies with the more 'revolutionary' Chinese position. This dilemma has given rise to Castro's offer of his good offices to mediate between Moscow and Peking.

Despite, and perhaps also because of this wide range of motivation, all these efforts have so far come to nought. To be sure, Gomulka may well have prevailed upon Khrushchev, in their meetings before the East German congress, to tone down the public attacks; witness Khrushchev's remarks, coming in reference to the case of Yugoslavia, that aberrant Albania whose leaders 'do not correctly understand a number of important problems', nonetheless remains 'a socialist country'.[24] Such verbal concessions notwithstanding, the battle, as Khrushchev himself correctly noted, does have 'a logic of its own', a point abundantly illustrated by the proceedings in Berlin and the subsequent recriminations to which they have led. And judging by the laconic dispatch in the London *Daily Worker* (11 February 1963), the attempted arbitration of the minor parties, which in the British case involved sending a delegation headed by party secretary John Gollan to Peking, has proved no more successful. That such activities fail of their avowed purpose does not diminish their significance. Parties like the British and the Norwegian, minuscule in size and without a real role domestically, have long been accustomed to instantaneous obedience to the dictates of Moscow. Yet nowadays they are not only experiencing an unprecedented sense of international importance but are also acquiring new lessons in independent action.

In the final analysis, however, the future of this kind of polycentrism

[23] See the statement issued by the Executive Committee of the British Communist party *before* the East German congress, *Daily Worker* (London), 14 January 1963.

[24] *Pravda*, 17 January 1963. Cf. the ominous note struck earlier on the occasion of Albania's National Day, when it was asserted that 'the Soviet people cannot remain indifferent to the fate of the fraternal Albanian people', *Izvestia*, 27 November 1962. It is significant that the Soviets have begun to use the phrase 'the fourteen socialist countries'. This is at once a manifestation of Khrushchev's willingness to rein in somewhat on the Albanians, and of his reluctance to undo the rehabilitation of the Yugoslavs; it is also, of course, a remarkable admission of what has happened to the sometime unity of 'the socialist camp'.

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depends upon a perpetuation of the present impasse in international communist relations. Yet the present phase of these relations involves less a static equilibrium than a dynamic disequilibrium. Recent developments demonstrate how rapidly the breach between Moscow and Peking has been widening. Not only do the Chinese unconditionally demand the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the ranks of international communism and the rehabilitation of Albania; they also ask the Soviets to admit publicly their past ' mistakes ' and insist that the Soviets apologise for their attacks on other fraternal parties.[25] Moreover, while formally calling for a cessation of public polemics, the Chinese have challenged the Soviets to publish in full the Chinese position on all the disruptive issues, and accuse the Soviets of both bad faith and outright cowardice in not doing so.[26] To the lengthy bill of particulars presented by the Chinese, the Soviets have no really effective answer.[27] Soviet activities at state level, utilising the diplomatic channels which are still open, have been conspicuously unsuccessful to date. Public pronouncements stressing that the Soviet defensive shield still protects mainland China have been interpreted by the Chinese, possibly with good reason, as yet another implicit threat. Such statements have met with cold disdain on the part of the Chinese, who charge the Soviet Union with ' great power chauvinism ', disregard for Chinese foreign policy interests, and violation of ' hundreds of agreements ' with China itself.[28] If Soviet diplomacy has sought, through a combination of political pressure and conciliatory approaches, to prevent a further deterioration of ' fraternal ' state relations, it has only produced the very opposite result.

The pronouncements and actions of both Moscow and Peking suggest that both believe the rupture between them to have already occurred. At the same time, neither the Soviet nor the Chinese party is yet ready to assume responsibility for the break. This very pursuit of innocence serves to curb the inherent drive of events towards a final split. But, in anticipation of that eventuality, each side is also manoeuvring to keep its own forces in line and to recruit supporters from within the other camp or from among the undecided. This, in turn, has the reverse effect; it further accelerates the drive towards an open break, for it prompts the Soviets to undertake anti-Chinese statements and actions, and the Chinese to continue what the Soviets deem the unpardonable practice of

25 ' Whence the Differences—A Reply to Comrade Thorez and other Comrades ', *Jen-min Jih-pao*, 27 February 1963. See also the summary excerpts published in the *Daily Worker* (London), ' Chinese View on how the Differences Arose ', 28 February 1963.

26 This is the gist of some of the points contained in the 100,000 character article, ' More on the Differences between Comrade Togliatti and Us—Some Important Problems of Leninism in the Contemporary World ', published in *Hung-ch'i* in March 1963. The article was serialised in four parts in *Jen-min Jih-pao* and widely disseminated in translation through the New China News Agency.

27 See G. Boffa, ' Prime reazioni a Mosca ai nuovi attacchi cinesi ', *L'Unita*, 2 March 1963.

28 See *Jen-min Jih-pao*, 27 February 1963.

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'fractionalism'. If fear of being responsible for a split has preserved the façade of formal unity, the imperatives of preparing for a split reduce unity to a meaningless façade. It should require no special profundity to appreciate the precariousness of the present balance, nor any exceptional imagination to sense its susceptibility to being permanently overturned.

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ANTI-KOMINTERN

Walter Laqueur

A RECENT number of *Survey* reviewed what was loosely called the Western image of the Soviet Union. It could not possibly cover all aspects of so large a subject; one notable omission was a discussion of the 'Anti-Komintern', the chief Nazi agency set up to fight Bolshevism.* In retrospect there is no doubt that the Anti-Komintern helped Stalin far more than it harmed him. The fact that Hitler and Goebbels were the chief sponsors of anti-bolshevism automatically generated sympathy, or at least understanding, for the Soviet Union and the communist parties, especially in the years 1935–38, even though in 1939 it appeared that Soviet anti-fascism and Nazi anti-bolshevism did not constitute an insurmountable obstacle to temporary collaboration between the two regimes. No attempt has been made in the West or East since 1945 to analyse the Anti-Komintern and its place in Nazi policy; such an analysis, based on hitherto unpublished documents, shows that in this, as in so many other fields, the Nazis' professed aims and their real intentions were by no means always identical. Just as the Anti-Comintern pact was not primarily directed against the USSR—Japan, after all, never joined Germany in its war against the Soviet Union—the true aim of the Anti-Komintern was not to denounce the Soviet Union but to gain support in the West for Nazi policy. Fortunately for the historian, the Nazis in the Anti-Komintern were cynically frank in their correspondence and inter-office memos. If Rosenberg and a few other ideologists took their Russophobia seriously (see *Survey*, Nos. 44–45, pp. 104–13), those who launched and ran the Anti-Komintern had very different views.[1]

The clash between national-socialism and communism, one of the most fateful in recent European history, never produced a serious ideological confrontation. The few Nazis who had read Marx or Lenin were professional economists or philosophers, none of them high in the party hierarchy. The Nazi party itself was not an ideological movement in the traditional sense; whatever doctrines it proclaimed were believed to be self-evident, not a matter for reflection, investigation, or learned comment. It strenuously denied that Marxism was a *Weltanschauung*. Hitler

* This essay is an abridged version of a chapter from a forthcoming study of Russian-German relations in the twentieth century.

1 The following abbreviations are used with regard to hitherto unpublished sources about the Anti-Komintern: 'Amt Osten', these are the files of the Eastern department of the Foreign Political Office (APA) of the Nazi party headed by Rosenberg, 1933–41; EAP (Einheits-Akten-Plan), a section of the German documents held in the National Archives, Washington, D.C. They have been microfilmed as T 81/ series 11.

Taubert: This refers to a final report, written in January 1945 by the father of the Anti-Komintern, a high official in Dr Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda. The full title is *Querschnitt durch die Tætigkeit des Arbeitsgebiet Dr Taubert (Antibolschewismus) des RMVP bis zum 31 Dezember 1944*, and the original is kept in the YIVO Archives, New York.

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and Rosenberg had decided, once and forever, that communism was the revolt of the underlings; a racial, not an ideological movement. Ideological discussions with Marxists, they said, were not merely senseless and absurd but positively harmful; it would imply that national-socialists accepted the communists as more or less equal partners; that the communists had an ideology which deserved to be taken seriously; what was important was to analyse the true (racial) sources of communism. As a communist one could win an argument simply by proving that one's ideas conformed to those of Marx, Lenin, or Stalin. As a Nazi any connection with Marx or Marxism was a priori evil, for Marx had been born a Jew.

There was little mention of Marxism or Bolshevism in Nazi literature or speeches before they came to power in 1933.[2] When the terms were used it was with considerable flexibility; 'Marxism' more often than not stood for German Social-Democracy, and 'Bolshevism' could be applied to anything, from modern art to a conservative writer who happened to have incurred Nazi displeasure. Such anti-bolshevik or anti-Soviet propaganda as was produced at this time, and there was suprisingly little, was the work of the local Nazi propaganda machines in working-class regions like the Ruhr.[3] It was taken for granted that the middle classes—particularly the lower middle classes—were firmly anti-communist.

When the Nazis took over there were few people within the party with the necessary qualifications to direct anti-bolshevik propaganda. Rosenberg, his deputy Schickedanz, and Georg Leibbrandt (a Russian-German, like most of the Nazi Russian experts), the head of the Eastern department of the Nazi foreign political office, were busy with other tasks, such as supervising Nazi ideological training. They viewed with increasing distrust the activities of the various state and party agencies in the Russian field, and occasionally tried to sabotage their efforts. The latter replied in kind.

From the early days of the Nazi regime to its very end the various factions with a vested interest in Russia and bolshevism fought each other tooth and nail. Apart from the 'academic' *Ostforschung*, there were at least half a dozen different institutions with interests in research and propaganda in the Russian sphere. The foreign ministry and the army (Abwehr) had their own advisers and contact men. They also had far more money than the rest, which was a source of much envy. The SS and its security service, the SD, joined the field comparatively late, but soon made themselves felt. The propaganda ministry was the sponsor and controller of the Anti-Komintern, and, to make a complicated

[2] The only exceptions are a few pamphlets such as Karl Bartz, *Bolschewismus ueber uns* (Berlin, 1932), or Heinz Franke, *Der Schwindel des Bolschewismus* (Munich, 1931), or Hardefuss, *Was hat uns der Bolschewismus gekostet* (Munich, 1932), which dealt chiefly with German communism. See also list in Erich Unger, *Das Schrifttum des Nationalsozialismus, 1919–34* (Berlin, 1934).

[3] e.g. *Hier spricht Sowjet Russland* (Gaupropagandaleitung Essen, 1932).

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situation even more confused, Dr Goebbels decided that his anti-Soviet experts should be split into two groups. One was officially part of his ministry (Section II/4) under Eberhart Taubert; the other was ostensibly an autonomous organisation under Adolf Ehrt, called the 'Anti-Komintern'. In fact it was part of Dr Taubert's section.[4]

Dr Adolf Ehrt had been the secretary of a diffuse and inactive association of German anti-communist groups which came into existence in the early thirties. Yet another *Volksdeutscher* who had been born in Russia, his chief claim to distinction was a little book on the history of the Mennonites, a religious sect among the German settlers in Russia. His organisation had originally been sponsored by the press section of the German Protestant church, the Catholic Institute for Research into Bolshevism and Atheism, and the Russian Scientific Institute in Berlin. Later sponsors included the Catholic *Pro Deo* group, the Association of German Refugees from Russia, and the Nazi Institute for the study of the Jewish Question.[5] From the Nazi standpoint this list of sponsors was not very promising; church influence was too prominent; the Berlin Russian Institute was said to have been supported by Jews and freemasons. The collaboration of the churches was not undesirable in the early years, 'since they gave the publications of the Anti-Komintern an aura of respectability; later they were squeezed out', Taubert, the guiding spirit behind it, wrote ten years later.[6] Worst of all was the fact that Dr Ehrt was a lapsed Nazi. He had joined the party in 1932 but left it again shortly afterwards, because, he said, of pressure from the churches; he thought he would be able to fight more effectively for Nazi ideals from outside the party. This, at least, was his version, but his enemies were not slow to cite excerpts from his writings in 1932 in which he had bitterly attacked some aspects of Nazism, particularly Rosenberg's doctrine and the anti-Christian trend in the Hitler movement. Rosenberg's men were quick to seize the opportunity of attacking Ehrt and what they considered the shortcomings of the propaganda ministry. Dr Goebbels retaliated by forbidding his staff to have any communication with Leibbrandt, head of the Eastern section in Rosenberg's office.[7] At times it seemed as if the enemy of which all the Nazi agencies wrote and talked was not in Moscow, but in the rival government or party office. Indeed,

[4] See Goebbels' announcement of 10 January 1936, designated a state secret, that for the purpose of covering up ('*zum Zwecke der Tarnung*') the Anti-Komintern was to appear in public as an independent organisation. Amt Osten: T 81, roll 14.

[5] Among its publications were *Bewaffneter Aufstand* (1933) which provoked a Soviet diplomatic protest, since it contained details about Soviet help to an alleged communist-planned take-over in Germany. Other books include Ehrt and Schweickerts, *Entfesselung der Unterwelt*, dealing mainly with communist front organisations, Dr Cramer's (one of Ehrt's pen names) *Notbuch der russischen Christenheit*, and Professor Iljin's *Welt vor dem Abgrund*, a symposium by members of the Russian Scientific Institute in Berlin. This institute was subsequently closed by the Gestapo and Professor Iljin settled in Paris.

[6] Cf. Taubert, p. 9.

[7] The order was revoked in January 1936. Amt Osten, Leibbrandt to Rosenberg 27/1/1937. T 81/11.

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the only common interest Goebbels and Rosenberg had at that time was a purge of German *Ostforschung* from all nefarious Marxist, liberal, Jewish, and masonic influences; this was begun in 1935.

IN Germany, Professor Otto Hoetzsch and East European studies were more or less synonymous in the public mind, for the editor of *Osteuropa*—the journal of the German Society for the study of Eastern Europe—was by far the most active and influential of German experts on the USSR. Unlike most professors, he combined academic teaching with a political career, journalism, and much public speaking. As a pro-Russian conservative he had little sympathy for Hitler's movement and none at all for the anti-Russian ideology of the Nazis. Klaus Mehnert, his assistant, who had made a name for himself with a well-received book on the younger generation in Russia, was at that time a sympathiser of Otto Strasser's 'Black Front'. Members of the Society, and contributors to its journal, included Jews, and what the Nazis loosely called liberals. Yet Professor Hoetzsch, like most German intellectuals, found in 1933 that there was no point in actively resisting 'the national revival', as he called it in one of his writings.[8] The Jewish and liberal collaborators were gradually dropped, but otherwise the character of the Society and the journal changed little after January 1933. Hoetzsch and his colleagues made ritual obeisance to the new regime, observing that in the new Reich German Eastern policy would be of even greater importance than before. But they were not to escape so lightly. Their activities had long been an irritant to the Nazis in charge of anti-bolshevik propaganda, who felt that the time was now ripe for getting rid of these 'crypto-communists' permanently. The attack was launched on various levels. A junior employee of the Anti-Komintern denounced the Society to the Gestapo as a hotbed of pro-bolshevik activity.[9] At the same time Dr Greife, Ehrt's assistant, protested in a letter to the Dean of Berlin University against the fact that a Jew of Polish origin called Heller had, under the aegis of Professor Hoetzsch, written a dissertation on the fate of the Jews in the Soviet Union. This, thought Dr Greife, was an outrage: What was a Jew doing in a German university in this year of grace 1935? And why was he allowed to produce anti-Nazi propaganda? For his thesis, that the condition of the Jews in Russia was unenviable, was in direct contradiction to the Nazi thesis that Russia was a Jewish state. The Dean apologised to the young Nazi activist and told him that he had refrained from conferring a doctorate on Mr Heller. But the damage had been done, and Professor Hoetzsch had to resign soon afterwards both from the University and the Osteuropa Association. He was also ousted from the journal. Mehnert had earlier retreated to Moscow, where he was working as a correspondent for various German newspapers. His reports from the Soviet capital were, however, considered too friendly;

[8] *Osteuropa und Deutscher Osten*, 1934.
[9] Letter dated 1 October 1935 in Amt Osten: T 81/11, roll 14.

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had not *Bolshevik* once quoted him as an admirer of Soviet achievements? [10] In the correspondence of the Anti-Komintern he figured as 'the notorious communist Mehnert'. (Dr Mehnert eventually went to the United States, and later to Honolulu and Shanghai; his subsequent activities are outside the scope of the present article.)

The chief culprits among the old *Ostforscher* had been dispatched by means of backroom intrigues and administrative measures. It only remained to discredit them morally and ideologically. Dr Greife volunteered for this task, too, with the backing of the Nazi party and the police. The result was a short book published in 1936,[11] in which he surveyed the field of Soviet studies in Germany, and reached the sad conclusion that in almost all German universities the liberal tradition still persisted; Marxism was studied as an economic doctrine and Bolshevism as a social experiment, the only exception being the 'anti-Marxist' seminary at the *Hochschule für Politik*. Greife reiterated stock Nazi statements about Russia and communism, and ridiculed those experts who welcomed the Soviet retreat from communism. The methods of Soviet rule might change, he wrote, but it remained the rule of an alien race. A liberal expert who did not realise the importance of race theory, for whom the Jewish race did not exist, was a figure of fun; a Don Quixote tilting against windmills, unable to recognise the real enemy. German Soviet studies were the legitimate offspring of Weimar. Their exponents were almost all liberals; some were Marxists; the Jewish question was taboo for them. But they were not complete innocents; a man like Hoetzsch had known all about the bolshevik menace and the Comintern threat and played them down. Had he not written that Soviet achievements did not threaten Germany? But Hoetzsch was not the only culprit. There were others who had done much harm; the 'German Stalinists' for instance. These had been greatly impressed by the swing to militarist discipline in the Soviet Union; they welcomed centralised economic planning and saw in it the Russian version of the Nazi *Fuehrerprinzip*. These misguided souls failed to realise that the brutal dictatorship of an alien race could never be equated with a sacred German principle. Some of them had even suggested that the patriotic fever in Russia was inspired by the Nazi Revolution in Germany, which of course was blasphemy.[12]

Nor did Greife approve of the theologians among the experts (such as Berdiaev, Waldemar Gurian, Fedor Stepun), who, for all their hostility to atheistic bolshevism, still refused to accept the Nazi creed. There was a real danger that the enemies of Nazism would use the work of these

[10] Loc. cit. letter dated 14 June 1935: this refers apparently to an article by Mehnert in the *Muenchner Neuste Nachrichten*, No. 173, 1935, and an article in *Bolshevik*, 15 March 1935.

[11] Dr Hermann Greife, *Sowjetforschung* (Berlin, 1936). Cf. also his and Ehrt's articles in *Das Volk*, April 1936, March 1937, passim. This politico-literary monthly, which was not of a specialised character, found very few people interested in its message; its circulation was about 3,000, most of which were given away. Yet it could speak with authority because of its influential backers.

[12] Ibid. pp. 37–8, 42, 54–7.

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'Soviet experts' to attack Hitler's Germany. The only valuable and realistic works on bolshevism and the Soviet Union had been produced by convinced Nazis. They, and only they, saw the world as it really was; only they had a real grasp of political factors; they were interested not in the economic, but in the racial structure of the Soviet regime. Who were these national-socialist experts who had—as another contemporary writer put it—not only defeated the liberals ideologically, but also produced better scientific work? [13] The list was very short; it included Ehrt's pamphlets, Hermann Fehst's *Jews in the Soviet Union*, and the work of 'K. Michael', who wrote on economic topics (the pen-name concealed a Georgian emigré named Akhmeteli). No wonder Greife reached the conclusion that the state of German *Ostforschung* after the national revolution of 1933 remained unsatisfactory.

The young Nazi expert was not alone in his anxiety. Himmler, together with the Gestapo intellectuals, was also concerned about the dangerous currents in certain German intellectual circles. There was Ernst Niekisch, preaching a synthesis of Potsdam and Moscow, who maintained that the Prussian state only came into being as the result of the mixture of German and Slavic blood.[14] Other misguided souls had found many similarities between German and Russian agrarian communism, regarded the Elbe as Germany's real frontier, and wanted to get rid of Western and Southern Germany as unnecessary encumbrances, and strongholds of alien influences.[15]

It was not until 1938 that the purge was completed. Part of the Breslau East European Institute had been transferred to the SD, which had established its own research institution near Berlin, the Wannsee Institut. This was headed by Akhmeteli, alias K. Michael. A new generation of experts had emerged; the Seraphims, von Mendes, and Maurachs, who were more at home in the new climate. The *Osteuropa* publishing house brought out a symposium on Russia, edited by Bolko von Richthofen, a fanatical anti-Semite, which compared not unfavourably with *Der Stuermer*.[16] The leading newspaper of the Nazi party announced that *Osteuropa* was compulsory reading for everybody interested in East European affairs.

Peace, however, still did not reign among the various institutions and agencies dealing with Russian affairs. *Osteuropa*, even under its new editorship, remained incomparably more detached and objective than the publications issued by the underlings of Goebbels and Rosenberg,

[13] W. von Kielpinski, 'Deutsche Wissenschaft und Sowjet Union', in *Volk im Werden*, February 1937, p. 77 ff.

[14] The genetic ties between the Prussian spirit and bolshevism was not, as commonly believed, a discovery of Niekisch. The first to comment about it in some detail was Otto Bauer in his *Bolschewismus und Sozialdemokratie* (1920).

[15] These and other deviationists are discussed in an internal document published in June 1935, *Der Reichsfuehrer S.S. Sonderbericht. Zersetzung der nationalsozialistischen Grundwerte im deutschsprachigen Schrifttum seit 1933*. One of the few existing copies is in the Wiener Library, London.

[16] Bolko von Richthofen: 'Bolschewistische Wissenschaft und Judentum' in B. von Richthofen (ed.) *Bolschewistische Wissenschaft und Kulturpolitik* (Koenigsberg, 1938).

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who continued to attack each other in their inter-office memos as 'communist stooges'.[17] The so-called 'liberals and freemasons' of the German Foreign Ministry, and the 'reactionaries' of the Reichswehr, such as Tippelskirch, still continued their activities, and professors of the old school, such as Laubert in Breslau, sabotaged the efforts of the new experts. Dr Taubert, writing a few months before the Nazi defeat, recalled that it had been very easy to get rid of Professor Hoetzsch, but that other 'pro-Russian elements' proved harder nuts to crack. Among these he mentions Colonel Niedermayer, who had influential supporters in Rudolf Hess and Blomberg, the Minister of War.[18]

THE Anti-Komintern idea played an important role in Nazi foreign propaganda, yet the organisation behind its activities was weak. Not one leading figure in the Nazi regime showed particular interest in its activities. The official head of the Anti-Komintern, Dr Adolf Ehrt, certainly did not pull much weight in the Third Reich, nor indeed in his own office; real power was in the hands of Dr Taubert. Ehrt was assisted by a number of young specialists, such as Rudolf Kommoss and Karl Baumboeck (in charge of press affairs), Bockhoff (legal affairs), Karl August Stuckenberg (colonial affairs). His office produced a periodical (*Contra-Komintern*) and a great many books, chiefly in its own publishing house, the Nibelungen Verlag. It arranged study circles, exhibitions, film shows, and even international anti-communist conferences. Some of its pamphlets were circulated in millions of copies. Yet all this was merely the visible fraction of the iceberg; the submerged, but incomparably more important, section was located in Goebbels' propaganda ministry.

Goebbels' closest collaborators, Haegert and Taubert, had envisaged the establishment of an Anti-Komintern even before the Nazis came to power. In October 1932, we learn from an internal report:

> a proposal was brought forward to unite the anti-communist associations under the leadership of the NSDAP. The necessity to replenish the party treasury, which had become much depleted, played a certain part in this context (*wobei die Ueberlegung mitspielte die arg zusammengeschmolzenen Kampffonds der Partei aufzufuellen*).[19]

It could hardly have been put more plainly. Nothing came of the plan at the time, but Taubert took it up again after Hitler came to power. In the autumn of 1933 an organisation called the Anti-Komintern was officially registered, the idea of its sponsors being that neither the state nor the Nazi party could, for diplomatic reasons, take an open stand against the Soviet Union. A similar dilemma had been solved in Moscow by disclaiming any responsibility for the Comintern; why should the Nazis

[17] Undated, unsigned memo, found in Amt Osten files, T 81/11, roll 14.
[18] Taubert, p. 8. On Niedermayer's activities in the twenties, see F. Carsten, 'The Reichswehr and the Red Army', *Survey*, October 1962.
[19] Taubert, p. 8.

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not play the same game, and set up an 'independent', semi-private organisation for which they could disclaim all responsibility? Dr Taubert, writing more than ten years later, was satisfied with his own creation; its very name seemed well chosen, because it could be easily remembered.

The functions of the Anti-Komintern were never clearly defined; was it to influence public opinion in Germany, or to act mainly as a clearing-house for governments and police departments in various European countries? Even in Rosenberg's office it was for a time believed that no German agents were involved in the Anti-Komintern.[20] According to its secretary, the Anti-Komintern had 'only *one* assignment; the struggle against Judaeo-Bolshevism'.[21] Yet its real aim was to win friends and support for Nazi Germany. When Ribbentrop met the secretary of the Anti-Komintern for the first time his only thought was: Your activity against the Comintern will make us many friends abroad. He was not interested, as Dr Ehrt notes, in the content of its propaganda; he did not even believe Anti-Komintern propaganda about starvation in the Soviet Union. Ribbentrop had never specialised in Russian or communist affairs. But even the experts from Amt Osten seemed to regard the Anti-Komintern's pro-Nazi propaganda as of even greater importance than its avowed aim: 'through anti-communist propaganda the interests of national-socialist Germany should be promoted, the Nazi revolution and the measures against the Jews be justified'.

In the middle and late thirties Stalin's Russia itself, with its purges and trials, supplied the most effective anti-bolshevik propaganda. Many people outside Germany realised this, but very few were willing to join an organisation sponsored by the Nazis. Nazism, not to mention its many other abhorred features, believed in the superiority of the German race, and with this basic belief in racial exclusiveness and the inferiority of all other peoples, no genuine international cooperation was possible.

The Anti-Komintern sought its contacts primarily in right-wing and clerical circles in the Western world. But clergymen in France and other countries, however anti-communist, looked with disfavour on the anti-Catholic measures taken by the Nazis. The Anti-Komintern had a fairly sizeable office in Holland supplying the provincial press with material; it had contacts (according to its own reports) with some officers of the Swedish General Staff and some obscure organisations in Greece and Belgium.[22] According to the same reports, the Anti-Komintern provided material for speeches by Prime Ministers de Valera of Eire, Tsaldaris of

20 Leibbrandt to Rosenberg, 2 October 1934, 10 October 1934. Amt Osten T 81/11, roll 14 (which means that Dr Goebbels fooled even his colleagues).

21 *Das Volk*, September 1936, p. 258.

22 Some of the internal monthly reports of activities have been preserved in T 81/11, 14. These records are, however, rather vague. 'Contact has been established with X in Poland' means more often than not that X was sent some magazine. If, for instance, a visit by Mr William Shirer to the Anti-Komintern office is recorded, this means, indubitably, that Shirer, a good journalist, wanted to find out about its activities, not that he sympathised with it. . . . Some of the foreign contacts of the Anti-Komintern were apparently British intelligence agents.

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Greece, Motta of Switzerland, and Bennett of Canada, while the Archbishop of Athens ' was contacted through his niece Mrs Karaiskalis ', for whatever that was worth. Some of this was idle boasting, other claims may be true. On the whole, the activities of the Anti-Komintern on the international scene were thoroughly inept, in striking contrast to the extravagant claims of its sponsors. If the Comintern brought together erstwhile professional revolutionaries turned bureaucrat, the Anti-Komintern convened motley assemblies of retired Austrian colonels, Polish priests, and Japanese counter-spies, who, whatever their other qualities, had an exceedingly limited political intelligence and were quite incapable of understanding bolshevism, let alone of combating it. These men were clearly quite unprepared for an ideological confrontation with communism: all they could do was to adopt resolutions about the necessity of stamping it out by force.[23] As the Gestapo engaged in these activities, their assistance was in any case hardly needed.

The attempt to find a common ideological denominator for the Anti-Komintern, however vague, ended in failure. Ehrt, and behind him Taubert, tried their best by giving anti-Semitic slogans pride of place and equating bolshevism with world Jewry. This, however, was no great help as far as Germany's two main partners in the Anti-Comintern pact were concerned, Italy and Japan, where the Jewish problem was of no importance at all. Nor did anti-Semitic propaganda have any relevance in Spain, the focus of the battle between ' bolshevism ' and ' fascism ' in the middle thirties. Nor was the Jewish issue of any significance in connection with the advance of communism in colonial countries. Asia in particular was a trial to the Anti-Komintern, which in its publications had frequently denounced ' Asian Bolshevism '; after the pact with Japan all this had to be changed.

Confusion reigned not only on ideological issues; there was general organisational muddle as well. The whole Anti-Komintern had been founded as a provisional body, a preparatory committee for a first world congress that was to establish a real world organisation.[24] A world conference was never held. The Anti-Komintern had a Scandinavian secretary-general, Niels von Bahr (who had replaced Ehrt), yet secretly it was manipulated as a German government office (as Dr Taubert put it in his charming bureaucratic language: '*im geheimen aber als deutsche Dienststelle gesteuert wurde*'). The Nazi leaders did not think very highly of Anti-Komintern activities, and were unwilling to invest large sums of money in the venture. It had to make do with a very small staff and never had sufficient technical means at its disposal; it needed, for instance, a big radio station to compete with the foreign broadcasts

23 See, for instance, the protocol ' strictly confidential ' of the ' Erste Vertrauliche Internationale Antikommunistische Konferenz in Feldafing bei Muenchen, 4–10 November 1936 '.

24 *Contra-Komintern* announced for three years in its sub-title that it was the organ of the preparatory committee for the Anti-Communist World Conference. This sub-title was dropped only in August 1939, but August 1939 was the last issue of the *Contra-Komintern*.

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from Radio Moscow, yet was quite unsuccessful in its attempts to set up a radio station of its own.[25]

SO much for the overt activities of Anti-Komintern. The more important initiatives came from the submerged part of the organisation at the Propaganda ministry. Russia and the Comintern were simply used as a bogy by these wire-pullers in Goebbels' ministry to enlist sympathy for the Third Reich, to extort concessions to Nazi foreign policy, and ultimately as a means to gain supremacy in Europe. These aims were stressed time and again with refreshing if cynical frankness.

The first great propaganda drive concerned the effects of collectivisation in the Volga German region, and the decision of the Soviet government to export grain despite the famine. The facts were basically correct, and an international relief campaign for the starving met with much sympathy. It was not realised at the time that the Nazis were wholly indifferent to the fate of the Germans in Russia; they used the campaign to break down the 'Chinese Wall' between Nazi Germany and Western public opinion: so far, they admitted, Nazi propaganda had been rejected by the world press—now there was a chance of a breakthrough:

> With the help of the charitable relief action, in which the churchmen of two confessions let themselves be used as marionettes by our propaganda, this Chinese Wall was breached. A particularly gifted agent, who worked for us, Ewald Amende, secretary-general of the Congress of European Nationalists, succeeded in persuading the Archbishop of Canterbury that the situation [in Russia] was indeed as painted by the 'Brüder in Not' committee . . . The Archbishop of Canterbury later realised whose work he had done, and declared sadly that he had been used as a fig-leaf by the Nazi propaganda ministry.[26]

The sponsors of the Anti-Komintern were ambitious men. Taubert thought it could be used to give Germany the leadership of a powerful band of forces embracing the whole world ('*die Fuehrung einer gewaltigen Weltumspannenden Kraeftegruppe gewinnen*') (p. 7), and offered the Nazis a moral formula to embellish power politics ('*eine moralische Formel zur Verbraemung des machtpolitischen Zusammengehens*') (p. 11). To that end it intervened in all major crises of the thirties with a varying degree of success. It tried to assist Germany to regain the Saar through its agents in Switzerland and the help of the local clergy, and by denouncing France as the ally of atheistic Russia. The ease with which the religious dignitaries were taken in caused great hilarity in Dr Goebbels' office:

[25] On lack of means, see Leibbrandt to Rosenberg, 28 September 1935. Amt Osten, APA, T 81/11, flash 1, folder 4.

[26] Taubert, pp. 5–6. Amende, like Rosenberg and Schickedanz a native of Reval (Talinn), was the author of *Muss Russland hungern?* He died on a trip to the Far East in 1935.

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> It was one of the unforgettable anecdotes of the Anti-Komintern that even the little priests in Saarbruecken never suspected for whom they were working.[27]

When Germany reoccupied the Rhineland in 1936 the Anti-Komintern provided some of the ideological justification, as it had done during the visit of Lord Simon and Anthony Eden to Berlin the previous year. On that occasion, Taubert reports, Hitler used anti-bolshevik arguments to stress the need for German rearmament, but Mr Eden was not taken in (p. 17). Whereupon it was decided to put even more stress in future on emphasising the Soviet military danger.

The Anti-Komintern took an interest in Spain: 'Dr Taubert was the first to intervene in Spain. A very clever agent was sent to Franco via Portugal, and served as Franco's first propaganda adviser' (p. 18). Franco was advised to use the anti-bolshevik card in his fight against the Republicans. In 1938, the Anti-Komintern devised the label 'The aircraft carrier of bolshevism in Central Europe' to describe Czechoslovakia during the crisis (p. 19).

Dr Taubert claims that German foreign policy in the mid-thirties was not made by the foreign ministry but by the propaganda ministry or, to be precise, by the Anti-Komintern. Hitler, according to this version, took from Dr Taubert the idea of making anti-bolshevism the central issue at the Nuremberg rally in 1935. The decisive impulse in the direction of German foreign policy ('*entscheidende Richtgebung der deutschen Politik*') came from the propaganda ministry, not the foreign ministry (p. 13). It is indeed true that Hitler decided in 1935 to adopt a sharp anti-Russian line, and it has been established that the Anti-Komintern supplied the material for some of the key speeches in Nuremberg. Yet to look for a causal link between Dr Taubert's brilliant ideas and Hitler's political decision is very far-fetched; Hitler was not in need of any prompting or persuasion; he had realised years before that he would have to play the anti-bolshevik trump card during the dangerous years, when German rearmament was still in progress and the danger still existed of a preventive war by France.[28]

TO return to the more prosaic activities of the overt branch of the Anti-Komintern: for domestic consumption it published a number of books on communism and the Soviet Union, prominent among them the recollections of German and other communists. Maria Reese, a former communist Reichstag deputy and a friend of Clara Zetkin, returned to Germany after the Saar plebiscite, and in a comparatively moderate report related that she had been disappointed by what she saw in the

[27] '*Es hat immer zu den unvergesslichen Anekdoten der Anti Komintern gehoert, dass die Saarbrueckener Pfaefflein nie geahnt haben wessen Geschaefte sie besorgt haben.*' Taubert, p. 16.

[28] Hitler admitted this to Lueddecke in so many words.

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emigration.[29] A more violent affair was Kajetan Klug's report on the Soviet labour camps. The author, a left-wing Austrian socialist, had fled to Russia after the suppression of his party in Vienna in 1934. The most substantial and influential work of this kind was Karl Albrecht's *Der Verratene Sozialismus*, which went through many editions. The author, who had been a deputy people's commissar, left Russia in the middle thirties and after a short, and apparently painless, sojourn in a German prison, began to work for the Anti-Komintern. Another series put out by the Nibelungen publishing house presented the recollections of Russians who had left the Soviet Union at various dates, some of them quite recently. Among them were Unishevski and Kravets, both pilots; Butenko, the former Soviet ambassador to Rumania; Nikolaiev, who reported on the condition of the peasants in the Soviet Union, and Goryanova, who told the life story of a Russian engineer.[30] These books differed greatly in quality. Some had obviously been concocted or rewritten in the Anti-Komintern offices and were full of lies or exaggerations, or simply horror stories. Others, such as Maria Reese's book, had the ring of truth. Some of these books and pamphlets were distributed in hundreds of thousands of copies,[31] but their propaganda impact was apparently limited; the narratives were usually repetitive and boring. Having read one, hardly anyone wanted to repeat the experience. Moreover, they said no more than could be found in the daily newspapers; there was no attempt to analyse or understand communist and bolshevik policy on a more sophisticated level. The few attempts that were made in this direction by Dr Ehrt and his associates were pitiable.[32] The most interesting publications of the Anti-Komintern were translations from foreign languages, such as Sir Samuel Hoare's *The Fourth Seal*.[33]

The journal *Contra-Komintern* was badly edited, attracted few readers, and made no political impact whatsoever. Occasionally it spread confusion by presenting a version of some specific event which differed from that given in other Nazi journals. If the *Weltdienst*, for instance, asserted that the March revolution of 1917 had been organised and carried out by the freemason, Sir George Buchanan (the British ambassador in St. Petersburg), *Contra-Komintern* had nothing but praise for

[29] *Abrechnung mit Moskau* (Berlin, 1938). Mrs. Reese also collaborated with Ernst Torgler, who had been a leading German communist and one of the main defendants in the Reichstag fire trial, in yet another book on German communism and the Comintern. Hitler decided against immediate publication 'until the old wounds are healed' (Taubert, p. 20). Only two copies of the manuscript existed and they may have been destroyed in 1945.

[30] *Die groesste Sklaverei der Weltgeschichte, Wettlauf mit der GPU, Fuenf Jahre Sowjet Flieger, Bauern unter Hammer und Sichel, Russische Passion.*

[31] For instance Laubenheimer's *UDSSR* (*Und Du Siehst die Sowjets Richtig*), one of Greife's pamphlets on forced labour in the USSR, had a circulation of 1·5 million; most of this literature was not sold but given away.

[32] For instance Bockhoff's *Voelkerrecht gegen Bolschewismus* (1938), or Greife's *Die Klassenkampfpolitik der Sowjetregierung* (1936).

[33] Dr Taubert hailed it as a great triumph that Sir Samuel Hoare gave permission for a German translation to the Anti-Komintern.

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Sir George, and published articles written by his daughter, complete with a photograph.

From the Nazi point of view the activities of the Anti-Komintern were not a conspicuous success, and at many points it overlapped with other government and party agencies. Yet bureaucratic institutions, once established, have remarkable staying power, and but for the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 the flow of publications would probably have continued without interruption. But in view of the rapprochement with Moscow, the Nibelungen output dwindled after 1938 and was discontinued altogether in August 1939. When war broke out, the Anti-Komintern was clearly considered non-essential. Its personnel were dismissed, and even some of its leading officials had to join the army.[34] The situation changed in the Spring of 1941, when the propaganda preliminaries for the attack on the Soviet Union were started. After the invasion the Anti-Komintern brought out a *Red Book* [35] and a few other publications. But after 22 June 1941 anti-Soviet propaganda became the main Nazi theme; its planning and execution could no longer be left to a mere sub-department of the propaganda ministry.

WHEN the Anti-Komintern was closed down in September 1939, all German anti-Soviet propaganda ceased. The general press had already received a directive from Goebbels in late May 1939, banning polemics against the Soviet Union; on 24 June a second, even more emphatic, directive followed: 'The Soviet Union is in no circumstances to be attacked.' [36] A few days later comment on world bolshevism was also forbidden. The periodical of the Anti-Komintern was apparently the only exception, perhaps on the assumption that hardly anyone was reading it anyway. On 26 August instructions came that the re-establishment of German-Soviet friendship was to be emphasised. The word 'Russia' could be used when referring to the Soviet Union. And above all: 'The approach should be warm and sympathetic.' [37] German

[34] Leibbrandt to Rosenberg, No. 1, 1939—Amt Osten, T 81/11, flash 2, folder 6.
The subsequent fate of some of the major dramatis personae should be noted briefly: Ehrt, who had been the nominal head of the Anti-Komintern, disappeared from the political scene in the late thirties. Dr Taubert, who was the guiding spirit behind it, remained with Dr Goebbels up to the very end. In the middle fifties he reappeared as the deputy head of a self-styled anti-communist organisation in West Germany, but had to resign when his past caught up with him. In Soviet publications, including even novels, he is frequently mentioned as one of the most influential men in West German and NATO politics. If the Russians should indeed take Dr Taubert seriously, this throws an interesting light on the critical faculties of his antagonists in Moscow. Dr Leibbrandt, who was in charge of the corresponding department in Rosenberg's office, fell a victim to an SS intrigue in June 1943, and spent the latter part of the war in the German navy. He was charged as a war criminal in 1950, but the charges against him were dismissed by a German court; after a few difficult years he found employment as a representative of a major industrial firm in Bonn. Judging the situation more realistically than Dr Taubert, he found the post-war climate uncongenial to a political career.

[35] *Warum Krieg mit Stalin? Das Rotbuch der Anti Komintern* (Berlin, 1941).

[36] *Zeitschriftendienst*, 30 May, 24 June 1939.

[37] Ibid. 26 August 1939.

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political commentators did their best. The SS weekly reminded its readers that Russia had twice in her history saved Prussia; in 1762, and again in 1812. The Tsarist Empire had been rotten through and through, whereas the Soviet Union was incomparably stronger, based on very different principles. If this was the approach of the *Schwarze Korps*, no wonder that the less orthodox Nazi writers were even warmer and more sympathetic in the tenor of their comments. No wonder, too, that the experts of Rosenberg's Eastern office were greatly disturbed about what they considered 'indecent deviations' and 'a general confusion of the German press'. 'Should we give up all our anti-Moscow armoury?', one of them asked plaintively.[38] Until then they had competed with the Anti-Komintern on a modest scale, publishing books and booklets, and financing and directing the Berlin Russian language newspaper *Novoe Slovo*, under an editor with the unlikely name of Despotuli. As late as early August they had sent to the party publishing house in Munich a manuscript written by a Mr Roedel and entitled *Eastern Ideology and Bolshevism*. It was intended as a crushing blow to those misguided Germans who had advocated a Russian-German alliance. The book could not have come at a worse moment, for the Fuehrer had decided months before in favour of just such an alliance. The Amt Osten was thoroughly inept at interpreting the international situation. It should have seen the writing on the wall nine months before, when it had prepared a series of anti-bolshevik talks for the German broadcasting service. At the very last moment, after all the manuscripts were ready, Dr Taubert stepped in and announced that Hitler himself had given an order that all anti-bolshevik propaganda was to be discontinued in order 'not to weaken the effect of the anti-Jewish propaganda'.[39] However much they disliked it, the experts from Amt Osten had to discontinue their publications in August 1939, and to be content with internal memos about the activities of the Comintern—not very numerous or important at that time. All the good work done in the years before 1938 seemed to have been in vain. In June 1940 Franz Eher, working in the Nazi central publishing house, enquired whether the unsold copies of the various anti-bolshevik books and pamphlets could be destroyed. After some hesitation Rosenberg refused to give permission[40]; he hoped that one day there would be a fresh demand for this literature.

WHAT were the ideological innovations of the Anti-Komintern and Nazi *Ostforschung*? Some of these writers saw as their main task the popularisation of Alfred Rosenberg's theories about the origins of

[38] Duerksen to Rosenberg, 2 September 1939. Amt Osten T 81/11.

[39] 13 December 1938. Leibbrandt to Rosenberg, Amt Osten T 81/16. If Dr Taubert's announcement was true, it throws fresh light on Hitler's foreign policy, for in this case Hitler must have envisaged a reconciliation with Stalin as early as December 1938, not only in April or May 1939 as most historians are inclined to believe. Yet it is by no means certain that Hitler really had given such an order; the propaganda ministry was probably just waiting for a pretext to sabotage the activities of Rosenberg's office.

[40] Amt Osten 1 July 1940; T 81/11, 16.

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bolshevism, Russian history, and similar topics. Others published articles and books in which they demonstrated that the new 'national wave' in the Soviet Union, which began in the middle thirties, was a mere tactical manoeuvre without deeper significance. Lastly, a series of books and articles attempted to demonstrate that, broadly speaking, all bolsheviks were Jews, and all Jews were bolsheviks.

The popularisation of Rosenberg's view was, naturally, the preserve of his own office, the Amt Osten of the Nazi party foreign political office. Leibbrandt argued that the ideas of liberalism, humanism, and democracy had emerged from the Mediterranean *Voelkerchaos*. This in its turn had given birth to parasitic 'Near-Eastern Marxism'. Much of it was the fault of the Russian character; Byzantium had left a tradition of slave morality in which there was no place for such things as honour, heroism, or liberty. Dostoevsky's heroes were all criminals and idiots—certainly this was not pure coincidence. The Russians lived in perpetual discord; plagued by discontent and self-torment. Russia, in brief, was an Asian monster with a thin outer skin of European varnish (as Napoleon and Pilsudski had claimed before). It was a 'frozen corpse which would stink horribly once it began to thaw'.[41]

These trite views were presented in pseudo-scientific language as an exercise in the history of cultural traditions and ideas. Occasionally Leibbrandt stepped down from these (comparatively) rarefied heights of quasi-philosophical discussion and engaged in the fabrication of crude forgeries: if Rosenberg, his master, had commented on the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion', the disciple wrote about the 'Protocols of the Poale Zion',[42] describing in lurid language the alleged convention of a left-wing socialist group in the Ukraine in March 1919 as yet another conspiracy for world conquest. In so far as they referred to verifiable historical facts, Leibbrandt's writings were replete with elementary errors[43]; he was clearly ill-equipped for the task he had set himself, which demanded at least a basic knowledge of communism and Russian history. Some of the authors of the series of pamphlets he published did have this factual knowledge,[44] but on the whole it made a very slight impact; the demand for this kind of literature was limited, and publishers had difficulties in selling even small editions.

Other Nazi institutions had their doubts about Rosenberg's philosophy of history; it was not openly attacked until much later, but was on the whole ignored. Goebbels' lieutenants argued, probably correctly, that very few people had any interest at all in amateurish comments on the Russian 'racial soul', while many were interested in what was actually

41 Gottlieb Leibbrandt: *Bolschewismus und Abendland* (Berlin, 1939), pp. 40, 93. See also the same writer's 'Die rassisch-voelkische Bedingtheit der bolschewistischen Revolution' in *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte*, November 1937, p. 1021.

42 'Die Protokolle der Poale Zion' in *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte*, November 1938, p. 1006.

43 For instance, Marx's year of birth is given as 1788.

44 For instance: Otto Keil (i.e. Otto Schiller), *Der Bauer in der Sowjet Union*, or Paul Schmitz-Kairo, *Moskau und die islamische Welt*.

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happening in the Soviet Union. Many outside observers were surprised by the patriotic fervour of Soviet policy in the middle thirties—by the rehabilitation of so many national heroes of the past, the restoration of 'Homeland' and 'Soviet people' as central values in Soviet life; by the reforms in education and family legislation, and last but not least, by the reintroduction in the army of the traditional ranks. Some German writers argued that the Russian element was again prevailing in the Soviet Union; that life was stronger than impractical theories; that Stalin was a *Russian* revolutionary and patriot who had no desire for world revolution, and that, generally speaking, what happened in the Soviet Union had little in common with the theories of Karl Marx.[45] Others even thought to discern important parallels between recent developments in Russia and Germany; had not the *Fuehrerprinzip* prevailed in both countries?

The backroom boys of the Anti-Komintern were set to work to counter these dangerous interpretations: 'We reject most emphatically any attempt to draw parallels between Bolshevism and National-Socialism.'[46] The only purpose of the new Soviet patriotism was to enlist the peoples of the Soviet Union in the cause of world revolution by misuse of national, patriotic feelings. It was a change, of course, carried out with typically Jewish lack of scruple. The evolution of bolshevism towards a national state was impossible for the simple reason that Russia was a Jewish state and a Jew could not evolve into an Aryan.[47]

If Nazism made any original contribution to this field of study, it was the identification of world Jewry and bolshevism; a dogma it repeated time and again on every level of sophistication from the quasi-scientific to the most vulgar. From the factual angle it was an uphill struggle; true, a fairly large percentage of the early bolshevik leaders had been Jewish by origin. But what the Nazis chose to ignore was the inconvenient fact that these Jewish bolsheviks had turned against their own religion and people and wanted nothing to do with them; and that the percentage of Jews in anti-bolshevik political parties—such as the Mensheviks—was even higher. They also ignored the fact that even within the bolshevik party leadership the participation of Jews had begun to decrease in the middle twenties, and had become quite insignificant after the big purges of the late thirties; Kaganovich was in fact the only communist of Jewish origin left in the supreme party leadership.[48]

All this had to be ignored by the Nazi writers in their endeavours to show that 'Soviet Judaea' was still the bulwark of the Elders of Zion. To prove that point a whole literature came into being; books that

45 *Wille zum Reich*, February 1935; *Fridericus*, February 1934.

46 Hermann Greife, *Ist die Entwicklung der Sowjet Union zum nationalen Staat moeglich?* (Berlin, 1939).

47 Greife, loc. cit., pp. 25, 32, 36–8.

48 Another favourite Nazi thesis was the argument that Zionism and Bolshevism were one and the same thing. In fact, Zionism was persecuted as a counter-revolutionary movement in the Soviet Union.

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consisted mainly of long lists of names and photographs which purported to show that all those listed were Jews.[49] An enormous amount of energy was invested, though it was not always clear to what purpose; for even if it was shown that a certain typist at the TASS office in Moscow was a Jew, what did this prove? Much of course was outright forgery. Fehst, lecturer at the German Academy of Politics, maintained that Lenin was of Jewish origin (his grandfather Blank having been a baptised Jew), so were Krasin and Kollontai (who came from old Russian aristocratic families), Manuilski, Safarov (who was an Armenian), Unschlicht (who was of Latvian origin), Lashevich, Petrovsky, and even Tomsky, who, he said, 'passes as a Russian with a mixture of some Jewish blood'. But Tomsky's looks were very suspicious, and in Professor Guenther's textbook on race his picture appeared with the caption 'Near-Eastern race'. Fehst argued that Stalin had taken an anti-Semitic line in his struggle against the opposition, or had at any rate tolerated the growth of anti-Semitic tendencies; but this had been a mere tactical manoeuvre.[50] After Fehst had finished with the Soviet Union there were few non-Jewish citizens left; everybody with a non-Russian name, regardless whether of Armenian, Latvian, or German origin, was automatically described as a Jew—and many good old Russian names fell into the same category. After so much spadework had been done, little scope remained for Mr Kommoss, who succeeded nevertheless in attributing to Stalin a Jewish wife. Among other Russians who were hebraised by Kommoss were the composer Shostakovich, and the political leaders Shvernik and Gorkin; Beria and Marshal Blucher looked like Jews, and Kerensky became at least half a Jew. Kommoss even claimed that the Red Army commanders Rataitchak and Mustafin were Jews, which was no mean feat, since the former was so obviously a Latvian, and the latter a Tatar or Azerbaidjani. Kommoss also maintained that Stalin had played on anti-Semitism in his struggle against the opposition; but this changed at once after his victory when he switched to support the Kaganovich clique.[51]

THE Anti-Komintern propaganda embodied a great many contradictions. At one and the same time the bolshevik system was described as utterly inefficient, bankrupt, devoid of order, discipline, and organisation, while the Red Army was described as the most formidable menace to the rest of the world. The Nazi propagandists were well aware that some of their slogans could backfire: it was pointed out in the instructions given to party speakers that to working-class audiences the world revolutionary mission should not be given undue emphasis, for this could be a source of encouragement to some circles and evoke

[49] Hermann Fehst, *Bolschewismus und Judentum* (Berlin, 1934), and Rudolf Kommoss, *Juden hinter Stalin* (1938), became the two standard works.
[50] Fehst, op. cit. p. 90.
[51] Kommoss, op. cit. p. 33.

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feelings of class solidarity.[52] It is striking to what an extent considerations that had nothing to do with Russia or bolshevism were of decisive importance; nor was any secret made of them. It was stated, for instance, in the secret instructions that those German economic circles which complained about high taxation might well benefit from speeches about the terror in the Soviet Union, the destruction of the family, etc. Or elsewhere: The shortage of foodstuffs in Germany and the complaints about alleged abuses by the party apparatus (in Germany) would appear as mere bagatelles when compared with the situation in Russia. The anti-bolshevik campaign of the Third Reich was certainly not launched solely to distract attention from shortcomings at home, but it is far too often forgotten that these domestic considerations played a very important role indeed.

This raises another question: to what extent did the sponsors of the Anti-Komintern believe their own propaganda? There seems to be a clear division. Those around Rosenberg in the Foreign Political Office of the Nazi party had no doubts about it. The German Foreign Ministry and the experts of the Wehrmacht had their doubts about the Anti-Komintern propaganda and activities, but did nothing about it, apart from making a few critical remarks from time to time. A perusal of the top secret monthly bulletins of the SD about the situation in Russia shows that they were far more concerned with the political and economic realities of Soviet power than with the theories of Rosenberg's office or the slogans emanating from the propaganda ministry.[53] Yet the real sponsors in the Propaganda Ministry were cynics, and there is much evidence that they regarded their extreme anti-bolshevism as little more than a gimmick; they were technicians of the big lie, who in different circumstances would have undoubtedly been quite willing to offer their services to other totalitarian regimes, including, perhaps, the one they fought so bitterly.

[52] ' Anti-Kommunistischer Propaganda Feldzug im Inneren ' (Confidential). Two such sets of instructions have been found, one dated October 1935, the other 31 March 1937 (Amt Osten T 81/14). They probably emanated from the propaganda ministry, either from Taubert, or from Goebbels himself.

[53] See for instance ' Mitteilungen zur Lage in der Sowjet Union. Reichsführer S.S. Chef des Sicherheitshauptamtes ', 1939. These monthly bulletins of about 60–80 pages each were apparently prepared by the Wannsee Institut headed by Akhmeteli.

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KREMLIN AND VATICAN

Miklos Vetö

THIRTY Catholic bishops from the Soviet bloc attended the first session of the Vatican Council. The Soviet, Polish, and Hungarian press praise the noble efforts of the Pope in the cause of peace. There is an exchange of New Year greetings between John XXIII and Mr Khrushchev. Archbishop Slipyj, Metropolitan of the suppressed Uniate community, is freed and allowed to go to Rome. Mr Kadar says that the relationship between state and church has become 'normal' in Hungary and a political struggle should no longer be waged against the Catholic Church. All these events seem to indicate a new approach towards the Vatican. Does this foreshadow a rapprochement between the Kremlin and the Holy See? Is there a détente in the air? The answer to this question, at least for the time being, would be mere guesswork, and arbitrary guesswork at that, except in so far as it fits in with one's own conception of the nature of communism, of the trends in its development, and one's own attitude towards religion. It may therefore be more useful to give a short account of the present relationship between state and Church in the Soviet bloc, and of the few recent Soviet gestures towards the Pope. Such a survey may indicate the major trends in communist policy towards the Church of Rome, living through the exciting period of the XXI Oecumenical Council. There does not appear to be anything necessary or 'scientific' about these developments. On the contrary, the communists, especially the Soviet government, seem to be pursuing a hesitating and rather illogical policy towards religion and the churches in general. Because of their incomprehension of the phenomenon 'Church', any sort of rapprochement with the Vatican, however superficial, would only emphasise the internal contradictions of this policy, given their assumption that the construction of communism will necessarily wipe out religion; on this basis, can the churches be expected to collaborate?

There is no doubt that Mr Khrushchev and John XXIII are more apt to promote a certain rapprochement than their predecessors could ever have been. But the question is not one of personalities. Even the formulation Kremlin versus Vatican is erroneous if it is conceived as a simple bilateral relationship between two states. If the Soviet government tends to consider itself less and less as the headquarters of a worldwide ideological organisation, the Vatican cannot undergo any such change. It is precisely nothing but the headquarters of a dispersed empire. Personal gestures from Mr Khrushchev to the Pope, and the Pope's silence about atheistic communism, as well as those thirty mitred bishops in the splendour of St Peter's, cannot be considered as simple diplomatic moves. They should be read in their context. This context is the situation of the Church in the Soviet world. Spectacular gestures on the part of Mr

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Khrushchev indicate a new approach of the Soviet government, but the more valid test would concern the policy of the other countries in the bloc. In these countries there are almost fifty million Catholics, whereas there are fewer than three million in the Soviet Union itself. (The four million Uniates, now subject to the Orthodox Church, should be added to this figure.)

The presence of their bishops in the Council is an important indication of the variations in the climate of state-church relationships in the different East European countries. The Albanians were not represented. The Hoxha regime can claim that it long ago won a victory which even the Chinese have not been able to achieve: a virtually schismatic church, separated from the Vatican and leading a kind of shadow existence. While in Albania 9 per cent of the population is regarded as Catholic, in Rumania the figure is one-fifth of the population; about 3,500,000 were Catholics in 1948, but in that year the Uniate Church was attached to the Rumanian Orthodox Church. The 1·5 million Latin Catholics (almost exclusively Hungarians) have managed to survive. They have no social or cultural organisations, no press, and only one seminary. Only one of their bishops is still alive: Mgr Aron Marton. Many priests have been imprisoned and many deported to the Danube delta. A strong offensive against the Orthodox, especially against monasteries, has been in progress since 1961.

One bishop represented the handful of Bulgarian Catholics (less than 1 per cent of the population). From East Germany came four bishops, among them Mgr Alfred Bengsch, Archbishop of Berlin. They had no trouble in getting their passports. Surprisingly enough, East Germany is, in many respects, the most liberal of these countries in matters of religion, apart from Poland. Pressure is heavier against the strong Lutheran Church than against the Catholics, who are only about 10 per cent of the population.

IN three countries Roman Catholicism is a major political issue because the majority of the population are Catholics. The special character of the regime, the degree of liberalism which it manifests, and the real strength of the church—its traditional role, its identification with the nation, its emotional appeal—are the clues to the position. In Poland, where the church has always been identified with patriotism, a *modus vivendi* has been established which is the envy of Christians everywhere in Eastern Europe. In Hungary Kadar no longer relies on terror, but the church has to suffer passively intolerable state interference in its affairs and exclusion from almost all domains of national life. The church's national standing in Hungary, because of its historical record, is less bright than in Poland; it is even less bright in Czechoslovakia, where the regime firmly maintains a church administration condemned by the Vatican.

Czechoslovakia is a country where three-fourths of the population are Catholic, and where not a single diocese is governed by its residential

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bishop. Most of them are administered by vicars capitular who are not recognised by the Holy See and who belong to the association of priests condemned by the Holy Office. Curiously enough, this country retains some appearance of the integration of Christianity in national life. There is a Christian party in the so-called Patriotic Front (with no political role whatsoever), a priest (the excommunicated Father Plojhar) is Minister of Health, and there are theology faculties at some state universities. On the other hand, priests and nuns in the 'concentration monasteries' number hundreds. There is no doubt that in Slovakia, where the people are more devout, the Church's position is better. Yet even in Bohemia the press complained last year that the income of the Church is increasing, since the faithful give more than before. If the excommunicated priests have the upper hand in the administration of the Church, they have not won the approval of the faithful; visitors have noted that while the Prague churches were packed, in the Cathedral where an excommunicated arch-priest officiated, an impeccably conducted, monumental Sunday Vespers attracted an attendance of six. . . . Most of the bishops are in jail, concentration monasteries, or homes for the aged, and the shadow of Archbishop Beran, held in an unknown convent (probably in Slovakia) hangs heavily over any move to establish contact with the Vatican. Only two weeks before the opening of the Council all the bishops of Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia were reported in Rome as being imprisoned, interned, or 'impeded', and it was a great surprise to learn that an auxiliary bishop from Bohemia and two titular bishops from Slovakia who are apostolic administrators, were allowed to attend the Council. However, this gesture seems intended for external effect; nothing has changed inside Czechoslovakia.

Two residential bishops and an apostolic administrator represented Hungary at the Oecumenical Council. Their arrival in Rome was greeted in the press with mixed reactions. Mgr Hamvas, the acting chairman of the Hungarian hierarchy, is known to have attended the World Peace Council in Moscow, and *Il Tempo* asked what such a man could or should be seeking in the Council. A few hours after their arrival, however, the Hungarian bishops were received by the Holy Father, and Mgr Hamvas was given a special honour. After Cardinals and Archbishops, he was the first bishop among twelve hundred to celebrate the High Mass which opened the daily sessions of the Council. He was also the one who rose to protest against any mention of the Church of Silence in the message of the Council to the world, contending that the best service the Fathers of the Vaticanum could render these Catholics was not to speak about them. As acting chairman of the hierarchy since the death of Archbishop Grosz, he stands for those who are resigned to coexistence with the communist state, an attitude adopted by most of the Hungarian bishops even in Rakosi's time. The Kadar regime seems to have embarked on a liberal course, but the Church's situation is not much brighter than it used to be under Stalin's best Hungarian disciple. The only real

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difference is that fewer priests and Catholic laymen are in prison (in spite of the 1961 trials); this is due not to a more liberal Church policy, but to the general easing of pressure on the population. The Hungarian hierarchy, for the time being, is a lame assembly of a handful of aged prelates. Only five sees are governed by their residential bishops. Several bishops and apostolic administrators are prevented by the state from fulfilling their duties. Even where the bishop governs his diocese, his activity, especially in clerical appointments, is restricted by the all-powerful representative of the Office of Cults. In 1962 sixty-four priests were suspended and many others forced to retire by the intervention of this office. The teaching of religion is practically finished in high schools, and has sunk below 10 per cent of the children in the capital's primary schools. In the countryside the figures are much higher. As for religious practice, it is still stronger than in many Western countries, but state employees and teachers risk their jobs if they are known to go to Mass. Catholic cultural activities have virtually ceased, while one weekly, one cultural monthly, and one fortnightly journal (that of the peace priests) make up the Catholic press. 'Socialist' marriages, burials, and name-giving ceremonies have been instituted to compete with the sacraments. In the last few years the periodical *Vilagossag* (Light) has been conducting anti-religious propaganda in the best nineteenth-century tradition of 'scientific atheism', mixed with rabid attacks on 'clerical reaction'. Meanwhile, even the remnants of the Catholic press are showing signs of resignation; more and more 'flexible' articles appear on the theme of the fruitful coexistence of Christian religion and Marxist humanism, and in Spring 1962 *Vigilia*, the last bastion of the orthodox Catholic press, published for the first time an article by one of the three excommunicated priests. On the other hand, there are also signs of a certain improvement. The practice of religion seems to be less dangerous for the average Hungarian than it used to be ten years ago, and there are fewer press attacks on the bishops. A few theological books have been published, and even *Vilagossag* speaks with respect and expectation of the Council, pictures of which are shown on television and cinema. The government, after taking the Church under its firm control, is anxious to reach a more stable and institutionalised understanding with her. It did not recognise the appointments of John XXIII to the Bench of Bishops made without its previous consent, but is trying to come to terms with the Vatican on a compromise for completing the hierarchy. The journey of the bishops to Rome was the first concession made with this aim. After Kadar's famous speech announcing the end of the political struggle against the Church has come the second—the lifting of residence restrictions on four bishops and one apostolic administrator. These bishops have not yet, however, been able to resume their duties. Ultimately, the precondition of any sort of agreement with the Vatican is the settlement of Cardinal Mindszenty's position. There is little doubt that the Cardinal will in the near future leave Budapest for Rome. To negotiate

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his journey a high official of the Vatican Secretary of State went to Budapest to talk with the Cardinal, and with officials of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and the United States legation. His visit had been preceded by that of Cardinal König of Vienna, who thereafter visited Poland as well. But even the settlement of the 'Mindszenty question' could be no more than a prelude to a tacit agreement. A radical revision of the regime's Church policy, including the restoration of their autonomy to the bishops, freedom of the Catholic press and cultural life, the re-establishment of the religious orders, dissolved almost without exception, would be necessary for agreement. That is to say, the 'Polish way'.

IN Poland the *modus vivendi* reached in 1956 has not really been broken but minor and major clashes poison the coexistence of church and state. The situation is certainly less harmonious than it was six years ago, and the government is steadily pursuing a policy of harassing the Church. On the other hand it is true that in few countries is Catholic fervour so strongly marked by intolerance as in Poland, and it is no wonder that old-fashioned clericalism still flourishes in the country. The Cardinal sometimes speaks of the 'blood of priests', but happily this apocalyptic language only covers a shrewd sense of *Realpolitik* and a limited acceptance of the present regime as a lesser evil. There is no doubt that Cardinal Wyszinski has cause for complaint. Just before the Council sixty Catholic kindergartens, ten Catholic secondary schools (out of eighteen), and nine junior seminaries were compulsorily closed by the regime, and six convents have been evacuated. Heavy taxes are levied on the seminaries and the teaching of religion is becoming more and more difficult. The gradual worsening of the situation compelled the Cardinal at the beginning of 1962 to write to the Chairman of the Sejm and—a thing unheard of in a communist country—to ask for a parliamentary inquiry into the government's violation of the U.N. Charter, as well as of the Polish constitution, by its religious policy. Of course, he received a negative answer. At the beginning of this year, Mgr Choromanski, secretary of the Bishops' Bench, declared that no new agreement could be reached with the government until 'religious freedom exists in Poland'. However, on the whole the Church's situation is not altogether discouraging. Two figures prove this eloquently. Before the war Poland had 31,000 priests and 7,251 churches and chapels; in 1962 there were 53,000 priests and 10,981 churches and chapels.

One peculiar aspect of the Polish situation is the potential role of the Church in the central issue of Polish foreign policy, the Oder-Neisse border. It is well known that the dioceses of the former German territories in Western Poland are not considered by the Holy See as belonging to the ecclesiastical organisation of Poland. In the Pontifical Annual for 1962 the diocese of Gdansk lies in the Free State of Danzig, and its bishop, Mgr Splett, a West German citizen, lives in West Germany. The

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diocese of Olsztyn is vacant, but the capitular assembly which holds the governing rights in case of vacancy has been functioning in West Germany since 1945. The other dioceses have Polish apostolic administrators, but this is a provisional arrangement. So when the government gave passports to twenty Polish bishops to go to Rome, they were regarded rather in the light of emissaries to get the Vatican to recognise the Oder-Neisse border. At the same time an assembly of 1,200 priests met in Poznan and sent a petition to the Pope with the same request. Mr Zawieyski, the most prominent member of the Catholic parliamentary group Znak, had a private audience with the Holy Father, and there is no doubt that he pleaded the Polish case. Yet, in spite of many rumours of a change in its position, the Vatican keeps silent, and, as a German bishop said, even if the Holy See decides to appoint Polish residential bishops in the Western dioceses, this would not mean the automatic recognition of the Oder-Niesse border. The apparent failure of all Polish efforts has angered the communist press, and the initial praises of the Council were gradually overshadowed by criticism.

However, it is in Poland alone that the Church enjoys a position which does not prevent it from preaching Christ's message; in Poland alone is it so strong that the government has to tolerate its activity in all fields of national life. In Poland alone is there such a delicate political equilibrium that in spite of minor and major clashes the Church must be considered an integral part, or rather a condition, of the Gomulka regime. Although the Kadar regime is certainly the second most liberal in East Europe, the Church in Hungary has no resource against state pressure and has practically no role in social life. When Kadar says that there is no need for political struggle against the Church, he is right. The Church has become politically harmless. If *that* is the meaning of normalisation of relations, he is only too right in saying that relations have been normalised. The Kadar regime's aim is national reconciliation, which implies more tolerance and concessions, but the Church's real strength is not great enough to induce Kadar to treat it as it is treated in Poland. Finally, in Czechoslovakia, any agreement would entail the restoration of the bishops to their sees, and the government does not seem to be inclined to pay this price. In fact, it seems uninterested in any change in the *status quo*.

WHAT is the situation of Catholics in the Soviet Union itself? It was only in 1939–40 that large numbers of Catholics came under Soviet rule. Eighty per cent of Lithuania's inhabitants are Catholic, and there is a substantial (mainly Lithuanian-speaking) minority in Latvia. In Lithuania the Roman Church has a national standing surpassed only in Poland and Ireland. If the Soviet Government cut off practically all ties of the Church with Rome, imprisoned, deported, and killed many priests and Catholic laymen, it did not go so far as did, for instance, the Czechoslovak regime. There are no associations of excommunicated

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priests whose members rule the dioceses, and no effort has been made to provoke schism. Moreover, in 1957 the Soviet Government agreed to the consecration of new Lithuanian bishops nominated by Pius XII, and although no bishops were allowed to leave, some Lithuanian priests went to Rome at the time of the first session of the Council. At present only one Lithuanian bishop governs a diocese; the others, as well as those of Latvia, are ' impeded '. The only remaining Roman Catholic seminary, that of Kaunas, has not been allowed since 1961 to start courses for freshmen, and in Latvia the cathedral of Riga was transformed into a concert hall last year. A year ago twenty-six Lithuanian priests were reported as being in prison, and since then several new trials of clergymen have been held. But that Catholicism is still a living issue is shown by sporadic news items, such as an article by a Kaunas University professor stating that many students are still practising Catholics, or the discovery of a monastery functioning as a model kolkhoz some eighteen miles from the capital, or the complaint that on Sunday mornings kolkhoz chairmen lend lorries to young people so that they may go to Mass.

In striking contrast to this relative leniency towards the Latin Catholics is the treatment of the Uniates. The Uniates, who numbered 4,000,000 in Western and Sub-Carpathian Ukraine, have been forced to submit to the Patriarchate of Moscow. Their bishops have been deported, and only the Metropolitan Slipyj survives. Perhaps the most important Soviet gesture towards the Holy See has been his release after eighteen years of prison and exile.[1] What is really interesting and may open new vistas is the fact that the Archbishop has been given a normal passport to go to Italy, which allows him to return to the Soviet Union. The Metropolitan, who may soon become a Cardinal, will not go back to the Ukraine to stay in a country house and to write his memoirs. But what sort of activity will be open to him? His cathedral is in the hands of the Orthodox, his priests are subject to Moscow. To allow him to restore the Uniate Church would only promote Ukrainian nationalism and would be a severe blow to the Patriarchate of Moscow. One of the dubious glories of the reign of the Orthodox Patriarch Alexis is to have ' re-established the unity of the Orthodox ', and even in its present subjection to the government, the Orthodox Church could hardly fail to resist a revival of the Uniates, which might also start a chain-reaction among the 2,000,000 Uniates in Rumania and the 300,000 in Eastern Slovakia, to be allowed to break their forced union with the autocephalous Orthodox Churches of those countries.[2] Some sort of restoration of the Uniates is one of the basic conditions of any détente between

[1] According to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (12 February 1963), representatives of the Soviet government and the Moscow Patriarchate visited him in 1961 and asked him to break publicly with Rome. If he did so, he would be restored in Lwow and given a formal promise of succession to the aged Patriarch.

[2] There is one Uniate bishop governing his diocese in the Soviet bloc, Mgr Dudas of Hajdudorog, in Hungary. In Poland a bishop-less Uniate community contrives a difficult existence; one Slovakian Uniate bishop, Mgr Hlopko, is reported still alive after thirteen years in prison.

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the Vatican and the Kremlin, but it is hardly likely to appeal to the Soviet government, since it would so gravely offend the faithful Orthodox, who are securely under control.

In the Soviet Union recent developments clearly suggest that the old truce is over. For the last five years or so the pressure upon the Orthodox has been greatly increased. Two archbishops have been imprisoned, and several bishops and archbishops have been removed from their sees. Nearly 2,000 churches have been closed down, as well as almost half of the monasteries and three seminaries (out of eight). A new law severely curtails ecclesiastical self-government, and the parishes are unable to meet the heavy burden of increased taxes. There is no question of the teaching of religion. As Mr Pavlov, secretary of the Komsomol, said, there is tolerance for the adults, but children who are not yet able to resist religious indoctrination should be preserved from such violation of their young minds. One might say that all this is the business of the Orthodox Church alone, but the offensive is not anti-Orthodox, it is anti-religious. If it is being conducted mainly on the Orthodox front, this is because the Orthodox are the major confession. The efforts of the Kremlin in the last years to promote some sort of rapprochement with the Vatican are not signs of an ideological armistice but must be seen in the context of Soviet foreign policy.

In August 1956, i.e. in the time of Pius XII, the Soviet chargé d'affaires in Rome handed over to Mgr Fietta, the then Apostolic Nuncio in Italy, a document on disarmament for transmission to the Pope. In January 1959 Foreign Minister Gromyko told an Italian delegation that there was a possibility of contacts and agreements between the Soviet Union and the Vatican on questions of peace, nuclear weapons, etc. Since his election John XXIII's speeches and actions have received some recognition, and in September 1961 Mr Khrushchev welcomed the Pope's message on peace.[3] Two months later he sent a message of congratulations on the Pope's eightieth birthday. Last October Tass praised the Pope's action for peace, and this was followed by an exchange of New Year wishes between John XXIII and Chairman Khrushchev. In March the Soviet members of the jury of the Balzan foundation voted, with Mr Khrushchev's explicit approval, to award this Peace prize to the Pope. A few days later the Adzhubeis had an audience of the Pope. Another manifestation of Soviet goodwill was the presence of two Russian Orthodox observers at the Council. For a long time the Patriarchate of Moscow seemed to reject the idea of any participation, and it was only at the very last moment that the Holy Synod decided to send its observers to Rome. (Incidentally, this sudden *volte face* caused considerable anger in Istanbul, where the Oecumenical Patriarch had regretfully declined the Pope's invitation in the belief that it was the only way to preserve Orthodox unity, given the tough anti-Vatican

[3] John XXIII's first diplomatic gesture was to ask the ministers of the Polish and Lithuanian governments-in-exile to refrain from participation in diplomatic activities vis-à-vis the Vatican. But the Holy See's recognition was not formally withdrawn.

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line of Moscow.) Greek Orthodox circles consider Moscow's last-moment decision as a blow to Orthodox solidarity, and point out that even the autocephalous Churches of the communist countries, otherwise very subservient to Moscow, refused to support this manoeuvre and to send observers to Rome.[4] But it is certain that without the consent of the Kremlin the two bearded prelates, looking very much like well-restored Byzantine ikons, would never have sat in the baroque splendour of Rome's Basilica.

The goal of all these moves may be the establishment of diplomatic or semi-diplomatic relations with the Holy See,[5] with Poland serving as a field of experiment. But ultimately diplomatic recognition is not so important. What matters is a détente of a kind to allow the Western communist parties to operate more freely among Catholics, which would diminish Church support for anti-Soviet policies in Western and neutral countries and would liquidate the remnants of Catholic resistance in the Soviet bloc.

NONE of these gestures, however, indicates any fundamental change in Soviet attitudes and prejudices. They are all concrete, well-calculated acts of policy towards a power which—as the editor of *Izvestia* said—has a considerable influence in world affairs, and with which the Soviet Union is trying to come to terms. An apocryphal story attributes to Stalin the question: how many divisions has the Pope? Fundamentally, nothing has changed since then except that Mr Khrushchev has come round to the opinion that the Pope *does* have some divisions, and is treating him accordingly. This is of course a sensible approach but it hardly squares with the attempt to dislocate and destroy those divisions. There is no doubt that it is in the Soviet interest to see them destroyed or at least disarmed, but does Mr Khrushchev think he can have it both ways?

In spite of this 'basic absurdity', a reassessment of Soviet opinion about the Vatican has been going on for some time. Four Soviet newspapermen have been accredited to the Council. They are severely handicapped by a primitive attitude to religion as such, based on outdated nineteenth-century materialism, but it is most interesting to discern here and there, through the old slogans and the totally irrelevant judgments, an effort to comprehend what the Catholic Church represents in the nineteen-sixties. Of course, the Council is described in purely political terms as a sort of enormous clash between the forces of peace and progress inside the Church, and those of war, 'Atlanticism', and oppression. Good Marxists, the press correspondents identify theological traditionalism with reactionary political attitudes, and so fail to notice,

[4] Cf. 'Les malentendus Moscou-Istanbul', *Informations Catholiques Internationales*, 15 March 1963.

[5] It has been suggested that the Holy See might establish consulates in countries with which it has no diplomatic relations.

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for instance, that the pillar of churchly conservatism, the powerful pro-prefect of the Holy Office, Cardinal Ottaviani, has condemned nuclear weapons without reservation. What is significant is that, although in the communist classics the Church is ineluctably condemned to death, the correspondents see quite good chances for those forces of peace and progress whose ' real ' aims are ' disguised ' behind demands for administrative decentralisation, a less scholastic approach to questions of Scripture and tradition, or the increasing use of the vernacular in the liturgy.

The Pope himself is reported to side with the forces of progress. His appeal for peace and negotiations during the Cuban crisis made a favourable impression in Moscow, which seemed out of keeping with the idea that the Vatican is no more than a mere annexe of the State Department (nor do we hear now of the Bank of the Holy Spirit through which Pius XII was supposed to get instructions from Wall Street). A certain revision of former positions in Moscow, some willingness to have a more objective look at the Church, an effort towards a rapprochement officially motivated by the possibility that the so-called forces of progress may gain more influence inside the Church, cannot be denied. But it must be repeated that such a rapprochement depends above all on what is happening in the bloc. The years since Stalin have brought a greater differentiation in the Church policies of the respective countries, but the Vatican still tends to take literally the unity of the Soviet camp. A dogmatic uniform approach to the Church as such, which was a fiction even in Stalin's time—one has only to recall the 1950 compromise agreement between bishops and government in Bierut's Poland—is now echoed in some Vatican circles by an equally dogmatic approach towards communism. Mr Khrushchev is held responsible for any encroachment on the rights of the Church, whether they occur in Poland, China, or Yugoslavia. But in fact their greater domestic autonomy makes it difficult and awkward for Mr. Khrushchev to dictate details of their religious policy. There is some irony in the fact that his aspirations in international policy may suffer from judgments passed upon policies for which he is not really responsible, whose details he does not fully grasp, and whose authorship is nonetheless attributed to him.

(This article was written before the death of Pope John XXIII.)

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VIEWS AND REVIEWS

DARKNESS AT NOON AGAIN

An Interview *

Urban: Since Khrushchev made his famous speeches at the 20th and 22nd Party congresses revealing the unpleasant things Stalin did to his opponents, I have seen it repeatedly said by quite knowledgeable people that your picture in *Darkness at Noon* of the way in which confessions were obtained by the police under Stalin was far-fetched. In the Gletkin passages, which are the core of *Darkness at Noon*, you gave a brilliantly argued justification of what Stalin was doing. Gletkin induces Rubashov to sign his confession with the argument that everything, including the victim's life, must be sacrificed for the maintenance and security of the Soviet bastion. Now, in his *Strangled Cry*, John Strachey says that Gletkin's case is so convincingly put that some people have been influenced by it in a pro-communist direction. Do you see a contradiction between the story as we now know it from Khrushchev and what you say in your book? I would myself agree with K. A. Jelenski, who says in one of his writings that you conferred on these confessions a sinister dignity which they did not altogether possess.

Koestler: Your first question has been answered in one of my autobiographical books, *The Invisible Writing*. Let me recapitulate: in my novel there are several characters in prison—there is Rubashov, there is Harelip, there is a peasant from Siberia, and there are others. Now Harelip is badly tortured and the peasant from Siberia is also beaten. With Rubashov it is touch and go whether his investigators are going to put him to physical torture or wear his resistance down and argue him into capitulation. You see human memory is a very faulty instrument. We all like to simplify, and remembering a story or a book such as *Darkness at Noon*, a lot of people retain in their minds only one or two outstanding features. It is the most striking thing that sticks and the rest is forgotten. I never said that *everybody* confessed to do the Party a last service. I said that a very few, the hard core, confessed in this manner. Now why is this important?

Mainly because I believe—even if you might think this somewhat sentimental—that the old Bolshevik Guard, the Bukharins, the Zinovievs and Piatakovs, were great men and it would be the final injustice to misinterpret the motives for which they died. It is not true that they succumbed to the promise of dachas or indicted themselves because they were tortured. They died for reasons which were human reason running amuck but within the logic of their own faith, and this is extremely important because intellectual murder is still going on in China. Brainwashing was successfully practised on American soldiers during the Korean War and a variant of the psychological technique which was used on the old Bolsheviks is now used on the people of China. It is easy

* These are excerpts from an interview given recently by Arthur Koestler to George Urban.

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to underestimate the subtlety of these methods—particularly if you compare them with the Nazi methods—because the communists apply a mixture: they appeal to the weakness of the flesh and to the noblest thing man possesses, his sense of duty and self-sacrifice.

As to my evidence on the hard core of Bolsheviks on whom these methods were used, let me say this: first, I know at least three people who spoke from personal experience: they told me how they were not allowed to sleep because their interrogators wanted to catch them with their defences down, how then they were treated with great consideration and addressed as comrades, all this leading to the final demand—' there is a small thing the Party is asking of you ', etc.

Then, of course, I had the evidence of people who had escaped from Soviet prisons. Now one of these, whose story shows a clear likeness to my interrogation scenes, was not known to me until after my book was finished. The man I have in mind is General Krivitsky, whose report is, no doubt, the most authoritative. Krivitsky was head of the Fourth Bureau of the Red Army, that is, of military intelligence for Western Europe, until in 1937 he broke with the regime. Twice the GPU made an attempt to assassinate him in France and a third time in the United States. The last was successful and it was made to appear as suicide. In December 1939, at a time when I had already finished all but the last chapter of *Darkness at Noon*, Krivitsky published his book *I Was Stalin's Agent*. I read the book only years later because, having got *Darkness at Noon* out of my system, I became allergic to the whole subject.

Urban: Krivitsky's account of the method by which one of the accused at the first show trial was induced to confess comes so close to Rubashov's interrogation by Gletkin that I, for one, would regard it as the most telling evidence of the accuracy of the whole analysis you have given in *Darkness at Noon*. For here we have a writer who knows the internal logic by which the communist mind works, particularly in this kind of dramatic confrontation. Here we have a conversation which is fiction, but then along comes a report from the files of the secret police and it proves to be almost identical with the kind of battle of wits and willpower you depicted for the reader between these two parties. I think this is the most striking thing about *Darkness at Noon*.

Koestler: I have, of course, discussed this all in detail in *The Invisible Writing*. But you know there was no clairvoyance involved, and it is less striking than you think, because, although the police methods under Stalin were varied and subtle, there was a pattern to them. I had the help and evidence of a personal friend who escaped by an extraordinary stroke of luck. He had been put through the whole works and I got a great many details from him. Of course, his was a completely different case from the one I tried to describe, but I could see the pattern. Also, if you have lived inside the Party you know the dialectic and you can re-enact for yourself the whole picture.

Today, Khrushchev says that the confessions were extorted by old-fashioned torture and bribery. But don't forget that with all their denunciations of Stalin, the Soviet leaders have shown absolutely no interest in disclosing these methods. They have worked out a number

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of approaches which they think they can use on various people in various circumstances. The Secret Police is still there—why should it tell the world how hardy old Bolsheviks were brought to their knees?

Urban: I am wondering whether this consideration would really militate against disclosure. The Russians say that the illegalities have been curbed and stopped. Khrushchev has told the Party repeatedly that Stalin's principal crime was that he was looking for the class-enemy inside the Party. Now the Rubashov case and the Bukharin and Radek cases would seem to come under this rubric. So if, under Khrushchev, the Soviet authorities are no longer looking for the class enemy inside the Party, there would seem to be no harm in telling the Party how the confessions were obtained. Indeed, I think it might help Khrushchev to underline once again the beastliness of his former principal. For these men were not even allowed to die for their heresies. They had to recant but they were still burnt at the stake.

Koestler: I don't think it is true to say that brainwashing and the other techniques of non-violent conversion have been, or are being, used only inside the Party. Think of the American soldiers in the Korean War, and many other cases one could mention. These people were as distant from the Communist party as you can get. Nevertheless, they produced the abject confessions their scriptwriters had written for them.

Coming back to your second question—Strachey's point that Gletkin converted quite a few people to communism—the answer is very simple. The difference between a propaganda pamphlet and a novel is that in a novel every character must be right and consistent within its own logic. If for some readers the Gletkin passages appear to be unduly convincing, I can only plead that the Gletkins are terrifyingly convincing when you meet them behind the prison walls of the Liubianka. In any case, I have no evidence that this applies to more than a very small proportion of those who have read *Darkness at Noon*. Among all the letters I received from readers—and there were a good many—only two said that I had put the communists' case so convincingly that the reader could find no conclusive answer to Gletkin.

THE WARSAW RISING

F. L. Carsten

PARTITIONED FOR THE fourth time in 1939, the Poles had to fight the second world war on two fronts: militarily against the Germans, and politically against the Russians, who were unwilling to recognise the pre-war Russo-Polish frontier. This was the issue which split the Polish government-in-exile from top to bottom. As early as July 1941, as Count Raczynski, the then Polish ambassador to the Court of St. James, mentions in his wartime diary,[1] when the Polish prime minister, General Sikorski, negotiated an agreement with the Russians, President Raczkiewicz refused him powers to sign because it did not recognise the

[1] Count Edward Raczynski, **In Allied London.** Introduction by Sir John Wheeler-Bennett. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1962. 381 pp., 36s.

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inviolability of the Polish eastern frontier. Thus General Sikorski signed the agreement without presidential sanction, and several members of his government resigned in consequence. Naturally, the Russians began to exploit this disunity among the Poles for their own purposes and 'to undermine the authority of the government of their Polish ally'. The Poles, by their own attitude towards their national minorities, greatly facilitated these Russian efforts. One of the most revealing passages in the diary runs:

> Their [the Russians'] repertoire of slogans includes that of defending Ukrainian and White Russian interests. In the last few days we have *therefore* [my italics] been discussing in the Political Committee of Ministers the possibility of ourselves announcing a progressive policy in regard to the Ukrainians.

This passage was written in March 1943: it was only in the fourth year of the war, and only because the Russians were sponsoring the cause of the Ukrainians, that the Poles began to discuss this vital issue. From the outset Stalin was clearly determined to gain the Curzon line or the frontier of 1940 as Russia's western frontier, while Mr Churchill and Mr Eden strove to persuade the Poles to accept 'compensation' at the expense of Germany—anything up to the Oder which they liked to choose: this they should accept 'with enthusiasm, "like gallant adventurers, not timorous victims"', as Mr Churchill put it to the hesitating Poles. That was a few weeks after the Teheran conference during which he had made it clear to Stalin 'that I was not going to break my heart about this cession of part of Germany to Poland or about Lvov . . . I was not prepared to make a great squawk about Lvov . . .' (*The Second World War*, vol. V, p. 351). No wonder that the Poles were disgusted by the British attitude which, the longer the war lasted, became cooler and cooler towards the Poles. From the point of view of the Great Power Club the stubborn defence of their rights was a nuisance which threatened to spoil the friendly relations among the Great and the division of Europe into zones of influence. If the Poles did not see 'that by taking over and holding firmly the present German territories up to the Oder they will be rendering a service to Europe as a whole' (ibid. p. 398), so much the worse for them.

The attitude of the great Powers showed itself equally clearly after the outbreak of the Warsaw rising of August 1944, the most heroic deed of the Polish *Armia Krajowa* (Home Army). The decision to start the insurrection was taken in Warsaw on 31 July for political reasons: Warsaw should not be 'liberated' by the Red Army, but by the Polish underground forces who thus hoped to establish their political claims in the eyes of the world. They had sufficient information about the ruthless measures taken by the Red Army and the NKVD against the units of the Home Army in the parts of Poland already conquered from the Germans. Instead of dispersing their forces and attacking the Germans at many scattered points along their lines of communication and in the countryside, the Poles committed the fatal error of striking at one point—that of the strongest German concentration—for reasons of political prestige. They believed that the Germans were beginning to evacuate Warsaw and that the Russians had arrived in strength on the opposite bank of the Vistula. As Dr Hanns von Krannhals makes clear

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in his important monograph on the Warsaw rising, based on Polish as well as German sources,[2] this information was incorrect: strong German reinforcements, among them crack SS armoured divisions, had arrived, the Russians were repulsed and did not succeed in conquering Praga opposite Warsaw until 13 September, when the rising was in its seventh week and almost subdued. It is not correct to say, however, as Sir John Wheeler-Bennett does in his introduction to Count Raczynski's diary, that 'the Polish Home Army . . . for a period of nine weeks . . . [was] receiving no support from the Soviet armies without the city'. As soon as the Russians had taken Praga they made—between 15 and 20 September—several attempts to cross the river in force. As the Germans by that time had reconquered and fortified the left bank of the Vistula, and as the insurgents were no longer able to render any effective help to the Red Army, these attempts were repulsed with heavy losses. The very fact that the attack on Praga on 10 September was undertaken by the 1st Soviet-Polish infantry division, which for this purpose had been strongly reinforced with artillery, armour, and equipment, and that further strong units of the 1st Polish army under Soviet command were thrown into the battle during the following days—it was these units which crossed the Vistula to relieve Warsaw—does not indicate that Marshal Rokossovsky and the Red Army command were prevaricating: after all, these tasks could have been entrusted to Russian troops which might have shown less zeal. Even Count Raczynski's diary admits that after 14 September 'the Russians did . . . render effective help in the form of air protection against German bombing and of artillery fire from Praga, assisted by Home Army observers'. It remains true, however, that Stalin considered the Warsaw rising 'a reckless and terrible adventure which is costing the population large sacrifices. . . . In the situation which has arisen the Soviet command has come to the conclusion that it must dissociate itself from the Warsaw adventure . . .' (Churchill, *op. cit.*, vol. VI, p. 118); he also refused permission for American planes to use Russian airfields for the purpose of dropping supplies to the insurgents until the rising was nearly over. It was only on 18 September that a large-scale operation of this kind could take place, when it was virtually too late.

How inaccurate the information available in London about the rising was is shown by an entry in Count Raczynski's diary made in August: 'The occupation of the Warsaw bridges had impeded German communications for several days.' In reality the attempts of the Home Army to take the vital bridges across the Vistula had all failed because they were undertaken with insufficient strength. From the military point of view the Germans throughout remained the masters of the situation; they retained not only the bridges, but the airfields around Warsaw and their centres of command within the city. The arrival of strong reinforcements, the atrocities committed against the civilian population by SS and police units, the burning down of whole streets and blocks, the woefully inadequate weapons and supplies of the insurgents, made the final outcome a foregone conclusion. Among the German units employed, the SS brigade Dirlewanger and the SS brigade Kaminski were the most

[2] Hanns von Krannhals, **Der Warschauer Aufstand 1944.** Bernhard & Graefe Verlag fuer Wehrwesen, Frankfurt, 1962. 445 pp.

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conspicuous for their behaviour against the Poles, the former consisting largely of professional criminals and the latter largely of Ukrainians and Cossacks (Kaminski himself being a Pole who pretended to be a Russian). They raped Polish and German girls indiscriminately, and their main other interests were loot and spirits. Their deeds were inspired by the orders of Himmler that *all* Poles were to be shot and Warsaw be levelled to the ground. These (and many other interesting) points are proved by Dr Krannhals's work. While he has done much to illuminate the motives of the Poles and of the Germans, we still have to make more or less accurate guesses about those of the Russians. The truth seems to be much more complex than Mr Churchill's ' they wanted to have the non-Communist Poles destroyed to the full, but also to keep alive the idea that they were going to their rescue ' (ibid. p. 127). This *may* be true of Stalin himself, but does not seem to fit the actions of Marshal Rokossovsky and of the Polish units under his command. Those who consider Stalin the devil incarnate may conclude that he wanted all Poles destroyed, whether anti-communist or pro-communist. Or one may assume, with Dr Krannhals, that it was Western pressure which made him change his tactics between August and September. If Rokossovsky's army had succeeded in crossing the Vistula in force, Warsaw would have been freed by the Red Army, not by the Poles, and this clearly would have brought great political advantages: perhaps this was, after all, Stalin's aim, or at least that of the Red Army command. Until there is clear evidence from Russian sources the historian can only put a question-mark.

THE KURDISH REPUBLIC

Günther Nollau

THE SHORT-LIVED KURDISH REPUBLIC of Mahabad, in north-west Iran, is of interest not only because it lay between the southern frontier of Russia and the Persian Gulf, that is, in an area which in 1940 Molotov, at that time Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, told the Germans was the central focus of Soviet aspirations. The story of that small Republic of 1946 helps us to understand the fight for autonomy now being waged by the Kurds of Iraq, for the military leader of the revolt which broke out in Iraq in 1961, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, was the soldier in whom Qazi Muhammad, President of the 1946 Kurdish Republic, placed the most reliance. The story has a third point of interest, as an example of the exploitation by the Soviet Union of a small people's right to self-determination, and the abandonment of that people once it seemed to be required by the interests of Soviet policy.

Mr Eagleton's book * fills a gap, for before its appearance the story of the Republic had not been fully told either in Iran or in the West. He has spent a good part of the last ten years in the area of ' Kurdistan ', that is, in Kirkuk and Tabriz, and he took the laborious but only possible way of finding out how Qazi Muhammad's Republic arose and how it

* William Eagleton, Jr., **The Kurdish Republic of 1946.** London, 1963. 143 pp. 30s.

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came to an end—he questioned many of the eye-witnesses who are still alive. In doing so, Mr Eagleton has managed to throw light on events long lost in darkness, for example, the journeys of the Kurdish leader to Baku, the part played by the Russians in the foundation of the Republic, the extent of Soviet help to the Kurdish autonomists, and its instant withdrawal when there seemed to be a chance of setting up a communist government for the whole of Iran.

An error seems to have crept into the work in regard to the fate of the poet, Muhammad Beria, Minister of Education in the autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan. It is true that, in the course of the anti-communist reprisals taken in Tabriz before the entry of the Persian troops, he was wounded by a shot in the leg and took refuge in the Russian hospital. However he was not, as stated here, dragged out by the mob, but managed to escape to the Soviet Union, where he still lives.

What makes the story of the Kurdish Republic so attractive, and speaks so well for the character of the Kurds and their leaders, is the atmosphere of courage and tolerance which reigned in Mahabad. After the collapse of the Republic there was no anti-communist reaction, unlike the course of events in Tabriz and the capital of the other Republic promoted by the Soviet Union in those years. If, when he was in Tabriz, Mr Eagleton collected material on that Republic, too, may we look forward to another book from him?

HUNGARY 1956

Tamas Aczel

AFTER ONLY SEVEN YEARS we feel about the Hungarian revolution as if it were an historical event rather than a contemporary happening that shook the world and of which we were all participants in both the real and symbolical sense of the word. Though historically seven years is a very short period, it was long enough to remove from the publishers' desks and the book-dealers' shelves the 'eye-witness accounts' written in the fever of the moment and often entirely unreliable, and replace them by books that try to appraise—and in a certain sense already *reappraise* —the roots, course, results, and failures of the 'unexpected revolution' and forecast its 'expected' consequences. This is the task undertaken by Professor Vali in his extensive summing-up and by Pal Kecskemeti in his shorter but no less valuable essay.* While Professor Vali explains and evaluates the revolution on the basis of a fundamental principle: the conflict and contradictions between nationalism and communism (and thus, willy-nilly, attempts to solve the problems of the origin and course of the revolution somewhat dogmatically, on the basis of a preconceived idea), Pal Kecskemeti tries to draw his conclusions from a sociological-psychological-political analysis of the events. Who is right? After reading the two books we can do no more than line up our arguments.

* **Rift and Revolt in Hungary,** by Ferenc A. Vali, Harvard University Press, 1961; **The Unexpected Revolution,** by Paul Kecskemeti, Stanford University Press, 1961.

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Judgment will be the task of those who, with access to all the historical documents, will one day analyse the Hungarian revolution.

This does not mean that Professor Vali's serious and excellent book, or Pal Kecskemeti's essay, are not richly documented. On the contrary, the first may be said to suffer rather from over-documentation; this raises it high above the schematic 'eye-witness accounts', but also entangles the reader in a multitude of references and cross-references and prevents him from forming his own opinions. Professor Vali takes the reader by the hand and leads him from one event to the next; Pal Kecskemeti informs him while walking at his side. And yet, in spite of the difference in method (or perhaps because of it), we have here two books that attempt, for the first time, to give a full and clear picture of the revolution which, in the opinion of Djilas, was the beginning of the end of communism.

Vali's conception stems from the incompatibility between nationalism and communism; this idea permeates his account of the roots of the 1956 revolution, traced back through the course of Hungarian history from the beginning to our days. Kecskemeti's book deals with the problem of the revolutionary elite, and comes to the conclusion that the unavoidable social and moral crisis of this elite was, if not the *cause*, then certainly the *motive force* of the revolution. This difference of attitude is in itself interesting: on the one hand it demonstrates the multifold character of the revolution, the problems presented by the line of approach; on the other it shows the intellectual and moral possibilities inherent in the revolution which, unfortunately, the revolutionaries had no opportunity to put into practice. While Professor Vali's book gives proof of a certain determinism, in so far as he regards the clash between nationalism and communism as unavoidable, Kecskemeti is inclined to believe that the unexpectedness of the revolution was due to social and moral forces that had emerged much earlier, and which brought the resistance latent within the nation to flash-point. That is, the unexpectedness was, so to say, a symbol of the historical possibilities created by the situation and circumstances.

This poses the question whether the sudden transformation of national interest into revolutionary force, is or is not identical with what Vali calls 'traditional nationalism', and whether this was the only cause of the armed uprising. Mr Nehru's statement—quoted by the author—that 'What happened in Hungary was not essentially a conflict between communism and anti-communism; it represented nationalism, striving for freedom from foreign control', supports but does not justify the author's attitude. The doctrine of traditional nationalism as against the doctrine of communism is tempting as an explanation, and in many respects true, but the revolution was more than this. A simplification of this sort ignores, or at least puts into secondary rank, those 'subjective' factors which also acted as motive forces of the revolution. As Vali says: 'A secondary, but still outstanding motivation for the intra-party split and the nationwide opposition against the regime was the aspiration for *freedom* and *democracy*.' But was it secondary? Was it not rather the two together—the struggle for national independence and the fight for freedom and democracy—that encompassed the meaning and content

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of the revolution? To stress the primacy of one over the other is misleading; the significance of the revolution lay precisely in that, going beyond traditional nationalism, it was able to combine it with the aspiration for freedom and democracy, or, more exactly, that for a while it was able to combine the national with political aspirations.

Kecskemeti's essay approaches the problems of the revolution from precisely this direction; he deals in the first place with those subjective intellectual and moral forces which created and widened the rift within the country, and though he does speak of the 'symbols' of nationalism he does not include them among the causes of the revolution, but comes to the conclusion that 'moral conflicts causing rifts within the political elites may be said to pose the most immediate potential threat to the political stability of communist regimes'. In considering the present conflict in the Soviet Union between the intellectual elite and the party leadership (for instance on the subject of abstract art, which goes beyond the political utility of the simple debunking of the Stalinist past) we cannot ignore the historical merit of the Hungarian revolution which first called attention to this aspect. Everything that has taken place since can be understood only in connection with that revolution.

YUGOSLAVIA

Alfred Sherman

YUGOSLAV EXPERIENCE CAN PROVIDE valuable insight into the potentialities and internal logic of communism, if studied empirically. Yugoslavia was the first communist state to undergo destalinisation and while Stalin was still alive at that; it was also the first to experience serious attempts at restalinisation, which began a few months after Stalin died. Many of Khrushchev's dilemmas were foreshadowed by Tito's, since he first embarked reluctantly on Titoism in 1949 after experience had shown him that he could not fight Stalin successfully as a Stalinist, only to learn that reform—or revision, as it is more commonly called—has a logic of its own. But to draw useful lessons from Yugoslav experience, qualities of detachment and freedom from emotional involvement, a sharp eye for the realities of power, and the ability to distinguish clearly between intentions and achievement are essential.

Yugoslavia and the New Communism * is, I am afraid, an object lesson in the pitfalls of 'Yugocentrism', and an illustration of what happens when detachment and healthy scepticism are lacking. Though it embodies many years of hard work, voluminous reading, extensive personal knowledge and the best of intentions, it is a long sprawling repetitive book which contributes nothing new and encourages fashionable illusions instead of pricking them. The spirit of the book can be gauged from its closing sentences. 'The Yugoslav communists are confident that they can meet it [the problem of succession to Tito] without difficulty. Most students of contemporary Yugoslavia would be inclined to agree. Regardless of what they might think of Titoism, those who wish well for the Yugoslavs can only hope they are right.' Now, quite apart from the fact that many Yugoslav communists are far

* G. N. Hoffman and F. W. Neal, **Yugoslavia and the New Communism**, New York, $8.00.

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from optimistic on this issue—when speaking off the record—and fear a strengthening of centrifugal nationalist tendencies, while many non-communists, who after all constitute the majority, hope for something quite different, this tendency to preach and to mix hopes with analysis is irritating to readers and a handicap for the authors.

Their version of the 1961 Conference of non-aligned states at Belgrade is so one-sided—in Tito's favour—as to make one hesitant about relying on the rest of the book. '. . . the failure of the non-bloc [*sic*] states collectively and of Tito personally to criticise the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing raised a storm of protest in the United States. The US Embassy . . . apparently anticipated, on the basis of unofficial Yugoslav comments, that Tito's speech to the Conference would be pleasing to the United States. Actually, Tito in his remarks to the Conference not only said little new but was in some ways less critical of the West than he had been on certain previous occasions. There might be reasons for a re-evaluation of relations with Belgrade, but unless the Kennedy Administration was to revert to an extreme form of the Dulles doctrine—that neutralism was immoral—it was difficult to see why the 1961 Conference was among them.'

Now the fact is that it was Ambassador Kennan himself who received explicit assurances from Tito himself regarding both his speech (of which Kennan had been shown a draft) and his handling of the conference in general. The result was that when Tito at the last moment went back on his assurances—after hurried negotiations with the Russians—Kennan, who had hitherto been most active in pressing for an understanding and benevolent attitude towards Tito, became absolutely infuriated and pressed for reappraisal of the State Department's Yugoslav policies. The text of Tito's speech at the conference was far from neutral; perhaps even more important, he and his delegation took the lead in pressing and urging the other delegations to adopt strongly anti-Western and pro-Soviet resolutions, in such a manner as to evoke the articulate admiration of the Cuban delegation while antagonising many of the more neutral among the neutralists; there are no secrets at this kind of jamboree. In many ways, the 1961 conference foreshadowed the present Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement at a party level, which confounds many of the authors' predictions and evaluations.

The chapter on 'Totalitarianism and Democracy' is a curious mixture of apologetics, evasion, and contradiction. As might be expected, we are told that 'The relaxation of totalitarianism in Yugoslavia cannot be adequately judged by Western standards . . .'

The book has little of interest to add on the questions of party control, and never poses the question whether there can conceivably be administrative decentralisation so long as the party holds the monopoly of real power. Its assurances that the workers' councils wield real power are not substantiated. Though this is a difficult subject to probe, there is a good deal of evidence which the authors ignore, particularly the experience of Westerners who deal with Yugoslav investment decisions, and have assured this reviewer that on no occasion were the managerial and technical personnel who negotiated and decided on the acquisition of new equipment accompanied or advised by members of workers' councils.

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IN BRIEF *

John A. Armstrong, **Ukrainian Nationalism.** Columbia University Press, London and New York. 1963. 56s.
The second edition of a book first published in 1955 that has established itself as the standard work on the subject. Professor Armstrong is at times somewhat uncritical about the activities and ideology of the Ukrainian Nationalists. There are important additions and revisions.

Robert C. North, **Moscow and Chinese Communists.** Stanford University Press and Oxford University Press. 1963. 60s.
A new edition of this well-known short history of Chinese communism which includes two new chapters.

Kurt Marko, **Sic et Non.** Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden. 1962. DM. 30.
An interesting attempt to provide a critical dictionary of some of the most frequently used terms of Marxism-Leninism.

Theodore E. Kruglak, **The two faces of Tass.** University of Minnesota. 1962.
A survey of the activities of the official Soviet news agency founded under a different name in 1918.

Günther Nollau, **Zerfall des Welt-kommunismus.** Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Köln. 1963.
An analytical review of developments within the communist camp during the last few years.

David Shapiro (compiler), **A Select Bibliography of Works in English on Russian History 1801–1917.** Basil Blackwell. 1962.
A useful work of reference of the more important books and some relevant articles.

Paul L. Horecky (editor), **Basic Russian Publications.** University of Chicago Press, London. 1963. 48s.
A selected and annotated bibliography on Russian and Soviet history, the political and social sciences and the humanities.

Chalmers A. Johnson, **Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power:** The emergence of Revolutionary China 1937–1945. Oxford, Stanford University Press. 1962. 35s.
A study of Chinese communism between 1937 and 1945 with particular reference to the agrarian question and the peasant movement.

Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, **A History of Russia.** Oxford University Press. 1963. 64s.
A new comprehensive textbook of Russian history 'developed through teaching' and intended to be a basic text.

Gillian King (editor), **Documents on International Affairs 1959.** Oxford University Press. 1963. 90s.
This most recent collection of documents includes a long section on Soviet and Chinese foreign policy and also documents concerning the Warsaw Treaty Powers.

* Inclusion in this list does not preclude a fuller review in a subsequent issue.

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Thomas P. Whitney (editor), **Khrushchev Speaks.** University of Michigan Press. 1963. $7.50.
A useful collection of Mr Khrushchev's most important speeches on a variety of topics from 1949 to 1961.

Heinz Abosch, **Menace of the Miracle.** Collets, London. 1962. 25s.
A hostile but well documented account of West German history from 1945 to 1959, written from a pro-communist but not party-line viewpoint.

Robert C. North and Xenia J. Eudin, **M. N. Roy's Mission to China.** Cambridge University Press, University of California Press. 1963. $7.50.
The documents about the Communist-Kuomintang split of 1927, with a long introduction on M. N. Roy's role.

Oliver Henry Radkey, **The Sickle under the Hammer.** London, Columbia University Press. 1963. 72s.
The second volume, immensely detailed and hardly likely to be superseded, of the history of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party in 1917 and 1918.

Abram Bergson, Simon Kuznets (editors), **Economic Trends in the Soviet Union.** Harvard University Press, Oxford University Press. 1963. 78s.
A collection of essays by eight leading students of the Soviet economy on economic growth under the five-year plans.

Richard F. Staar, **Poland 1944–1962.** Louisiana State University Press. 1963. $7.50.
An analysis by a political scientist of the structure and dynamics of the Polish Government, the Polish Communist Party, and the influence of other groups, such as the Catholic Church.

J. K. Zawodny, **Death in the Forest.** University of Notre Dame Press. 1962. $6.50.
An account of the Katyn affair based on all sources now available.

Günther Specovius, **Die Russen sind anders.** Econ-Verlag, Düsseldorf, Wien. 1963.
An attempt to produce a German version of 'Inside Russia' covering a wide variety of subjects with many illustrations and cartoons, but not altogether satisfactory.

Günther Nollau and Hans-Jürgen Wiehe, **Rote Spuren im Orient: Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan.** Cologne. 1963.
The authors made a tour of these three non-Arab countries of the Middle East bordering the USSR to investigate the extent of communist influence and the strength of neutralism in the area. Their findings are placed in a useful historical setting.

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SUMARIO

EL MATERIALISMO ZOOLOGICO, por Pedro Gringoire—EL CENTENARIO DE LA EMANCIPACION, por Allan Nevins—LAS TRES ANARQUIAS ARGENTINAS, por M. I. C. de Monner Sans—*PERFIL DE UN HOMBRE DE ESTADO*, por Víctor Alba—LAS CONDICIONES DE VIDA DEL CAMPESINO DOMINICANO, por Alberto Arredondo y Carlos M. Campos—TRES PROTUESTAS DE UN "VISIONARIO", por Felipe Herrera—HAMBRE Y EXPLOSION DEMOGRAFICA, por A. Boix y Vallicrosa—LOS NUEVOS AMOS, por José Vázquez Amaral—NADA (relato), por Elvira Orphée—AGUJA DE MAREAR: Cómo nos ven—Homo sapiens—In memoriam—Fichas—Biblioteca—

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SURVEY

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Introduction

Pictures from an Exhibition *R. Etiemble*

From Amis to Waugh *Ronald Hingley*

Music *Fred K. Prieberg*

Repercussions in East Germany *Heinz Kersten*

Recent Hungarian Writing *George Gomori*

Document: Literaturnaya Gazeta *R. Samarin*

Sociology and the Social Scene

Sociology as a Vocation *Leopold Labedz*

Sovkhoz Kuban *Allen Ballard*

Soviet Medical Institutions *Mark G. Field*

The Soviet School Today *Frederic Lilge*

Marriage and Divorce *Peter Juviler*

Opinion Polls *Emilia Wilder*

The Dialectics of Polycentrism *Melvin Croan*

Anti-Komintern *Walter Laqueur*

Kremlin and Vatican *Miklos Veto*

Views and Reviews

Darkness at Noon revisited—The Warsaw Rising—
The Kurdish Republic—Yugoslavia—Hungary 1956

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